HS2 Project

28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

The Department and HS2 Ltd’s failure to work together effectively is starkly illustrated by them not being able to agree how much HS2 will cost. The Department and HS2 Ltd have still not agreed on how much it will cost to complete Phase 1. They are yet to reach agreement on the methodology and assumptions that underpin their cost estimates. This has been exacerbated by HS2 Ltd failing to ensure it receives reliable data from its supply chain. The existing budget, set in 2019, is no longer via...

The Department and HS2 Ltd’s failure to work together effectively is starkly illustrated by them not being able to agree how much HS2 will cost. The Department and HS2 Ltd have still not agreed on how much it will cost …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

Over the last decade the Department and HS2 Ltd have repeatedly said they are learning lessons but there is little evidence that lessons have been applied effectively and mistakes avoided. Since 2013, the Department and HS2 Ltd have told the Committee that they have been learning lessons. This has included areas such as around management of costs and schedule. The Department and HS2 Ltd say that they are still drawing on work already completed on HS2 to learn lessons for future delivery and h...

Over the last decade the Department and HS2 Ltd have repeatedly said they are learning lessons but there is little evidence that lessons have been applied effectively and mistakes avoided. Since 2013, the Department and HS2 Ltd have told the …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Transport (the Department) and High Speed Two Limited (HS2 Ltd) on the current state of the High Speed Two (HS2) programme.1 The Department is the programme’s sponsor, responsible for funding and overseeing delivery. HS2 Ltd, an arm’s–length body of the department, is responsible for delivering an operational railway.2

On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Transport (the Department) and High Speed Two Limited (HS2 Ltd) on the current state of the High Speed Two (HS2) programme.1 …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

We were told by HS2 Ltd that it would take time to implement the changes needed as part of the programme’s fundamental reset, with all of 2025 needed to ensure the organisation’s activities are all orientated towards delivering Phase 1. HS2 Ltd estimated that the reset would not be complete, with an “assured contractualised baseline” that can be properly measured against, until mid–2026. The Department also explained that the reset will include a re–evaluation and refreshing of the business c...

We were told by HS2 Ltd that it would take time to implement the changes needed as part of the programme’s fundamental reset, with all of 2025 needed to ensure the organisation’s activities are all orientated towards delivering Phase 1. …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

The Department and HS2 Ltd still disagree on the estimated total costs for completing the programme. Despite using the same data, the Department and HS2 Ltd told us that estimates differ because they disagree over a range of technical factors relating to the methodology used for the estimates and assumptions used, for example over the value of remaining risks on the programme and productivity savings.16 HS2 Ltd also had limited cost information from the supply chain, which reduced its ability...

The Department and HS2 Ltd still disagree on the estimated total costs for completing the programme. Despite using the same data, the Department and HS2 Ltd told us that estimates differ because they disagree over a range of technical factors …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

Both the Department and HS2 Ltd told us that they were working together to reach an agreed methodology including drawing on third–party technical advice on cost estimation and, to ensure that the underpinning assumptions of future estimates are agreed, establishing an oversight group with HM Treasury representation.18 The Department expressed confidence that there would be agreement on the methodology in the coming two to three months.19

Both the Department and HS2 Ltd told us that they were working together to reach an agreed methodology including drawing on third–party technical advice on cost estimation and, to ensure that the underpinning assumptions of future estimates are agreed, establishing …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

Prior to the October 2023 announcement, HS2 Ltd estimated that the total costs of Phase 1 would be £49 billion to £57 billion. The Department’s estimate was lower, at £45 billion to £54 billion but still above the funding envelope of £44.6 billion set in 2019. These estimates were all calculated 14 Qq 72–73 15 Qq 5, 37, 39 16 Qq 1, 6–7, 12 17 C&AG’s Report, Figure 8 18 Qq 6, 9, 13 19 Q 12 12 using 2019 prices.20 HS2 Ltd has continued to assess the cost of the programme and provided an even hi...

Prior to the October 2023 announcement, HS2 Ltd estimated that the total costs of Phase 1 would be £49 billion to £57 billion. The Department’s estimate was lower, at £45 billion to £54 billion but still above the funding envelope …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

We expressed to the Department how unsatisfactory we found it that the cost estimates for completing the programme are still in 2019 prices. The Department agreed, telling us that it expects that any funding agreed at the spending review will be in current prices. It also explained that this will produce an increase in the estimated total programme cost in cash terms given that the adjustment will cover a period of time that has seen very high inflation, particularly in the construction secto...

We expressed to the Department how unsatisfactory we found it that the cost estimates for completing the programme are still in 2019 prices. The Department agreed, telling us that it expects that any funding agreed at the spending review will …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

The Department confirmed that as well as agreeing a revised cost for the programme with HS2 Ltd, there will also be challenge from HM Treasury before a revised budget for the programme can be set. It told us that HM Treasury is already closely engaged and an important step in determining the eventual cost of the programme will be the upcoming spending review. As part of that, the Department will need to agree with the Treasury what the funding profile for the programme will be for the remaind...

The Department confirmed that as well as agreeing a revised cost for the programme with HS2 Ltd, there will also be challenge from HM Treasury before a revised budget for the programme can be set. It told us that HM …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

The Department emphasised the need for a long–term spending profile for the completion of HS2, acknowledging to us that agreeing annual budget settlements was really poor for long–term infrastructure delivery.26 20 C&AG’s Report, para 4.6 and 4.7; Department for Transport, HS2 6 monthly report to Parliament: October 2020, 13 October 2020 21 Q 7; Department for Transport, HS2 6-monthly report to Parliament: December 2024, 17 December 2024 22 Qq 23–25 23 Transport Committee, Oral evidence: HS2:...

The Department emphasised the need for a long–term spending profile for the completion of HS2, acknowledging to us that agreeing annual budget settlements was really poor for long–term infrastructure delivery.26 20 C&AG’s Report, para 4.6 and 4.7; Department for Transport, …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

HS2 Ltd acknowledged that it has not managed these contract risks in an optimal or coherent way.30 In September 2023, HS2 Ltd estimated that the forecast cost of main civil construction work alone had increased by £6 billion (2019 prices) since 2020.31 27 Q 35; Department for Transport, HS2 6-monthly report to Parliament: December 2024, 17 December 2024 28 C&AG’s Report, High Speed Two: A progress update, Session 2019–20, HC 40, 24 January 2020 29 Committee of Public Accounts, High Speed 2: S...

HS2 Ltd acknowledged that it has not managed these contract risks in an optimal or coherent way.30 In September 2023, HS2 Ltd estimated that the forecast cost of main civil construction work alone had increased by £6 billion (2019 prices) …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

The Department strongly agreed, however, about how the balance between compliance and cost should be considered when delivering national infrastructure in the future.41 HS2 Ltd also recognised that it was a complex issue and a sensitive area, telling us that the structure needed local planning permission from Buckinghamshire Council which led to at least a four–year delay which was eventually resolved by the planning inspector.42

The Department strongly agreed, however, about how the balance between compliance and cost should be considered when delivering national infrastructure in the future.41 HS2 Ltd also recognised that it was a complex issue and a sensitive area, telling us that …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

HS2 Ltd also acknowledged in evidence to the previous Committee in November 2023 that it that it needed to think about its capacity and capability throughout the company to deliver the task ahead.47 While HS2 Ltd’s focus in recent years has been on civil engineering, it has been 44 Q17; Letter from HS2 Ltd dated 10 January 2025 45 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, Planning proposals to unblock vital infrastructure and d...

HS2 Ltd also acknowledged in evidence to the previous Committee in November 2023 that it that it needed to think about its capacity and capability throughout the company to deliver the task ahead.47 While HS2 Ltd’s focus in recent years …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

HS2 Ltd now has new leadership, with Mark Wild appointed as the new Chief Executive Officer and taking up the role in December 2024. He brings his experience of delivering Crossrail into operation and is tasked with delivering the programme’s reset.49 He told us that the three things that he needs to do with HS2 Ltd are: reinforce its capability, particularly commercial management in the teams that are managing the contractors, bear down on costs and drive productivity; create an organisation...

HS2 Ltd now has new leadership, with Mark Wild appointed as the new Chief Executive Officer and taking up the role in December 2024. He brings his experience of delivering Crossrail into operation and is tasked with delivering the programme’s …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

Since 2013, the Department and HS2 Ltd have told the Public Accounts Committee that they have been learning lessons from other major programmes to apply to how they are managing the HS2 programme. For example, in 2019, the Department and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority published a ‘Lessons for the sponsorship of major projects’ report that drew from the Department’s experiences, and the Department told the previous committee that it was embedding the 24 lessons across its portfolio....

Since 2013, the Department and HS2 Ltd have told the Public Accounts Committee that they have been learning lessons from other major programmes to apply to how they are managing the HS2 programme. For example, in 2019, the Department and …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

However, the Committee has needed to recommend repeatedly that the Department and HS2 Ltd improve the degree they reflect on past or current experiences and implement any lessons. In 2020, the previous Committee made clear its dissatisfaction: 80 “Given the repeated emergence of issues across the Department’s major programmes, we are not satisfied that the Department is yet embedding the lessons it has learned to date.”

However, the Committee has needed to recommend repeatedly that the Department and HS2 Ltd improve the degree they reflect on past or current experiences and implement any lessons. In 2020, the previous Committee made clear its dissatisfaction: 80 “Given the …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

The previous Public Accounts Committee also concluded in its 2023 report on HS2 Euston that it was another example of the Department making the same mistakes and failing to learn lessons from its management of other major rail programmes, highlighting the need for more work on cost estimation, the treatment of contingency and managing the integration of complex projects.81 78 Committee of Public Accounts, High Speed 2: Spring 2020 update, Third Report of Session 2019–21, HC 84, 17 May 2020 79...

The previous Public Accounts Committee also concluded in its 2023 report on HS2 Euston that it was another example of the Department making the same mistakes and failing to learn lessons from its management of other major rail programmes, highlighting …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

The Department told us that, together with HS2 Ltd, it has worked with HM Treasury and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority to consider all the lessons to date from the HS2 programme but is continuing to ‘mine’ the lessons learned from HS2. The Department also expects the Major Transport Project Governance and Assurance Review to identify lessons from the programme.82

The Department told us that, together with HS2 Ltd, it has worked with HM Treasury and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority to consider all the lessons to date from the HS2 programme but is continuing to ‘mine’ the lessons learned …

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28 Feb 2025 | Committee report linked

The Department reflected that a key lesson from the experience of HS2, and which needs to inform all the Department’s future infrastructure plans, is that the Department needs to be very clear when it sets out on a large project what it is there to achieve. Changing the scope significantly when a project is already underway has a financial cost to it and the Department told us that the escalation of costs seen with HS2 reflects an obvious lesson of “to have a plan and stick to it.”83

The Department reflected that a key lesson from the experience of HS2, and which needs to inform all the Department’s future infrastructure plans, is that the Department needs to be very clear when it sets out on a large project …

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7 Feb 2024 | Committee report linked

Costs have continued to escalate and the Department and HS2 Ltd do not know how much the programme will now cost. This Committee has repeatedly raised concerns about the Department’s and HS2 Ltd’s management of costs. But, despite our warnings and recommendations, costs have continued to rise. The Department’s estimate of how much it will cost to complete Phase 1 is now £45 billion to £54 billion (in 2019 prices), above a budget of £44.6 billion that had been reset only three years previously...

Costs have continued to escalate and the Department and HS2 Ltd do not know how much the programme will now cost. This Committee has repeatedly raised concerns about the Department’s and HS2 Ltd’s management of costs. But, despite our warnings …

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7 Feb 2024 | Committee report linked

In our previous reports we have regularly raised concerns about escalating costs and cost forecasts for the HS2 programme. For example, in our May 2020 report we commented that “The High Speed Two programme has gone badly off-course and is now estimated to cost up to £88 billion, significantly more than the original budget of £55.7 billion (both figures are 2015 prices)”.20 In our September 2021 report we noted that “The programme’s funding was reset in 2020 and is now expected to cost a tota...

In our previous reports we have regularly raised concerns about escalating costs and cost forecasts for the HS2 programme. For example, in our May 2020 report we commented that “The High Speed Two programme has gone badly off-course and is …

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7 Feb 2024 | Committee report linked

HS2 Ltd’s most recent estimate for the cost of Phase 1 is that it will be in the range £49 billion to £57 billion (2019 prices). It cites a range of issues as the cause of increases, including “design performance, delivery productivity, consenting delays, and a difficult operating environment with COVID-19 and the Ukraine War affecting the supply chain.” In particular it also cites the increased cost of ‘Main Work Civils’. The Government disagrees with this forecast because a) it was drawn up...

HS2 Ltd’s most recent estimate for the cost of Phase 1 is that it will be in the range £49 billion to £57 billion (2019 prices). It cites a range of issues as the cause of increases, including “design performance, …

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7 Feb 2024 | Committee report linked

HS2 Ltd told us that its cost estimate had been the result of much detailed analysis and many meetings, all done transparently with the Department. It told us that while Ministers had committed to an opening date between 2029 and 2033, HS2 Ltd was well within that range at the moment, and was aiming for 2030.24 The Department said that it had worked off the same data and been in the same meetings as HS2 Ltd when coming up with its own overlapping but lower forecast range of costs. But it said...

HS2 Ltd told us that its cost estimate had been the result of much detailed analysis and many meetings, all done transparently with the Department. It told us that while Ministers had committed to an opening date between 2029 and …

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7 Feb 2024 | Committee report linked

To explain cost increases since 2020, the Department pointed to several factors including: Covid, inflation, Ukraine, the supply chain and the scale of the cost of dealing with ‘planning and consenting’. It said that poor cost information and cost reporting from the supply chain had been a significant contributing factor, and that financial and risk management broadly had not been as robust and as good as it needed to be. The Department acknowledged the need for HS2 Ltd to focus on building t...

To explain cost increases since 2020, the Department pointed to several factors including: Covid, inflation, Ukraine, the supply chain and the scale of the cost of dealing with ‘planning and consenting’. It said that poor cost information and cost reporting …

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7 Feb 2024 | Committee report linked

The Department’s November 2023 update to Parliament stated that “No decisions have been made on the train service that will run when HS2 is operational.”33 The Department told us it had developed “an outline train specification that sets out an assumed service”, but before bringing it into service there would need to be proper consultation nearer the time. Final decisions would need to take account of the economic conditions and the demand at the time. It explained that some assumptions are m...

The Department’s November 2023 update to Parliament stated that “No decisions have been made on the train service that will run when HS2 is operational.”33 The Department told us it had developed “an outline train specification that sets out an …

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7 Jul 2023 | Committee report linked

The Department and HM Treasury have not reached a clear understanding about how they would manage high levels of inflation on the HS2 programme, including accessing Government-held contingency. In the 2022 Autumn Statement, HM Treasury confirmed that departments needed to absorb the higher costs from inflation within existing cash budgets. In response the Department has paused some of its capital projects including Euston. However, the risk from high inflation will continue to be an issue on ...

The Department and HM Treasury have not reached a clear understanding about how they would manage high levels of inflation on the HS2 programme, including accessing Government-held contingency. In the 2022 Autumn Statement, HM Treasury confirmed that departments needed to …

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7 Jul 2023 | Committee report linked

The Department’s reports to Parliament on the HS2 Programme did not reflect the significant level of uncertainty in its estimated cost of Euston station. From October 2020 through to its six-monthly update in October 2022, the Department HS2 Euston 7 has reported to Parliament that the cost pressure at Euston was around £400 million, and the focus of its accompanying narrative was that work was ongoing to reduce this. However, this reported cost pressure is less than one-fifth of the £2.2 bil...

The Department’s reports to Parliament on the HS2 Programme did not reflect the significant level of uncertainty in its estimated cost of Euston station. From October 2020 through to its six-monthly update in October 2022, the Department HS2 Euston 7 …

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7 Jul 2023 | Committee report linked

The Department told us that, although budgets are now set, it continues to have discussions with HM Treasury about how it manages inflation on programmes like HS2 in order to deal with any issues that may arise later in the year. The Department also acknowledged the value for money implications of any further reduction in spending during the year, telling us that it and HM Treasury recognise that for such programmes it is ‘almost impossible—and certainly impossible in a way that is consistent...

The Department told us that, although budgets are now set, it continues to have discussions with HM Treasury about how it manages inflation on programmes like HS2 in order to deal with any issues that may arise later in the …

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7 Jul 2023 | Committee report linked

One potential source of additional funding to help manage higher costs from inflation and also higher costs at Euston is the government-held £4.3 billion contingency. This was set by the Department in 2020 as part of the £44.6 billion budget for the whole of Phase One.42 The Department told us that it had no expectation on what this contingency would have been needed for when it was established. However, it is also unclear on what it could be used for, with the Department acknowledging that i...

One potential source of additional funding to help manage higher costs from inflation and also higher costs at Euston is the government-held £4.3 billion contingency. This was set by the Department in 2020 as part of the £44.6 billion budget …

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7 Jul 2023 | Committee report linked

In response to our May 2020 recommendation on the lack of transparency on the HS2 programme, the Department began providing six-monthly reports to Parliament on progress, including on costs.44 The Department published its first update in October 2020 and, on Euston, reported that design work was indicating a ‘cost pressure’ or overspend 37 Q 34; C&AG’s Report, para 12 38 Committee of Public Accounts, Oral evidence, High Speed 2: 2022 Spring Update, HC 51,16 May 2022; Q92 39 Q 109; C&AG’s Repo...

In response to our May 2020 recommendation on the lack of transparency on the HS2 programme, the Department began providing six-monthly reports to Parliament on progress, including on costs.44 The Department published its first update in October 2020 and, on …

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7 Jul 2023 | Committee report linked

However, HS2 Ltd’s latest cost estimate of £4.8 billion is significantly higher than previously reported, at £2.2 billion over the budget.49 The Department told us that it did not know of the £4.8 billion estimate until HS2 Ltd reported it to them during February and March 2023.50 Prior to that, the Department noted that HS2 Ltd had been reporting a cost estimate of £3.3 billion, within a range of £2.6 billion to £3.6 billion.51 It acknowledged that this cost pressure was ‘slightly greater’ t...

However, HS2 Ltd’s latest cost estimate of £4.8 billion is significantly higher than previously reported, at £2.2 billion over the budget.49 The Department told us that it did not know of the £4.8 billion estimate until HS2 Ltd reported it …

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7 Jul 2023 | Committee report linked

HS2 Ltd explained that it had not expected to have an estimate of costs that it was confident in until the end of 2022 following work by the construction partner on a detailed, ‘bottom-up’ costing of the design.55 This followed the two-stage procurement process that HS2 Ltd told us it is employing on the HS2 programme, where the construction partner is first appointed based on capability and suitability and then works with HS2 Ltd to develop a design and agree a target price for construction....

HS2 Ltd explained that it had not expected to have an estimate of costs that it was confident in until the end of 2022 following work by the construction partner on a detailed, ‘bottom-up’ costing of the design.55 This followed …

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7 Jul 2023 | Committee report linked

Prior to our evidence session, the Department had published its latest six-monthly update to Parliament in October 2022. It did not publish an update six months later in March 2023. Following our evidence session on 24 April 2023, the Department published its next six-monthly update on the HS2 programme on 19 June 2023.58 Our sister committee, the Transport Committee, held a session with the Department two days later, where it asked why the update had been delayed. The Department explained th...

Prior to our evidence session, the Department had published its latest six-monthly update to Parliament in October 2022. It did not publish an update six months later in March 2023. Following our evidence session on 24 April 2023, the Department …

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27 Jul 2022 | Committee report linked

Local stakeholders and the Government have very different views on the likely merit and cost of the underground station option at Manchester Piccadilly. There are considerable cost and practical challenges to delivering this solution, though we recognise the benefits of a through station and saving land for development. We have heard concerns that there has been a lack of direct engagement and a paucity of detail shared about the basis for the Government’s decision not to opt for an undergrou...

Local stakeholders and the Government have very different views on the likely merit and cost of the underground station option at Manchester Piccadilly. There are considerable cost and practical challenges to delivering this solution, though we recognise the benefits of …

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29 Oct 2021 | Committee report linked

In August 2020, Crossrail Ltd announced that up to £1.1 billion of further funding would be needed to complete the programme. In December 2020, the government agreed to loan the Greater London Assembly (GLA) £825 million to complete the programme, which represented the limit of what the GLA could prudently borrow.32 This additional funding brought total funding for Crossrail Ltd to £15,790 million.33 To date, the Department has provided £2,875 million of loans to Crossrail Ltd to complete the...

In August 2020, Crossrail Ltd announced that up to £1.1 billion of further funding would be needed to complete the programme. In December 2020, the government agreed to loan the Greater London Assembly (GLA) £825 million to complete the programme, …

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29 Oct 2021 | Committee report linked

In April 2019 we reported that the Department, TfL and the previous Crossrail Ltd management team had focussed on a fixed delivery date of December 2018, which led to warning signs that programme was in trouble being missed or ignored.45 The Department told us that it was not falling into the trap of past behaviours which is why it is presenting the opening date as a range.46 However, with the expected opening window of services fast approaching, passengers and businesses will need clarity on...

In April 2019 we reported that the Department, TfL and the previous Crossrail Ltd management team had focussed on a fixed delivery date of December 2018, which led to warning signs that programme was in trouble being missed or ignored.45 …

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29 Oct 2021 | Committee report linked

The Department also referred to the lessons it and HS2 Ltd have learnt from the difficulties Crossrail had in integrating the 36 main works contracts and ensuring that they work together. Informed by the Crossrail experience, at our June 2021 session on HS2, HS2 Ltd and the Department told us of their different approach to contracting for railway systems, which involves an alliance approach.63 However, the Department has not demonstrated to us in practical terms what it is doing differently i...

The Department also referred to the lessons it and HS2 Ltd have learnt from the difficulties Crossrail had in integrating the 36 main works contracts and ensuring that they work together. Informed by the Crossrail experience, at our June 2021 …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

HS2 Ltd has started planning how it will integrate its systems for Phase One to ensure the railway works, but this is an inherently risky part of the programme. We previously raised concerns that, given the scale of the programme and its future impact on the rail network, if the Department does not give enough attention to managing the interdependencies within HS2 and other rail programmes, passengers and services would suffer. In addition to the stations and infrastructure, HS2 needs to ensu...

HS2 Ltd has started planning how it will integrate its systems for Phase One to ensure the railway works, but this is an inherently risky part of the programme. We previously raised concerns that, given the scale of the programme …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Transport (the Department) and High Speed Two Limited (HS2 Ltd) on the High Speed 2 programme.1 We also took evidence from the West Midlands Combined Authority, the National Infrastructure Commission and the Independent Construction Commissioner HS2 (the Commissioner).

On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Transport (the Department) and High Speed Two Limited (HS2 Ltd) on the High Speed 2 programme.1 We also took evidence from …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

In our 2020 report we recommended that the Department publish regular reports on progress to Parliament, including a realistic appraisal of the programme’s likelihood of delivering to budget and schedule.18 HS2 Ltd and the Department reported £0.8 billion in cost pressures in their most recent update to Parliament in March 2021.19 We therefore asked what they were doing to finalise and manage cost pressures to ensure that the programme kept within its revised budgets. HS2 Ltd told us that the...

In our 2020 report we recommended that the Department publish regular reports on progress to Parliament, including a realistic appraisal of the programme’s likelihood of delivering to budget and schedule.18 HS2 Ltd and the Department reported £0.8 billion in cost …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

Euston station is a key element of HS2 and will be an important transport hub and business area, with potential opportunities for economic regeneration at the wider site. It is intended to be the London terminus of the High Speed 2 programme, providing links to the existing railway, London Underground and other transport links.23 The build at Euston is complex, with the site positioned at a busy existing railway station in a dense city centre.24 It is currently expected to open between 2031 a...

Euston station is a key element of HS2 and will be an important transport hub and business area, with potential opportunities for economic regeneration at the wider site. It is intended to be the London terminus of the High Speed …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

We asked the Department what assurances it could give that whatever happened at Euston, it would not affect the delivery of the programme overall.36 The Department provided us with details of the assurance process it follows more broadly on the High Speed 2 programme, including lines of assurance within HS2 Ltd, the Department and the ministerial taskforce. The Department also told us that it has separated out its work on Euston from that on the rest of the programme, due to a specific set of...

We asked the Department what assurances it could give that whatever happened at Euston, it would not affect the delivery of the programme overall.36 The Department provided us with details of the assurance process it follows more broadly on the …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

The High Speed 2 programme has many interdependent elements, including stations, infrastructure and railway systems. We raised concerns in our previous report that, given the scale of the programme and its future impact on the rail network, if the Department does not give enough attention to managing the interdependencies within the programme and other rail programmes, passengers and other services could suffer.38 From Crossrail, we have also seen the problems that can arise from poor integra...

The High Speed 2 programme has many interdependent elements, including stations, infrastructure and railway systems. We raised concerns in our previous report that, given the scale of the programme and its future impact on the rail network, if the Department …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

The Department recognised two primary risks in relation to railway systems: the physical practicalities of different contractors working on the ground together; and, systems not integrating effectively.41 We asked HS2 Ltd how it planned to avoid the issues with railway systems experienced on the Crossrail programme. HS2 Ltd told us that in its capacity as system integrator, it had undertaken work to develop a reference design on which the work of all systems contracts should be based, and had...

The Department recognised two primary risks in relation to railway systems: the physical practicalities of different contractors working on the ground together; and, systems not integrating effectively.41 We asked HS2 Ltd how it planned to avoid the issues with railway …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

HS2 Ltd recognised that the integration of railway systems would be crucial and explained that it planned to establish a collaborative alliance amongst the main railway systems contractors to encourage them to work together to deliver the integrated systems. Although HS2 Ltd’s pre-contract market engagement found suppliers to be receptive to this approach, it also admitted this was a “bold” and “complex” approach.47 It told us this approach had not been used in the railway sector before, but ...

HS2 Ltd recognised that the integration of railway systems would be crucial and explained that it planned to establish a collaborative alliance amongst the main railway systems contractors to encourage them to work together to deliver the integrated systems. Although …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

The Department and HS2 Ltd have repeatedly promised that High Speed 2 will bring about a wide range of benefits that go beyond the increase in capacity and reduction of journey times on routes between major cities. These promised benefits include jobs, economic growth, investment and regeneration. The Department told us that High Speed 2 was not just a railway, but a “catalyst for investment, jobs and growth”, and that the strategic case for High Speed 2 depends on these promised economic ben...

The Department and HS2 Ltd have repeatedly promised that High Speed 2 will bring about a wide range of benefits that go beyond the increase in capacity and reduction of journey times on routes between major cities. These promised benefits …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

The Department and HS2 Ltd asserted that many of the jobs from the programme will go to those who live locally to construction sites. However, the West Midlands Combined Authority told us that of a high number of the jobs promised to be created from work at Delta Junction, just outside Birmingham, only 35 went to local people. HS2 Ltd told us that these 35 jobs related to a specific job advert issued by one of its contractors.52 We are also mindful of the experience of the London Olympics whe...

The Department and HS2 Ltd asserted that many of the jobs from the programme will go to those who live locally to construction sites. However, the West Midlands Combined Authority told us that of a high number of the jobs …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

HS2 Ltd told us that the nature of the High Speed 2 programme means that the work required for it will be disruptive. HS2 Ltd estimated it had handled 124,000 queries over the past three years and interacted with over 76,000 people along the route.63 The Independent Construction Commissioner HS2 (the Commissioner) told us that the complaints the programme had received so far had mainly been about disruption to roads and traffic, vegetation clearance and noise and vibration from construction a...

HS2 Ltd told us that the nature of the High Speed 2 programme means that the work required for it will be disruptive. HS2 Ltd estimated it had handled 124,000 queries over the past three years and interacted with over …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

In May 2021, the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman published a report that found that HS2 Ltd had misled and failed to communicate promptly and effectively with a family whose home was being purchased to make way for the railway.68 HS2 Ltd told us that although it had not accepted all the findings in the report, it had acknowledged and accepted the recommendations, and made good progress in its engagement with communities affected by the programme since.69 HS2 Ltd accepted that the r...

In May 2021, the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman published a report that found that HS2 Ltd had misled and failed to communicate promptly and effectively with a family whose home was being purchased to make way for the railway.68 …

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22 Sep 2021 | Committee report linked

HS2 Ltd told us that there had already been significant activity from environmental protests at various sites along the Phase One route. Most notably, protesters tunnelled beneath land owned by HS2 Ltd at Euston. HS2 Ltd told us that this disruption had cost it in the region of £75 million so far and had an impact on the programme. It recognised that those living on the HS2 route did not choose to live alongside the work, and that they had “every right” to peaceful protest but told us that it...

HS2 Ltd told us that there had already been significant activity from environmental protests at various sites along the Phase One route. Most notably, protesters tunnelled beneath land owned by HS2 Ltd at Euston. HS2 Ltd told us that this …

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22 Feb 2016 | Committee report Department for Transport linked

High Speed Rail (London–West Midlands) Act 2017 — Select Committee report: High Speed Rail (London - West Midlands) Bill Select Committee Second Special Report - pdf version

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