Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Committee (3rd Day)

Northern Ireland and Scottish legislative consent sought . Relevant document: 2nd Report from the Delegated Powers Committee .

15:45:00

Clause 17Requirements to have regard to the regulatory principles

Amendment 80

Moved by

80: Clause 17, page 21, line 34, leave out subsections (2) to (11) and insert— “(2) In section 3B (regulatory principles to be applied to both regulators), in subsection (1), at end insert—“(i) the need to consider climate risk;(j) the desirability of sustainable growth in the economy of the United Kingdom in the medium or long term.””

Baroness Northover (LD)My Lords, in moving Amendment 80 I shall also speak to Amendment 103. My name is also on Amendment 140, and I have no doubt that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, will expertly present that. I also support the other amendments in this group.

We experienced, of course, the most extraordinary heatwave last week, made so much more intense because our climate has already changed. It is now anticipated that we will never return to pre-industrial levels, yet, we have gone backwards on climate change and climate risk in this Bill. The Government may say that they have not, and that they want to ensure that the regulators are flexible in how they can tackle this challenge, but Clause 17 strips out all sorts of accountability arrangements in a number of areas. My noble friend Lady Bowles rightly argues that it simply should not stand part of the Bill.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said on day one in Committee that she concluded that in the Financial Services Act 2023, we failed to understand what the lack of EU oversight, as passed into UK law,

“meant for democratic oversight of what the regulators do with the powers that they acquire. We also failed to appreciate the scale of the task of holding the regulators to account.” ”.—[ Official Report , 22/6/26; cols. GC 193-4.] This has to be a major cause for concern to us across the broad range of powers we are passing to the regulators, especially as we do not even know what new rules will be drawn up for them. As my noble friend Lady Bowles said, again on the first day of Committee:

“Our system is not to delegate unconstrained power to regulators. Parliament sets the framework, regulators operate within it and, when necessary, the court interprets.” ”.—[ Official Report , 22/6/26; col. GC 197.] I know there will be a number of objections to what Clause 17 seeks to do, but in this group, we focus on the steps backwards that this represents in terms of climate risk, climate change and nature loss. I am extremely grateful to my noble friend Lady Kramer, who directed me towards the relevant page in an absolutely enormous tome which details the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, with all the subsequent amendments, so that I could see exactly what Clause 17 does. If you simply read the Bill or the Explanatory Notes, you would never quite know what was being deleted. Knocking out the regulatory principles eliminates the explicit reference to the desirability of sustainable growth in the UK economy in the medium to long term, and the need to contribute to achieving compliance with the Climate Change Act 2008, on net-zero emissions, and with Section 5 of the Environment Act, on environmental targets.

I am sure the Minister will say that when the rules are drawn up, or when the regulators work out their strategies, they are bound to look at climate risk, for example. But as the earlier debates on this Bill have shown, we are removing protections that were in place and handing them to the regulator, when regulators are so often found lacking. That is why I put down Amendment 80, and I am very grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and the noble Baroness, Lady Griffin, for their support on this amendment.

Our concern here is to reinsert the desirability of sustainable growth in the economy of the UK in the medium and long term, something we managed to get into the 2023 Act. Of course we should be doing this. These are the industries of the future, and that is what we need to do if we are not to drive climate change further, but we have added climate risk. As I mentioned at Second Reading, we know that a lax attitude to regulation helped to bring about the financial crash of 2008 with all its economic, political and social consequences; so, it is all very well saying that of course the regulators will do this, but we know that that is not necessarily so. Climate change is a current and future risk to the financial sector over both the short and long term. Therefore, we should be strengthening, not weakening, the regulations here.

This comes across very clearly from the report of the Adaptation Committee of the Climate Change Committee. The priority risks in the UK are intensifying heat, growing flood risk and rising drought and wildfire risk. The risk to the insurance industry is obvious. There is a report in today’s Times on subsidence and the likely increase in its incidence. It points out that the summer of 2025 was

“Britain’s hottest on record and also its most expensive for homeowners: insurance companies paid out £307 million for subsidence claims over the year, the highest ever amount, according to the Association of British Insurers”’

Moreover, many insurers are now becoming so risk-averse that they no longer cover subsidence, so that leaves the poor home owners on the hook. The Adaptation Committee points out that flood-related insurance claims are rising and that home insurers have paid out more in claims than they received in premiums for the five years to 2024. It notes that this will put stress on the financial sector as banks face higher default rates on mortgages and business loans, and this will then affect the housing market, just as happened with subprime mortgages. As the report states:

“Actions by FIs are needed to ensure that physical climate risks don’t disrupt the financial system”.

Therefore, it becomes vital that we ask the regulators to assess for climate risk. This should be in the Bill as this issue, sadly, is not going to go away.

For this reason, in Amendment 103—I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Griffin, for her support— we propose that the regulators make annual reports to the Treasury on how they have upheld their climate risk and environmental principles. The reports must explain what action they have taken to ensure that climate risk is embedded in their operations, processes and decision-making, and what rules and guidance they have therefore promulgated. The way this is done takes as its template the proposals in Clause 20. Moreover, it should not be just a matter of “having regard” to these issues; it should be informing their day-to-day work, due to the negative impacts already being witnessed on price stability, financial stability, market functioning and growth.

As I have said, I also support the other amendments in the group—which will be fully explained by others—to ensure that UK-related financial institutions develop and implement credible transition plans, as well as those in the name of my noble friend Lady Sheehan. I beg to move.

Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 83B and 86A, which appear in my name. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and to agree with a great deal of what she said. It is almost as if in the past week or so, the planet itself has been speaking to us and sending us a message that should direct the Committee’s deliberations on this Bill.

I will restrict myself to my two amendments, in the interests of time. I have been asked to table them by people who are gravely concerned about issues of corruption, dirty money, the “London laundromat” and associated security concerns. These are issues on which I do a considerable amount of work, and that is why I have this focus on this group.

These amendments are related. They seek to add both climate risk and the laundering of criminal gains causing environmental harms to the regulatory principles to which the FCA and PRA must have regard. I can pretty well hear the concerns about to be expressed some time soon about “have regard” amendments, but surely these are things that we have to think about. We have to make sure that we direct the regulators to think about climate and the laundering of criminal proceeds through the City and associated institutions.

I note that the Financial Action Task Force recognises environmental crimes as predicate offences for money laundering. The European Union has strengthened its criminal law framework through the environmental crime directive, requiring member states to publish a national strategy on combating environmental criminal offences by 2027.

Looking around the world, in 2018 the United States Treasury sanctioned the Zhao Wei transnational crime organisation and listed wildlife trafficking as one of the many illicit activities undertaken by the network. In Zambia, the economic and financial crimes division of the high court recently forfeited to the state a vast array of assets associated with a major illegal logging operation. Diplomatic momentum for a fourth protocol under the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime to address crimes against the environment is also advancing, with the support of the UK.

As a global financial centre, the UK has a particular responsibility to ensure that it is not supporting financial and environmental crimes globally and it should play an important role in achieving a stronger global approach. Evidently, however, although environmental crimes are recognised as serious at present, without an explicit recognition of this in the regulatory principles, the FCA and the PRA will not be equipped or directed to respond with the necessary action.

It is important to stress that this is also very much a security issue. There is clear evidence that environmental crime is not only associated with financial and organised crime but with terrorist and armed groups as well. For instance, the proscribed terrorist group al-Shabaab has historically benefited from the illicit charcoal trade in Somalia, with state actors also being complicit. More generally, Interpol has found that the proceeds of environmental crime have become the largest source of income for non-state armed groups and terrorist organisations. Without sufficient regulatory framework, the UK could be contributing to these very dangerous, deadly, human rights-abusing forces around the world.

So much of what is happening in the world is criminal. Between 2013 and 2019, about 69% of tropical forest agro-conversion was conducted in violation of national laws and regulations. This, of course, is also associated with human rights abuses. Perhaps this is sometimes less considered, but Interpol says that illegal mining generates up to $48 billion annually, frequently breaching environmental regulations and contributing again to deforestation, pollution, biodiversity loss and harm to local communities.

I have already mentioned illegal wildlife products. Interpol found that the black market for those is worth up to $20 billion annually, and up to 100 rangers are killed by poachers each year while protecting wildlife and habitats. It might seem a very long way from the City of London to the ranger desperately trying to protect the wildlife population in a national park in Africa, but those two things are linked. We bear responsibility here. I urge the Government to consider these amendments in order to put this back into the directions for the FCA and the PRA.

Baroness Hayman (CB)My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and to say that I broadly support the action that she is suggesting in Amendment 83B. Organised environmental crime, including illegal deforestation and wildlife crime, is increasingly acknowledged as a major source of illicit finance and money laundering. It is therefore important that the FCA and the PRA have the ability properly to take account of these risks within their existing anti-money laundering framework. I hope that we will get a positive response from the Government on that.

This group of amendments deals with the gaping hole, frankly, in the Bill on nature and climate considerations. I was going to speak more broadly about the importance of taking these into account—I may still do so in our stand part debate on Clause 17—but the noble Baroness, Lay Northover, did the Committee a great service in setting out very clearly, in her opening speech, the issues that we need to address with some urgency.

16:00:00

This feels rather depressing for those of us who were in this Room three years ago trying to make the argument that we needed to embed into financial regulation the recognition of the risks inherent in climate change and the need to remember that it will be impossible to achieve the economic growth that we are concerned about unless we also look to the medium and long term on climate. That is depressing.

Frankly, it fills me with sadness that we have lost the cross-party consensus we had three, four and five years ago on climate issues. It is not that we agreed on everything—there were differences on the speed of transition and the need for transitional measures—but we seem to be continuing to lose our understanding of the framework on which we were working in a non-partisan way. I very much appreciate and support what the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, said.

In this group, I have Amendment 140, and I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Northover, Lady Penn and Lady Griffin, for adding their names to it. At Second Reading, the Minister reaffirmed the Government’s

“ambition to position the UK as the leading hub for sustainable investment, leveraging our sustainable finance expertise to support transition and drive growth ”.—[ Official Report , 8/6/26; col. 1215.]

The Government have placed a huge amount of importance on achieving this aim through plans for mandating

“UK-regulated financial institutions (including banks, asset managers, pension funds and insurers) and FTSE 100 companies to develop and implement credible transition plans that align with the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement”.

That aim was repeated and included in the Government’s manifesto. However, we are now almost one year on from a consultation on this matter and remain no clearer as to what the next steps will entail or the timeframe that is envisaged. I have therefore tabled Amendment 140, which has received cross-party support, as I say, to help the Government to achieve that central objective, which the Minister says is at the heart of the Bill, by providing a mechanism to deliver this commitment in full within a given period.

If we are to achieve any of the objectives that the Government have set for unlocking the potential of the financial sector for green growth, we have to find a way to combine both the goals of growth and addressing climate change. The Government also identify that putting in place a transition plan would give them the ability to secure that win-win. The consultation itself described transition plans as

“a vital part of our commitment to secure Britain’s position as the green finance capital of the world. This offers a significant growth opportunity for the UK’s financial services sector”.

My concern—the reason I tabled this amendment—is whether we can afford to wait indefinitely for implementation, as seems to be the situation at the moment, because delaying a decision is not cost-free. Investors wanting to make decisions need visibility and certainty on how firms in the UK plan to manage climate-related risks, and to adapt their business models over the long term so that they are resilient to those risks. Lloyds Bank found that the majority of investors—68%—believe that a company’s transition plan is “important” or “very important” when considering an investment. The UK Sustainable Investment and Finance Association found that 95% of UK large financial firms would increase investment into the UK if regulatory changes, such as transition plans and sustainability standards, were implemented.

My Amendment 140 would give the Government an opportunity on transition plans. It would ensure that we avoid a scenario of protracted uncertainty for the private sector around whether implementation may be so piecemeal or partial that it does not bring about the level of transparency and consistency that investors need. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to say in his response that the Government will use the Bill to implement their given commitments on transition plans.

Baroness Sheehan (LD)My Lords, first, I apologise for being unable to take part at Second Reading due to other commitments. However, my interest in nature and climate-related issues in previous Bills on financial services and markets is a matter of record. Two amendments in this group are in my name. I thank my co-signatories, the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott, Lady Young of Old Scone and Lady Coffey, for their support because cross-party support sends an unequivocal message to government that this is not ideological but concerns the health of our environment and the future of our natural world.

I will speak first to Amendment 142 on the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures. In essence, it seeks to insert a duty into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000—FSMA—so that regulators must

“make rules requiring such regulated persons as they consider appropriate to disclose information relating to nature-related dependencies, impacts, risks and opportunities”.

Nature-related dependencies are things from nature on which businesses rely, such as water, soil, pollination and healthy ecosystems. Nature-related impacts are harms or pressures that companies themselves put on nature, such as through land use change, pollution or deforestation.

Clearly, nature is financially material, and nature is under threat. Investors are demanding comparable information on how nature loss, biodiversity, water, land use and similar issues could affect companies and profits. This amendment would deliver just that. It would tell the regulators to write the rules and decide which regulated persons should be in scope, shifting TFND reporting from a mainly voluntary framework towards a mandatory requirement. The Dasgupta review clearly showed us that nature is not an externality but an economic foundation. It is, quite frankly, utterly barmy to degrade the very assets on which markets depend.

Deforestation-driven biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse are high-level threats to UK national security, according to the Government’s own assessment in their report, Global Biodiversity Loss, Ecosystem Collapse and National Security . Four out of the six ecosystems identified as critical to the UK’s security are forests. I utterly endorse the excellent speech made by the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone, at Second Reading, in which she said that having

“a stiff gin by your side ”—[ Official Report , 8/6/26; col. 1190.] is necessary before reading the report.

Nature loss is no longer an environmental issue. It is a national security and market stability risk, and it must be treated with the urgency it deserves. Climate change is accelerating, as borne out last week by temperature records being broken daily. The measured carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere serve as the single best real-time signal of whether the world, as a whole, is on track to a safe future. It is currently at 430.52 parts per million. Pre-industrial levels hovered at around 280 parts per million and never went above 300 per million. We are in uncharted territory and we need urgent action. I look forward to the Minister’s response to Amendment 142.

Turning to Amendment 172, I again thank my co-signatories, the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott, Lady Young of Old Scone and Lady Penn, each of whom has been a consistent and persuasive advocate for regulatory coherence in addressing the urgent challenge of deforestation. This is a crisis with profound implications for the health of our planet and for those who depend on forest ecosystems, particularly indigenous communities, which are both their most effective stewards and, too often, their greatest victims. This amendment would introduce three clear and necessary measures. First, it would require that within three months of the passage of this Act

“the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament draft regulations under Schedule 17 … of the Environment Act 2021”

concerning the

“use of forest risk commodities in commercial activity”.

This provision addresses the unacceptable delay in bringing into force measures that Parliament has already approved five years ago. Secondly, it would ensure that at the point those regulations are laid,

“the Secretary of State must immediately commence”

the statutory review required under Section 79 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. That review is essential to understanding how financial systems intersect with and potentially drive deforestation risk. Thirdly, the amendment specifies that the regulations must include provision for both “due diligence requirements” and

“reporting obligations for regulated persons”.

The intention is straightforward but criticalto place due diligence and transparency at the centre of the regulatory framework. By making these elements explicit, the amendment would signal Parliament’s clear expectation that businesses will be subject not merely to guidance but to enforceable obligations, both to undertake robust supply-chain checks and to report publicly on their compliance. Furthermore, by aligning the introduction of these regulations with the commencement of the Financial Services and Markets Act review, the amendment would promote better co-ordination across government and ensure that market implications, including those for regulated financial institutions, are considered alongside the development of the regulatory regime itself.

As Sir Ian Cheshire, former chair of Barclays and head of the Global Resources Initiative taskforce, noted in his open letter of 23 January 2023, addressed to the then Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury and Members of this House, “regulating supply chains alone” is not sufficient. He recommended that the Government should make it unlawful

“for financial institutions to invest in or lend to … companies that are unable to demonstrate forest risk commodities have been produced in compliance with ‘local laws’”.

This amendment seeks in part to address that gap. It reflects the compelling case that it is more effective to require financial institutions to undertake due diligence at the point at which finance is first provided, rather than attempting to remedy harms further downstream.

Although I welcome the Government’s recent announcement that Northern Ireland will follow the EU’s deforestation regulations, due to come into force on 31 December 2026, and their stated ambition to align rules across Great Britain with those requirements, the position remains one of stated intent rather than concrete action. The commitment to consult on new regulations requiring larger businesses to ensure that forest-risk commodities are produced legally in their country of origin is a step forward, but it falls short of providing the firm timelines and enforceable measures that are now very overdue. It is, after all, five years since Parliament set out its expectation that illegal deforestation would be addressed in regulation. In that context, Amendment 172 remains both necessary and timely. I hope the Minister will accept that these measures are necessary now, not tomorrow—whenever tomorrow may be. My colleagues and I from across the House will push hard for that acceptance.

16:15:00

Before closing, I add that I support all amendments in this group, in particular Amendments 103 and 140. I give notice that I lend strong support to the Clause 17 stand part notice in the name of my noble friend Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. Her Second Reading speech was outstandingly clear and compelling.

The Lord Bishop of ManchesterMy Lords, I, too, support all the amendments in this group, but I will limit my remarks to Amendment 80, to which I have added my name. I note that I appear to be the only man to have signed any of the amendments in this group. I hope that does not mean that climate concern is now becoming divided on gender lines; climate risks are not sex specific. Perhaps I might encourage some other men to rise and support amendments in this group.

We have heard that Clause 17 will remove the requirement that the FCA and the PRA have regard to certain regulatory principles, including those relating to environmental obligations. As the climate crisis grows and public services are forced to adapt to a growing range of climate-related challenges, weakening such regulations is neither environmentally nor economically sustainable. The regulatory principles of the previous Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 were intended to ensure that climate risks were incorporated into regulators’ day-to-day decision-making. I am afraid that the evidence is not very good that they have been sufficiently incorporated in practice.

We have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, about deforestation. In 2022, a report from the Make My Money Matter campaign found that over 30% of UK pension fund public equity and corporate bond investments were in institutions with a high risk of causing deforestation. When I was chair of the board of the Church Commissioners, I was very proud that it was one of the major investors in sustainable forestry across the world and was constantly seeking to increase our investment in that sector as something that was doing climate good at the same time as making the returns we needed as an investment institution.

Deforestation is already a priority in the Government’s net zero strategy, but weak regulation has enabled the UK financial system to fuel climate destruction directly. If we weaken the existing framework, it will only move us further in the wrong direction. As the climate crisis deepens, we have a responsibility to exercise wise stewardship over our planet to ensure that the consequences of environmental degradation are not simply passed on to future generations. That, for me, is a theological point as much as a practical one. It can be done only if we embed climate and nature implications in financial decision-making at every level.

It is not just an environmental imperative; it is an economic one as well. Climate change presents significant challenges to the Bank of England in meeting its primary objectives of controlling inflation and ensuring financial stability. As we have heard from the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, climate change was responsible for a third of the UK’s high street food price inflation in 2023. Meanwhile, the UK recently experienced its worst inflationary crisis in four decades due to the price volatility of fossil fuels bought on the global market. Without action, vulnerable communities, including those in my own diocese of Manchester, will tend to bear the greatest weight of fluctuating prices and economic insecurity. I have just come from the launch earlier today of a new inquiry by the Trussell Trust into the need for food banks and why that, sadly, continues to be a growth area in our community. Why are people finding it harder and harder to afford to feed their households week on week, year on year?

The General Synod of the Church of England has set out ambitious targets for attaining net zero, recognising our responsibilities as God’s stewards of the planet. I note that similar robust targets have been set by the former mayor of Greater Manchester, where much of my diocese lies. I wonder whether the honourable Member for Makerfield will have, and indeed express, a view in the other place. In the meantime, we need to use every lever we have to bring human-made climate change under control—including this Bill. We should not make any legislative changes that act in a contrary manner. What is set out in Amendment 80 would not only remove the deregulatory changes in Clause 17 but strengthen regulatory responsibilities by embedding climate considerations in decision-making and making environmental responsibilities clearer. I hope the Minister will set out how climate risks will remain central to the decisions that regulators make, should this clause remain in the Bill.

Baroness Coffey (Con)My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 142, which I have signed, and Amendment 172, which I strongly support.

The whole concept of the TNFD follows on from the TCFD, but it has been driven and particularly supported by Defra over the past several years. As such, David Craig, who has been tremendous in promoting the TNFD, has started, just after another session of London Climate Action Week, to share the frustration of many that we already have the ISSB, which has made progress: at its April meeting, I think it agreed a way forward for its IFRS practice statement to start to be included automatically in accounting standards around the world. Indeed, we know that investors are now asking boards what they are doing about understanding their risk if certain things in nature start to change. That is, in effect, what the TNFD is about: it is not saying that you cannot do this, that or the other but about making sure that you think ahead. Why does it matter? Well, nature is at the very heart of the food we eat and pretty much every pharmaceutical we use. That is why it matters to start having this as a regular, ongoing way for the board of every business in this country to think about it.

I appreciate that there have been various difficulties over recent years when it comes to the subject of Amendment 172. I nearly got the regulations through, but then it was held up because of the issue involving Northern Ireland having to follow EU law and the then Administration finally deciding that they did not want, at the time, to try to work out a way for the two to be managed within the United Kingdom. That issue has been ongoing, and I appreciate that the Minister, Mary Creagh, announced a policy paper last week. I think it is fair to share with the Committee that the European Parliament itself voted to delay the implementation of the EUDR—which is about the forest risk commodities—and to start to restrict some of the elements that were being applied. Mary Creagh suggested that we would perhaps go further than our original suggestions on which commodities we would focus on to get these regulations into place.

Why does it matter? In values, the UK is second only to China in the importation of the products—the commodities—that risk deforestation. We took a pragmatic approach in the UK, in that we were not looking to do what the EU was trying to do, which was trying to make every product “deforestation free”. We took an approach of basically saying that you have to show that your products are not a result of illegal deforestation—at the time I thought that that was a pragmatic move, and I still do.

Again, it shows that we need to recognise the implications of what some of my noble friends may think unnecessary: we actually have responsibilities in a variety of conventions to which we have signed up, over the years, to recognise our role in supporting free trade around the world, while making sure that free trade is done in a responsible way. This is about trying to make sure that supply chains understand where their products have come from and to address that, if necessary, to make sure that their products are not, in effect, being sourced illegally.

On the basis of the two amendments tabled, I hope the Government will consider this further. Mary Creagh made an announcement last week about the Great British version of the EUDR, but apparently no regulation is due in your Lordships’ House until 2027. It is disappointing to hear about the slow work, especially as regulations were pretty much drafted three years ago. With that, I will support this amendment in Committee and if it is put to the test in the House on Report, I will support it then too.

Baroness Penn (Con)My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendment 140 on transition plans and Amendment 172 on forest risk commodities, to which I have added my name. On transition plans, I do not think it is really an interest to declare, but a reason I signed that amendment is that I was a Treasury Minister—in some ways a similar position to that of the Minister now fielding friendly questions from noble Lords—on the previous Financial Services and Markets Bill, in particular on parliamentary accountability. At the same time, I was also acting as co-chair of the Transition Plan Taskforce that worked collaboratively with businesses as well as NGOs and academics to produce the transition plan disclosure framework now hosted by the ISSB. I would like to emphasise the collaborative nature of that work and those involved in it.

This was not government writing a framework for business. The task force was co-chaired by Amanda Blanc of Aviva. Its membership included the London Stock Exchange Group, NatWest, Diageo and many other businesses—and, I think, the Church of England Pensions Board—all working together to develop the content of a framework that worked for business.

I also reiterate my commitment to the importance of climate risk and nature risk to our financial institutions and our financial regulation, and the importance of finding a way to incorporate that into our approach. I believe that disclosure has been important in driving change and will continue to be so. However, it is one of many different approaches. One success that came with TCFD was that it was part of a global move led by the UK that got all G7 countries to sign up to the same disclosure standards, creating somewhat of a level playing field. There is a question as to whether that momentum continues today and whether further action on disclosure is the right thing at this time, versus many of the other different levers that we can pull beyond the UK’s SRS S1 and S2, which were published earlier this year, and on which the FCA is currently consulting.

It is a legitimate and open question to think about how much further at this stage we want to go on disclosure. The Government, though, have a commitment in their manifesto to go further, saying that there should be mandatory transition plans aligned to 1.5 for all UK businesses. They consulted a year ago on that position, and we have had nothing since. I really want to join others in getting some clarity from the Government on what they think the right approach is. Is it further action on disclosure? Is it further action in other areas? To me, the fundamentals remain the same: climate change and nature risk are material to our financial system and its stability. We need more investment in our transition to a low-carbon economy. The UK is a leader in green finance and can be one in transition finance, too. How do we want to maintain and build on that?

I should like to hear how the Government want to achieve those aims. It may be through the different policies contained in the amendments here—it may not be. We have to have a more open discussion about the trade-offs involved in some of these areas: how you get businesses and Governments to recognise these risks, who pays for them, and how you spread those costs. I am not saying there is a single answer or, much as I would like to, that the answer I was working on three years ago continues to be the right answer. But clarity and articulation of the Government’s position, rather than nearly a year of silence, would be helpful in moving us forward in what continues to be a really important area for our country and for financial services regulation.

16:30:00

Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)If I might talk on this point, I have huge sympathy with the overall direction of where people want to go on this. Climate risk is clearly relevant for any financial manager managing the assets—the cash—of any ordinary citizen, be they a vicar of the Church of England or simply a worker setting money aside, and that needs to be taken into account.

Even if you do not buy that argument, there are financial risks that go with climate that need to be recognised—for example, assets that will become stranded if we responded to the climate crisis, which should not be recognised as being valuable today. By the way, if I were to find an institution that is a mile ahead of the regulation in trying to make this take place, the Church of England pension fund is exemplary of what it is that we want to do.

As I look at this, I find it rather ironic that we are focusing on the FCA. In the past five years, if there is a financial regulator that has taken steps forward on this, it is the FCA rather than the others. I think—I have tried to check on the internet—the UK now has the highest number of transition plans by companies, and the highest standard of transition plans by companies, of any country in the world. I want to celebrate the companies doing that and the senior appointments that the FCA put in place to make these sorts of things happen.

It might be a good idea for us to scratch our heads about those regulators that, even where there are clear rules on reporting on financially material matters, are finding it difficult to see them enforced. We might want to raise those sorts of issues as well as additional reporting. If it is additional reporting, as the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, said, let us be sure that we know that the extra reporting is bringing about some good.

In Amendment 80, and perhaps in some other amendments, there is a question about parliamentary oversight. Does the Minister consider that parliamentary oversight might be kept under review so that we know that we have a financial services industry that is properly responding to the risk of climate change, and might perhaps do some other things as well?

Baroness Kramer (LD)I shall be exceedingly brief because the position of my party has been so well-voiced by my noble friends Lady Northover and Lady Sheehan, and there is a great deal more to say in the clause stand part debate in today’s fourth group. My party has made it very clear that it has a deep commitment to the climate, nature and sustainability agenda. I am conscious that it has become quite fashionable in financial circles to say that this agenda should not be the concern of the Bank of England or of any of the regulators. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, can indicate to me where in the five-year strategy of the FCA he can find any reference to it, because I cannot.

Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)For five years, there has been a director of ESG at the Financial Conduct Authority who has specifically taken responsibility for ensuring that, where relevant, it is embedded in what the FCA is doing. Most of the feedback I get from the FCA and financial practitioners suggests that he is called Sacha Sadan, and that he had a senior role in financial services beforehand and has had considerable success in being able to do that. Is it perfect? No, I am sure it is absolutely not perfect. We have a long way to go, but I want to do something that says, “Let us celebrate some success when we have it”.

Baroness Kramer (LD)I always join in celebrating success but, from our perspective, this is a pivot moment away from what has been the practice and emphasis over the past several years. Indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said, there was consensus across the parties, with perhaps different strategies, but this appears to be a time when much of this has changed, or is about to change or is changing. I have to say that it makes absolutely no sense. Climate risk is so obviously a financial and economic stability risk, as indeed is the loss of nature and the issue of sustainable growth; surely “sustainable” belongs in growth programmes that we put in front of us.

I am also very conscious that the City and others, which have tended to have very short-term perspectives—typically the next quarter’s results—have voiced opposition to the inclusion of climate and nature in the financial regulators’ remit and that it should have the significance it has had to date, and I am very afraid that the Government are now responding to that particular set of views. Moving these regulatory principles from the Bill—from primary legislation—into a “have regard” for the five-year strategy strikes me as an acquiescence with those voices we are hearing from the City. To me, there is some confirmation in not finding a firm strand in the FCA’s own five-year strategy; that is its forward look, not its historic look backwards.

In a few minutes the Conservative Party will speak, and it will make its own position clear, but I understand that Kemi Badenoch has now said that her party, if in government, would scrap the Climate Change Act. That is a very significant change. I know it is motivated by fear of Reform, but it really has an impact on the overall discourse and the cross-party commitment we have had up to this point.

I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester—I think it was him, although I may have attributed this to the wrong person—that this is a very strange week in which to downgrade the significance of climate change. I happened to be in conversation with my daughter in the midst of last week’s heat. When I described what we were doing, she said, “I guess the universe has heard the intention and it’s decided to bite back”. I think it must have been the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, who made the remark; I am so sorry not to have recognised that.

I think that both Labour and the Conservatives hope that by Third Reading, we will have forgotten the extreme heat and they can reassert a much more convenient and easy agenda of pretending that climate change is no longer an issue of urgency. It has now dropped down the scale and there are other issues of much greater urgency on which we must focus, and this one can be largely set aside. But I and my party continue to look at it as a series of risks that will cause extraordinary pain to ordinary people in Britain, both relentlessly and increasingly—and not just to people in the UK but to far more vulnerable countries across the globe.

The Bank of England and the financial sector have crucial and powerful tools in their hands. Those tools are vital if we are to redesign our world to limit nature loss and climate change, and to ensure that we grow sustainably in the future. As the Bill is now structured, it takes away from those tools and will encourage their being regarded as secondary or tertiary instruments, to be used only when it does not irritate certain voices in the City of London. That is not appropriate for the legislation we pass today.

Lord Reay (Con)My Lords, I first declare that I own some shares in JP Morgan, where I used to work, and some energy shares, as set out in the register.

It will probably come as no surprise to the Committee that we broadly disagree with the approach taken in this group of amendments. Climate change is, of course, an important issue, but the question before us is not whether climate change matters but whether the answer is to place still more statutory duties, reporting requirements, disclosures and regulatory obligations on businesses and financial institutions in this country. I am not persuaded that it is.

Each of these amendments is no doubt well intentioned, but they point towards a model in which ever more public policy objectives are loaded on to regulators and then passed through into more paperwork, compliance, board time, legal advice and cost for firms. At a time when every week, the London Stock Exchange loses companies that decide to list in the US, is this really what we want to do?

Many of the businesses and organisations that would be affected by this kind of regulatory layering make very limited direct contribution to global emissions. Yet they may find themselves spending more and more time demonstrating compliance, producing reports, revising governance documents and satisfying regulatory expectations. That all has a cost. It takes resource away from investment, innovation, productivity and growth. It makes us all poorer.

We should also keep a sense of proportion. The United Kingdom’s territorial CO 2 emissions from fuel combustion are around 292 megatons a year. Those of China are around 13,125 megatons. China’s historical emissions within its borders have now caused more global warming than the 27 member states of the EU combined.

The UK can make a meaningful global contribution by developing and commercialising the technologies that reduce emissions at scale. However, we risk doing precisely the opposite if our response is simply to increase bureaucracy and the cost of compliance and regulation. Indeed, I believe that growth and competitiveness in this sector will be virtually impossible if mandatory 1.5% transition plans are introduced. At one stage, growth was the Government’s prime mission, and it is urgently needed to pay for Labour’s costly plans. It would not make sense for them to go down that path.

There is also the question of regulatory purpose. The FCA and the PRA already have substantial responsibilities. They are responsible for financial stability, prudential soundness, consumer protection, market integrity, competitiveness and growth. We should not ask them to become the delivery mechanism for ever wider public policy objectives. The more duties we give regulators, the less clear their priorities become. The more principles we add, the more difficult it becomes to know which objective should prevail when they come into tension. That does not make regulation better; it makes it more complex.

The Government should instead focus on making the UK an attractive place for climate-related innovation and investment. That means clear rules, proportionate regulation, a competitive market and an environment in which firms are incentivised to deploy capital into the technologies and infrastructure that will reduce emissions. In our view, the cumulative burden of existing kinds of climate and environmental reporting obligations placed on firms is quite high enough; the FCA and the PRA should remain focused on their core financial regulatory functions. For those reasons, we oppose the proposals in this group.

The Minister of State, Department for Business and Trade and HM Treasury (Lord Stockwood) (Lab): My Lords, I am thankful to noble Lords for their contributions. I specifically welcome the noble Lord, Lord Reay, who is making his first contribution on the Bill from the Front Bench.

There is absolutely no denying that this is a critical issue. As set out by the Chancellor in her Mais Lecture, sustainable growth depends on resilient foundations. Action on climate, adaptation and resilience can help reduce exposure to future shocks and support long-term economic stability. At the 2025 spending review, this Government committed £65 billion in capital funding for clean energy, climate and nature, including nuclear, and an additional £3.6 billion in capital funding for flood defences. The National Wealth Fund has been capitalised with over £27 billion and plays a central role in mobilising private investment into priority sectors, including clean energy, and supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy, while contributing to growth and energy security objectives.

Before I turn to the amendments, I stress that sustainable finance is a core priority for the Government. It is also a key opportunity within the financial services growth and competitiveness strategy. The UK is one of the world’s leading sustainable finance centres, with London ranking first in the Z/Yen global green finance index. Our focus now is on how to evolve and expand.

16:45:00

We are leveraging the UK’s sustainable finance expertise to mobilise capital in order to support the Government’s growth and clean energy missions. This strategy sets out how the Government will build on the UK’s world-leading strengths to support transition and drive growth. More than £100 billion of clean energy investment has been secured since the Government came into office. We are prioritising changes that will make the greatest impact, boost investor protection and UK competitiveness, enabling the sector to innovate and adapt. This will support the UK’s ambition to position itself as a leading hub for sustainable investment. Many of my responses will be framed in these terms: trying to find the right interventions at the right time to further this agenda.

Turning to the amendments, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for Amendments 80 and 103, which seek to require the FCA and the PRA to have regard to climate risk and sustainable growth and to introduce annual reporting on those principles. As I have said before, the regulatory principles are not having the desired effect; that is the reason behind Clause 17, which we will debate shortly. I do not want to pre-empt that debate, but I think that many noble Lords will agree with me that we should not add further regulatory principles to what is already a complex landscape. Clause 17 is not designed to weaken the “have regard” that was introduced in 2023. It is meant to help the regulators to focus on strategic interventions. I say in response to the question from my noble friend Lord Pitt-Watson that the Government always keep all aspects of the framework, including parliamentary oversight, under review. I expect that we will discuss that oversight in more detail today in our debate on a later group.

I assure noble Lords that regulators are already required to take into account many aspects of climate policy. First, they are required by law to have regard to the UK’s net-zero and environmental targets, where relevant to their functions, and they are taking substantial action as a result. Secondly, the Government have sent remit letters to the Financial Policy Committee, the Prudential Regulation Committee and the FCA to make it clear that they should support the transition to a climate-resilient, nature-positive and net-zero economy. Thirdly, the Financial Policy Committee must also consider climate-related risks, where they are relevant to financial stability, as well as proactively identifying and assessing climate-related risks to UK financial stability, as set out in the framework published in its Financial Stability Report of November 2024.

All this has resulted in some significant actions. The PRA has issued pioneering supervisory expectations to enhance firms’ management of climate-related risk—this includes insurance firms, of course—and has, together with the FCA, convened the Climate Financial Risk Forum. The FCA has consulted on aligning listed companies’ sustainability disclosures with the internationally aligned UK sustainability reporting standards, which the UK recently published. The Government have legislated to regulate ESG ratings providers, and the FCA will publish its final rules later this year. This will improve transparency, reduce conflicts of interest and strengthen investor confidence. I hope that this response clarifies why we believe that the current framework is the right one.

Amendment 103 would further require the PRA and the FCA to report on their work in implementing the principles in Amendment 80. The regulators already report on all their objectives and principles through their annual reports. In addition, they must respond to HM Treasury’s remit letter once a year to set out what actions they have taken. As I have said, the Government have ensured that that remit letter asks them to support the transition to a climate-resilient, nature-positive and net-zero economy.

Baroness Kramer (LD)Let me ask a direct question of the Minister. He referred to the actions that he expects from the FCA. I take it at its word, with its five-year strategy, but I cannot find any reference to anything to do with the climate, nature or even sustainability anywhere in there. Have I missed a page? It is a bit difficult to do that when there are only 20 pages, with very little written language, but it seems to me that, if this matter were of any significance, it would have been somewhere in that document. Is the FCA just anticipating what it believes to be the direction that it is getting from the Government, as reflected in the actions that are being taken in the Bill?

Lord Stockwood (Lab)We believe that the “have regards” give them the current position, which is that they should consult on the nature considerations. As my noble friend Lord Pitt-Watson mentioned, there is a substantial amount of work going on. There is room for improvement in the governance of that process, but we believe that the next five-year plan should be the place to review that even further.

Amendment 140 would require the FCA and the PRA to make rules mandating transition plans aligned with the Paris Agreement. The Government have committed to mandate UK-regulated financial institutions and large companies to develop and implement credible transition plans that align with the 1.5 degrees goal of the Paris Agreement, and we remain committed to that. We are reviewing responses to the Government’s consultation on the topic from a wide range of respondents and we will set out those next steps in due course.

I make it clear that we are mindful that firms do not approach transition planning in isolation, as this is closely linked to how firms identify, assess and manage climate-related risks. Any requirements must reflect this and sit within a coherent sustainability reporting framework. This policy is not confined to financial services alone; it must be done across the wider corporate landscape. We are therefore considering transition plan requirements alongside the wider modernising corporate reporting programme and discussions on what role the UK sustainability reporting standards should play in our corporate reporting framework. This amendment would risk pre-empting carefully considered and co-ordinated plans following our consultation, so I am afraid that I cannot agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, that the Bill is the right route forward to deliver this final commitment.

Baroness Hayman (CB)I hear what the noble Lord says, but that terrible leaden phrase “in due course” was used. He says that there is a way of looking at this in the context of many other issues. Can he give me a little bit of comfort? We are one year into the consultation. Will we have another consultation that takes in all the wider issues that he discussed? How long is this grass?

Lord Stockwood (Lab)I cannot pre-empt the timing of that report, but I will come back to the noble Baroness and have a follow-up meeting to get the specific details. I do not want to give her the wrong information today. This is important to this Government, as set out in the wider consultation and actions that we are taking. I might have to have a separate meeting to get a specific answer to that.

On Amendment 142, it is important that nature-related risks are properly understood and managed, given the material risks that they can pose to the financial system and wider economy, and we have already made significant progress in this area. As I mentioned, the Government have now finalised the UK sustainability reporting standards, and the FCA has consulted on aligning listed company disclosures with this framework. These standards, based on the International Sustainability Standards Board’s well-established global baseline of sustainability disclosures, require companies to disclose material sustainability-related risks, including nature-related risks where relevant. The Government recognise the important work of the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures in this area and we welcome ISSB’s decision to advance further work on nature-related disclosures, building on TNFD’s recommendations. We will continue to ensure that the UK framework evolves in line with international best practice and we therefore do not support this amendment.

Amendment 172, on deforestation, seeks to require the Government to lay regulations on deforestation and undertake the review envisaged in Section 79 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. I reassure the noble Baroness that the Government remain committed to this work. Just last week, the Government announced their intention to bring forward new rules to tackle deforestation. Later this year, we will consult on the proposed approach to bring in a due diligence framework in regulations under primary legislation, including the Environment Act 2021. We aim to require GB businesses using forest risk commodities to carry out appropriate due diligence, with secondary legislation delivered as soon as possible.

Action on deforestation must be co-ordinated across government to be effective. Therefore, the government commitment already made in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is the right one. HMT will publish the deforestation-linked finance review within nine months of the Environment Act regulations being made, rather than laid. I do not accept that this can be speeded up, but I assure noble Lords that the Government will undertake this review. This approach will support coherent regulation across the UK, protect the internal market and support export-led growth. For these reasons, we do not support bringing forward these timelines.

Amendments 83B and 86A are related to climate risk and the financial gains from environment-linked criminal activity. I reassure noble Lords that, as set out in relation to Amendment 103, regulators are already required to take into account and monitor climate risk, including through the requirement that they have related to the UK’s net-zero and environmental targets, where relevant to their functions. This has already resulted in significant regulatory action.

Additionally, financial crime and money laundering, whether related to environmental crimes or not, is illegal and something that financial regulators, and this Government, already take extremely seriously. The FCA has a broad remit to tackle financial crime under its market integrity objective and requires authorised firms to take steps to ensure they are not used to further financial crime. The FCA has robust powers to supervise these controls and take action against firms which do not put adequate financial crime controls in place.

The Chancellor also announced on 21 October 2025 that the FCA will become the supervisor for professional services firms’ anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing work. This will replace the existing complex system, involving 22 private sector bodies, and recognises the FCA’s effectiveness in tackling financial crime. Clauses 14 and 48 make necessary changes to primary legislation to enable this reform.

I hope this response clarifies why we believe the current framework is the right one. This has been an engaging debate. We have heard a range of views, and I hope I have convinced the Committee that the Government’s approach is the right one, and that we are making significant progress against our commitments, but that we should not rush to action. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Northover (LD)I too thank everybody who has contributed to this debate. It is concerning, as my noble friend Lady Kramer anticipated, to hear the Conservative contribution, given the obvious risk to the financial sector of climate change and the devastating effects of ignoring risk, which led to the 2008 financial crash.

That said, the Minister will have heard the concern about Clause 17. I note that he has given a speech saying that the Government are doing this, that and the other in all sorts of different areas, and therefore this is not needed, which is a very familiar argument. I think he is about to discover, if he stops reading his note, that this area will come back on Report, because there is widespread concern right across the House about climate change, climate risk and nature loss. We will come back to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 80 withdrawn.

Amendment 81

Moved by

81: Clause 17, page 21, line 34, leave out subsection (2) to (11) and insert— “(2) In Section 3B(1) (regulatory principles to be applied by both regulators), in paragraph (b), for the words from “considered” to the end of that paragraph substitute “taking into consideration the nature of the service or product being delivered, the nature of risk to the consumer, whether the cost of implementation is proportionate to that level of risk and whether the burden or restriction enhances UK international competitiveness;””Member's explanatory statement This amendment seeks to amend the existing regulatory principle for the FCA and PRA and require that the nature of, and risk to, the consumer and the service or product being delivered must be considered when imposing a new burden or restriction.

Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)My Lords, it is a pleasure to open on this second group of amendments, to move Amendment 81, which is in my name, and to speak to Amendment 87. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral for variously co-signing the amendments.

We ask a lot of our financial regulators—not least in recent times, with international competitiveness and the growth objective, and with the Chancellor calling all regulators, including financial regulators, into No. 11 to seek their commitments as to what they will do to advance the Government’s stated growth objective. My Amendments 81 and 87 seek to assist the regulator in bringing some clarity to how to approach these matters.

Amendment 81 looks to the nature of the financial product and of the risk to the consumer, and how the proposed regulatory intervention sits against those factors and the need to promote international competitiveness. It is entirely possible for our financial regulators to balance their objectives and to do right by consumers and by growth, but they need to consider those objectives alongside one another rather, than having a broad-brush, non-specific approach.

This brings me to Amendment 87, which seeks to put in the Bill the nature of the response the regulators could make in their supervisory activity and interventions. It sets out the difference between retail consumers and professional market participants, not least in wholesale markets. I have no doubt that the regulators are well aware of the different levels of knowledge and experience of people who participate in financial products and financial markets, be they retail, professional, or operators in wholesale markets. But it is potentially helpful to set this out in the Bill in order to assist and support the regulators in what they seek to achieve through this approach: to drive the effectiveness of their regulatory activity, to sharpen their supervisory activities and, not least, to have that sense of dialogue—always where appropriate—rather than reaching for more severe interventions at that stage.

I support the other amendments in this group and look forward to noble Lords’ contributions and to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

17:00:00

Baroness Noakes (Con)My Lords, I have Amendments 83, 84, 85 and 86 in this group, and I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for adding her name to the first three of them. We are continuing our examination of the role of the regulatory principles, which we debated to some extent on previous Committee days. To recap, Clause 17 proposes to downgrade the regulatory principles in Section 3B of FSMA so that instead of guiding the everyday work of the regulators, they will now feature in only an element of the regulators’ new five-year plans. Some of us have tried, but so far failed, to convince the Minister that this represents a constitutional assault on the effectiveness of your Lordships’ Financial Services and Regulation Committee. I am pleased that a meeting has now been arranged for the committee to discuss this in more detail with the Minister, together with the Financial Secretary, and I hope we can make some progress there.

On the previous day in Committee, I moved an amendment which called for the Treasury to undertake a review of the regulatory principles, because they are a mixture of important things concerning how regulations should be conducted, some duplicated areas and some special interest items. The Government resisted my amendment, with the Minister saying that they had already reviewed them and found them to be fine, which was a completely bizarre judgment.

My Amendments 83, 84 and 85 take a different approach. If Clause 17 is to remain in its present form—that is to say, downgrading the Section 3B principles to abstracts, to be wordsmithed into five-year plans—it is important to rescue the most important element of them: proportionality. Amendment 83 places the proportionality principle, using the rather wordy parent formulation in Section 3B(1)(b), into Section 1B of FSMA, which is about how the FCA should discharge its general functions. This achieves for proportionality the effect of ensuring that when the FCA draws up rules or guidance or does anything else, it will conform to the proportionality principle. That would allow the rest of Section 3B to head into strategic oblivion, but it would preserve proportionality as a matter that should guide the FCA’s work on a daily basis—for example, when drawing up rules or guidance. That, in turn, would allow the Financial Services Regulation Committee to focus on whether the FCA is indeed reflecting the principle of proportionality in its rules. Amendment 84 seeks to do much the same for the PRA. Lastly, Amendment 85 removes proportionality from Section 3B to avoid yet more duplication cluttering up FSMA.

The Financial Services and Regulation Committee received a lot of evidence for its first inquiry into the secondary competitiveness and growth objective. One of the enduring themes was that neither regulator lived out the requirement for proportionality. For example, the confidential round table that we held with mid-market and specialist banks, which are very diverse and very different from the big banks, reported that regulations are substantially similar for all sizes of banks. The confidential round table with insurers and reinsurers found that there were disproportionate responses to consumer issues, failing to differentiate between different business models or different types of firms.

As an aside, the committee had to hold these round tables on a confidential basis because of a widespread fear of regulatory repercussions if attendees articulated views that did not reflect well on the regulators. This is a serious cultural issue that cannot be dealt with directly in this Bill, but it underlines the need for parliamentary accountability mechanisms to be made stronger rather than weaker. We should make these mechanisms as effective as we possibly can.

As well as finding disproportionate regulations and supervision, the committee’s report also highlighted how thresholds, which can aid proportionality, were often used in a way that in practice impacted the willingness and ability of financial services businesses to grow. The proportionality is a very big ongoing issue in financial services regulation and has real-world consequences.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has tabled similar amendments to mine, which also include the regulatory principle currently found in Section 3B(1)(f). My own view is that paragraph (f) is a restatement of proportionality from a different angle. I agree that the things in it are important, but I hope that we can work to get some kind of streamlined definition of proportionality that incorporates both strands.

My other amendment in this group is Amendment 86, which seeks to import the regulatory principles of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 into the regulatory principles in FSMA. I did this in response to a statement in the Explanatory Notes that the Government intended to use secondary legislation to take the financial regulators out of the ambit of the 2006 Act, which I regard as a bad decision.

It is true that some elements of the very succinct expression of regulatory principles set out in the 2006 Act are already found in Section 3B, but not all of them. The 2006 Act requires all regulators to carry out their regulatory activities “in a way which is transparent, accountable, proportionate and consistent”.

It also says that regulated activities should be taken only for

“cases in which action is needed”.

This goes beyond Section 3B in requiring accountability and consistency, and I cannot find anywhere in FSMA that says that the FCA and the PRA should regulate only when action is needed.

I cannot think that it is right to dilute the FCA’s and the PRA’s regulatory obligations. They are probably the most important regulators in the land; to let them off the regulatory principles in the 2006 Act is just plain wrong. Since Parliament is, in effect, powerless against secondary legislation, the only way to ensure that the FCA and the PRA remain subject to the 2006 Act principles is to hard-wire them into FSMA, which is what Amendment 86 seeks to do. It may well then be downgraded if the Government have their way on the regulatory principles and Clause 17, but it will not disappear completely from the requirements to which the FCA and the PRA will, in some measure, have to have regard.

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)My Lords, before turning directly to proportionality, I will touch briefly on sustainable growth, because its meaning has drifted over time. Sustainable growth was not part of FSMA 2000. It was introduced later, in the post-crisis reforms, as a macroeconomic guardrail. Its purpose was to ensure that regulators did not focus solely on narrow consumer protection or market integrity but had regard to the wider economy. It was intended to counteract over-regulation, pro-cyclical rule-making and, in effect, to avoid killing the golden goose of financial services. It was, in fact, a pro-growth statement. Later, maybe since 2018-19, sustainability has expanded in understanding to include environmental concerns, although, of course, they now have their own place and, as debated earlier, will maybe have some further places in legislation.

I do not want the original macroeconomic point to be lost. It was designed as a counterpart to proportionality, a reminder that regulation must support durable long-term economic stability, not contribute to boom-and-bust cycles. In that sense, both proportionality and macroeconomic sustainable growth sit in the same family of “have regards”. They are deregulatory principles intended to prevent unnecessary burden and to ensure that regulation does not itself become a source of economic harm. Of course, climate change has macroeconomic effects, but they are of a different character and should not obscure the original boom-and-bust prevention purpose of this duty.

I turn to proportionality and Amendments 83 to 84A. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on Amendments 83 and 84, which would restore the proportionality duties to the regulators’ general functions, and Amendment 86, which would import the principles of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act into FSMA. These are thoughtful and constructive amendments, which would save something, but there is a great deal they cannot save—we will discuss that later. In particular, they do not save the second proportionality duty: the duty to have regard to the nature and objectives of businesses carried on by different persons. That is the proportionality principle that protects smaller firms, sole traders, mutuals, benefit companies and individuals. It is not just about cost-benefit or even size; it is about recognising that different types of firms have different objectives and experience regulation differently. To some extent, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, this should all be understood within proportionality, but if we leave it out when it is still separately listed in the current regulatory principles, even when they are largely disregarded, that might lead to the wrong conclusions.

That is why I tabled Amendments 83A and 84A, which build on the formulation of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and would restore the smaller and different business protections. As has been explained, these would be inserted into clauses that relate to the discharging of the regulators’ general functions so that they restore these duties to the operational level of rules and supervision. But this limb of proportionality does more than protect smaller firms; it may also protect firms whose objectives legitimately involve taking more risk in the interests of growth and innovation. Parliament’s role is not to eliminate risk but to ensure that it is understood, calibrated and supervised fairly. That is why this proportionality duty matters: it is one of the few operational tools that give Parliament visibility into how regulators weigh those differences in practice.

However, even with these amendments, we still would not save the principle of sustainable growth—growth that is durable, predictable and not a flash in the pan. As I have explained, that was a partner “have regard” to proportionality. I hope that during these proceedings I can persuade noble Lords and the Minister that sustainable growth should also be included. It chimes with competitiveness and growth, but it, too, needs to have a place in the real business part of these clauses, in the general functions. To echo my earlier comment, macroeconomic sustainable growth belongs alongside proportionality, as part of the deregulatory family of “have regards”.

These duties were originally conceived as guardrails to ensure that regulation supports the economy rather than constrains it. That operational balance is worth preserving. All the “have regard” duties were carefully designed and each has a purpose, and some of the others work together, as I have explained.

17:15:00

Lord Ashcombe (Con)My Lords, I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, the insurance broker regulated by the FCA. A number of amendments in this group discuss the downgrading of the “have regard to” requirement for proportionality, which would be a backward step. At a time of intense global competition, the Bill should strengthen proportionality, not weaken it. These amendments do that by replacing Clause 17’s downgrading provisions with a clearer, more robust and more meaningful principle, based on the distinction between wholesale and retail markets.

There remains a clear need for a better balance between these two sectors. Evidence supports this. A survey of chief risk officers conducted by the City of London Corporation identified simplification of regulation as the single most important step that regulators could take to foster growth and innovation. Similarly, a recent Prudential Regulation Authority survey showed that fewer than 60% of respondents believe that its current approach to proportionality makes the UK a more attractive place to do business, with most of the remainder expressing neutrality. That is hardly a vote of confidence.

In practice, the current one-size-fits-all approach is flawed. London’s world-leading wholesale insurance market is increasingly subject to rules designed for retail consumers. These regimes impose additional compliance burdens and costs, yet offer little meaningful benefit to sophisticated corporate clients, who require flexibility to negotiate bespoke arrangements tailored to their risks. This is what I have spent my working career doing, and I have never dealt with retail consumers, other than being an insurance buyer myself. There is a massive difference between the companies I advise and seek insurance for and the consumers such as me. Indeed, their premiums are often significantly larger than what I am trying to insure. The two entities should not be regulated by a one-size-fits-all regime.

The Financial Services Regulation Committee has highlighted this issue, noting that failure to distinguish between wholesale and retail drives bureaucracy and costs. Evidence from the London Market Group revealed that one UK broker, for example, employs far more compliance staff domestically—almost four times more—than in the EU on a proportional basis. Stronger proportionality would not weaken consumer protection; it would enhance it, allowing regulators to focus on where risks are greatest. In short, we should seize this opportunity not to weaken proportionality but to make it work properly for growth, innovation and the effective protection of consumers.

Baroness Kramer (LD)I very much support the two amendments of my noble friend Lady Bowles. There is often an assumption that those of us who feel that regulation plays an important role have no instinct or desire to see proportionality in place, which could not be more untrue. My history is as a commercial banker, back in the days when we used to participate intensively in writing the loan documents and creating the covenants associated with our lending, whether to small companies or to some of the largest on the globe. Frankly, covenants that were off the shelf were completely inappropriate for providing the protection we needed in many cases. They were just useless exercises in paperwork for the companies involved. We used to reshape the loan agreements on that basis and, frankly, it worked exceedingly well.

When I look at the amendments, I am glad that proportionality is being recovered from the scrapheap that would result from Clause 17. That is important, and the way that my noble friend Lady Bowles, framed it is particularly significant. Both for the PRA and the SRA, the focus is proportionate to the benefits expected to result from the imposition of the burden or restriction, recognising the difference in size, nature and objectives. I agree with her that this really needs to be considered through the lens of genuinely sustainable—as in durable as well as environmental—growth. That is a very important addition to the discussion. I am disturbed by Amendment 81. I am not disturbed by most of it, but when I read

“proportionate to that level of risk and whether the burden or restriction enhances UK international competitiveness”,

I begin to get somewhat queasy, because the lowest common denominator is not where we should be headed. We need to genuinely assess risk—the cost of dealing with and understanding it—in a very direct way. I have always thought that a distortion was introduced by the competitiveness objective, and I am afraid that it is reflected in Amendment 81, in my reading at least.

I hope that the Minister understands that proportionality is not something for five-year strategies. It is central to the work, culture and behaviour of a regulator; as such, it clearly belongs in principles that sit on the face of the Bill.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes and other noble Lords for bringing forward their amendments in this group.

I was glad to hear that the Minister will meet the Financial Services Regulation Committee to discuss this part of the Bill. I am sure he will be as disturbed as I was to hear about the widespread fear of regulated businesses in expressing any criticism of the regulators—the most important regulators in the land, to quote my noble friend Lady Noakes. We certainly rely on financial services and good regulators for growth in this country.

The central theme of this group is the proportionality of regulation. That is an absolutely fundamental requirement for all regulation; it is particularly so when we are talking about small and medium-sized enterprises, which are less able to afford the costs of regulation—in terms of diversion of time, regulatory fees and legal fees—and are the most held back by excess regulation.

There were 5.6 million small businesses in the UK at the start of 2025. They account for three-fifths of employment and around half of turnover in the UK private sector. Total employment in SMEs was 16.9 million—60% of the total—with turnover estimated at £2.8 trillion, or 51% of the total. Having financial services that operate with proportionality and common sense is important to them; indeed, almost every single one of these firms will access and use financial services through the course of their operations. It is even more important to the thousands of SMEs that operate in financial services, whose remit is of course being extended by the Bill, and the thousands more SMEs in the legal and professional firms that advise on financial services.

In practice, regulation often falls most heavily on precisely those smaller firms least able to absorb it. The reasons are obvious: SMEs do not have large compliance departments or in-house legal teams; and they do not have armies of advisers whose job is to interpret regulatory requirements. In many smaller firms, people wear many hats, as I know well. This means that a regulatory requirement that may be manageable for a large institution can be a serious burden for a smaller firm. Above all, regulation should be designed in such a way that it protects consumers and supports market integrity without imposing unnecessary burdens.

Amendments 83 and 84 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, to which I have added my name, go to this underlying point by seeking to elevate proportionality in the FCA and PRA frameworks; it is pleasing to have the support of my noble friend Lord Ashcombe and the Liberal Democrat Front Bench in this. Proportionality should not be a box that regulators tick after the main decisions have already been made; it should be central to how they think about regulation from the outset.

The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, raise an important point about tailoring regulation to the size, nature and objectives of different firms. The regulatory framework should recognise that a mutual does not have the same objectives as a major bank, and that different business models can present very different risks; the noble Baroness explained all that eloquently.

I would also like to comment on Amendment 86 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes. As she said, the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 requires regulators to act in a way that is transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted, ensuring that regulation is effective without being unnecessarily burdensome. Those are fundamental points and likewise need to be protected as guiding principles.

In closing, I would be grateful if the Minister could assure usfirst, that proportionality will be genuinely embedded in regulatory decision-making, ideally by amending the Bill on the lines of Amendment 83. We hope he will look at this issue very seriously. Secondly, can he assure us that the FCA and PRA will in future be expected to take account of the particular position of SMEs, mutuals and smaller firms when designing and applying rules? A proportionality duty would go a long way to fixing the problem and would seem to fit in well with government policy to support small business promoted by his other department, the DBT.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)My Lords, this will be the first of many groups where we discuss the frameworks that the regulators operate under, so I will say a few words about that framework before turning to the amendments.

Many of these amendments, and those in other groups we will take today, focus on the regulators and their accountability to Parliament. Parliament has enshrined the principle of regulatory independence into primary legislation through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which obviously everyone in the Room knows as FSMA. The Government continue to believe that this model best serves the UK’s long-term interests by delivering effective regulation, informed by evidence and free of political interference. It is absolutely right that financial services markets, firms and activities are overseen by operationally independent, expert regulators. The FSMA model sets out clear roles and responsibilities for Parliament, the Government and the regulators. Parliament sets the objectives for the regulators and holds them to account for how they further those objectives when discharging the statutory functions that Parliament has given them. The Government and Parliament must be able to scrutinise the work of the regulators to evaluate how effective they are and the impact that their rules are having. It is important that the regulators remain independent and accountable for their actions. The regulators are directly accountability to Parliament, and there are a range of mechanisms within FSMA to support that accountability and allow Parliament to effectively scrutinise the regulators.

A critical part of regulatory independence is the idea that the regulators listen to legitimate criticism and scrutiny—and the regulators do listen. For example, the FCA decided not to progress some changes to its proposed enforcement policy following scrutiny from the House of Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee. However, it is clear from the debate today and from outside the Room that there is room for improvement.

On the recent publication by the Financial Services Regulation Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I recognise the important work of that committee in its Growing Pains report and share its ambition to see a regulatory culture that is more proportionate, more responsive and more supportive of growth. The committee’s recommendations were directed principally at how regulators exercise their functions rather than at the statutory framework itself. The Bill provides greater legal clarity and certainty but it remains for regulators, through their leadership, judgment and accountability to Parliament, to deliver the cultural change that the committee rightly called for.

On the amendments in this group, Amendments 81, 83, 83A, 84, 84A and 85 each seek to address various aspects related to the principle of proportionality. I recognise the concerns and strength of feeling that I have heard today and I agree that the principle of proportionality is extremely important and must remain central within the regulatory framework.

The Bill’s approach is not to remove proportionality from meaningful consideration. Instead, the reforms will require the regulators to have regard to proportionality in the development of their long-term strategies, ensuring that they are applied in a more coherent and visible way at the strategic level. This would mean that, for example, rather than considering if an individual proposal is proportionate, the regulators will be required to set out clearly how they have considered whether their strategy and workplan as a whole results in burdens on firms that are proportionate to the outcomes they achieve. This change will support more meaningful scrutiny of how the regulators are considering and responding to the regulatory principles, and will support greater overall scrutiny of the regulators’ work.

Amending the framework to prescribe in detail how the regulators must recognise differences in the size, nature and objectives of the firms it regulates goes far beyond the current framework and risks adding unnecessary complexity to the framework. It is for these reasons that the Government cannot accept these amendments.

Baroness Noakes (Con)I am afraid the noble Lord is going to be assailed from all sides. I was glad to hear the Minister refer to the work that the committee did in relation to the enforcement proposals, otherwise known as naming and shaming. Is he aware that if the proposals in Clause 17 go through, we will be unable to interrogate the FCA, in this case, on the proportionality of particular examples of what they are doing, in this case to change the enforcement rules? Proportionality there related very specifically to a set of proposals. For example, those proposals, which were to name people much earlier in the enforcement process, could have had the effect of wrecking the businesses of very small players in the financial services market. That is something that we were very keen to draw the attention to.

17:30:00

I understand this theory about looking at the five-year plans and holding them strategically to account for achieving high-level aims. That is not in practice how regulation affects individual operators in the financial services market, or sectors of the financial services market, and that is what we are seeking to protect. Does the Minister understand that difference?

Lord Stockwood (Lab)I understand it, and I think I have demonstrated in the debate today and outside—I am looking forward to the meeting next week—that we remain open-minded. We are trying to achieve the balance between the regulatory oversight that we believe already exists and the feedback that we have had from the committee. I remain open to those conversations. We believe that the framework tries to keep that balance between the oversight that exists in Parliament and the independence of the regulators, but we genuinely look forward to that constructive discussion.

I turn to Amendment 87, which seeks to expand the regulatory principles and make them more detailed and directive. The Government’s view is that FSMA should provide a principled framework within which the regulators exercise expert judgment. This amendment goes far beyond refining the existing principles and would, instead, replace them with a highly prescriptive set of instructions that risks legal complexity, rigidity and dispute over interpretation.

The concepts highlighted in the amendment are important, but the Government do not believe they should be hardwired into primary legislation in this level of detail via the regulatory principles. The issue is not whether compliance costs, innovation, competition or post-implementation review matter—they clearly do—but whether it is right to place these requirements in primary legislation. The Government’s view is that it is not. It is not a sensible approach to grant the regulators significant powers and responsibilities, and to then overprescribe with how they must fulfil them.

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)The Minister keeps saying that these things should not be in primary legislation, but they are in primary legislation, and they stay in primary legislation. Even if you try to take the effectiveness away by Clause 17, everything that I referred to in my speech, and that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred to in hers, is about the existing regulatory principles that are in the Act already. Therefore, I do not understand saying that they should not be in primary legislation—they are.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)Let me get back to the noble Baroness on that. I believe the amendments were trying to change and streamline the regulation, but I want to make sure I give a precise answer rather than a quick judgment on that.

Let me turn to Amendment 86, which seeks to bring the regulatory principles of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 into FSMA. The Government recognise the importance of certainty in the regulators’ framework. FSMA already contains its own carefully developed set of duties, objectives and principles, designed specifically for financial services regulation. The Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act is very broad in scope, and the principles it contains are important ones. But there is significant overlap between these principles and those already in FSMA, so adding them here would bring duplication and legal complexity, rather than clarity. These will now be considered at a strategic level as a result of Clause 16.

In some way, the Government agree that proportionality matters, that unnecessary burdens should be avoided, and that the regulators must be held properly to account for how they exercise the significant powers Parliament gives them, but they should not be overly constrained in how they approach their work. We should have confidence in their expertise and regulatory judgment, and confidence in the mechanisms in place that allow us to ensure that they are performing as they should do so. Ultimately, an overly prescriptive approach that ties the regulators would not be in the interests of those they regulate, or those protected by their regulation.

This is not a question of whether Parliament should hold regulators to account. We all clearly agree that it should. The matter before us is where we think the right balance lies between democratic oversight and allowing regulators to carry out statutory responsibilities effectively. I recognise that not everyone will agree that the Bill strikes that balance in the right place, and I respect the arguments that have been made this afternoon and the continuing debate that we will have. I hope noble Lords will also accept that I have listened carefully to those arguments that have been made. I will respond either in writing or in meetings outside the Room to any points that I have not answered fully today. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)Perhaps I might press the Minister on the subject of smaller businesses and the Bowles amendment to the proportionality proposal, which takes account of differences in the size, nature and objectives of businesses when the regulators are plying their trade. I am not quite clear what the Minister feels about these smaller businesses and whether he agrees that it is necessary to deal with them in a slightly different way.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)My business insured a million small businesses, so I think they are vital to the UK economy. Let me come back to the noble Baroness with a full answer on that. It is critical that we make sure that they are protected.

Baroness Noakes (Con)To return to the question of the 2006 Act, the Minister said that FSMA’s regulatory principles have been specially crafted for financial services. They have, over a period of time; they have changed rather a lot since they were first put into FSMA. However, when the 2006 Act was passed, there was a specific decision, by the Government, to include the FSA within its scope. They were all brought within scope by secondary legislation, just as the Government now propose to take them out by secondary legislation. Why do the Government take a different view from the Labour Government in 2006—who decided that those regulatory principles have, as I have explained, some important additional elements to those within Section 3B—and think that those additional principles are not now relevant?

Lord Stockwood (Lab)It goes without saying that there are many things on which I do not agree with the Labour Government of 2006, but we will leave that for another day. We believe that this is already covered. I do not want to allow the noble Baroness’s expertise to be undermined by my relative inexpertise, so let me come back in writing on that. The advice I am getting is that we believe that it is already covered, but let me come back in writing before our meeting next week.

Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)I paused there in case somebody else wanted to make another point—I did not want to jump in. I thank all noble Lords who participated in this excellent, informed and important debate. I would never seek to offer a Minister of the Crown advice, but, having said that, when the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Noakes, speak on these matters, it is worth paying attention, reflecting, reading Hansard and reflecting again.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for all the work she has done as chair of the FSR committee. It has produced excellent reports that always cut to the heart of an issue. At a time when, as she rightly identifies, more and more is coming before Parliament as regulation which, on the Floor of the House, we have so little role in which to play or influence to bring to bear, the role of her committee is even more significant and important.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe summed up with her usual brevity and precision. This is all about proportionality and common sense. The only tiny addition I would bring to that is specificity. In essence, all the amendments in this group have been tabled for the same reason that we debated these subjects on previous committee days. Strategies and frameworks are important, but events do not happen in strategies and frameworks. Events happen: they impact individuals and businesses, particularly small businesses, minute by minute, hour by hour—or, to quote a phrase apropos of nothing in particular, events happen on a day-to-day basis. All the amendments in this group are significant and worthy of reflection.

In conclusion, I apologise profusely to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for causing her to feel queasy. I can only hope that my financial inclusion amendment in the next group can act as an effective antiemetic. For now, I thank all noble Lords who participated in this important debate and beg leave to withdraw Amendment 81.

Amendment 81 withdrawn.

Amendment 82

Moved by

82: Clause 17, page 21, line 34, leave out subsections (2) to (11) and insert— “(2) In section 3B(1) (regulatory principles to be applied by both regulators), after paragraph (h), insert—“(i) the need to consider financial inclusion.””

Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)My Lords, I rise to speak to three amendments I have in this group: Amendments 82, 95 and 97. This group is all about financial inclusion. It is a very important group. I am also very sympathetic to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and my noble friend Lady Kramer.

Amendment 82 would place financial inclusion where I believe it firmly belongsamong the regulatory principles set out in this legislation which the regulators must consider in carrying out their functions. This is not a novel idea. When I had the privilege to chair this House’s Financial Exclusion Committee back in 2017, we recommended that financial inclusion be given a firmer footing in the regulators’ duties. Indeed, when this House last legislated on these matters, in the 2023 Act, I am sorry to say that financial inclusion was not included as part of the regulatory principles. Despite a concerted effort at the time to put it on a statutory footing, we did not succeed, and my amendment would simply correct that. Financial inclusion, which determines whether millions of people can access the essentials of modern economic life, surely belongs in legislation.

However, the Bill as drafted moves in the opposite direction, confining the regulatory principles to strategic activities only, thus removing them from day-to-day decisions that impact the lives of millions of people, particularly those who are financially excluded. My amendment would ensure that financial inclusion remains a live consideration in the regulators’ day-to-day work. I say this to the Minister: if financial inclusion is genuinely a priority for this Government, why does it not sit among the principles the regulator must consider, and should these principles not be considered when implementing the activities that truly affect many people’s daily lives, rather than being set aside to apply only to more abstract strategic work?

I am conscious that, in the Committee’s debate last week, there were those who felt that any new principles should meet the “essential and enduring” test—I think the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said that. In my view, financial inclusion is essential and enduring. Whether people can access banking, credit, insurance and savings is not a passing policy priority but a permanent structural feature of how the system serves, or fails to serve, the population. It has been a concern for decades and will remain one.

I turn now to my Amendments 95 and 97, which would require the FCA to report each year on how the exercise of its functions has affected financial inclusion, and to be ready to account to relevant parliamentary committees, which would include the Treasury Committee and the Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee, which we have just heard about. My purpose here is specific and, I hope, constructive: to ensure that financial inclusion is reported on openly every year and that the public and Parliament can scrutinise the activities of regulators in ensuring that we all have access to the financial services and products we need at a price we can afford.

We all know that what gets measured gets done. What is reported on, transparently and regularly, is far harder to neglect than what is not. This is not an abstract concern. When I chaired the Select Committee, we found that 1.7 million adults were without access to a basic bank account; that communities were losing their bank branches at an alarming rate, as we focused on last week; and that households on the lowest incomes were paying more for credit, insurance and essential services simply because they had less money. Nearly a decade on, too many of these problems persist. An annual report will give this House and the public a clear and reliable picture, year on year, of whether the position is improving or deteriorating on things such as access to bank accounts, access to face-to-face banking services, affordable credit and insurance—the list goes on.

Such a duty asks the FCA to ensure that those who are excluded from financial products and services are taken into account, with their experiences seen and their problems addressed. It creates no new rules for firms, which is an important point. It simply ensures that the fundamental question—“How are the most financially excluded people in this country being served?”—is asked and answered each year, in public, before Parliament.

17:45:00

I anticipate the Minister saying to me that the consumer duty already provides for this, but, with respect, it does not. This is the central point, which I emphasise: the consumer duty is a significant and welcome protection, but it protects people who are already customers of financial service firms. It says nothing about, and does nothing for, people who cannot get through the door in the first place: those who are declined credit, those who cannot open an account and those who are priced out of insurance altogether. The people with whom these amendments are most concerned are, almost by definition, the very people the consumer duty cannot reach. If our reporting on financial inclusion relies on the consumer duty alone, the millions of people excluded from financial services will remain invisible in the data—unseen, uncounted and unaddressed. An annual report that explicitly covers what work has been done to improve their situation is, I believe, how we can make them more visible.

Can the Minister respond to a few specific questions? First, does he accept that the consumer duty, however valuable, applies only to existing customers and offers no protection to those excluded from financial services altogether, and that there is, therefore, a real gap in how regulators are expected to monitor and improve the financial lives of all? Secondly, if the Minister does not support this amendment, can he set out precisely how Parliament will be able to scrutinise the FCA’s efforts to improve financial inclusion, given the Bill’s proposal to confine the “have regard” duty to regulators’ strategic activity only? Thirdly—I really hope the answer to this one is yes—will the Minister agree to meet me and other interested Peers before Report to discuss how a meaningful financial inclusion reporting agenda might be given effect?

Lastly, I also anticipate the Minister saying that this amendment is unnecessary because the Government have published a financial inclusion strategy. It is a good document, but I must politely disagree: a strategy is a policy document that any Government may revise or set aside; it reports on the Government’s own programme, rather than on the regulators’ impact. Indeed, I have asked His Majesty’s Government which metrics exist to evaluate the strategy’s implementation and impact.

These amendments are, I believe, modest, proportionate and constructive. They ask only that this country keeps a clear and honest annual account of how well—or how badly—our financial system serves those who are most at risk of being left behind. I beg to move.

Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. I had the equal pleasure of serving alongside her during her excellent chairing of the Financial Exclusion Committee.

As the noble Baroness rightly identified, since we published our report, financial exclusion—or a lack of financial inclusion—has persisted. She rightly identified the Government’s financial inclusion strategy. There are a number of good things in it, but I ask the Minister: why was it so light on the potential role that fintech, as well as broader technologies, could play in addressing some of the elements of financial exclusion? It was largely silent on those issues.

I shall speak to Amendment 104 and all the other amendments in my name in this group. Similarly, I suggest having a financial inclusion objective and detailed reporting requirements therein. We have the Financial Inclusion Commission, which has some excellent members, but financial exclusion persists.

It is right to have our financial services regulator further empowered to be the lightning rod and the focus for this whole question of financial inclusion. To talk about the principles again, the Government are keen on growth, but financial inclusion does not run counter to that growth or the international competitiveness objective. Financial inclusion is essential to it: enabling people to have financial services and be financially included is likely to increase digital inclusion and social inclusion, as employees become self-employed and the employed become economically active. I ask the Minister: are these things—enabling and empowering financial inclusion—not what any Government should be about?

I suggest a financial inclusion unit for the FCA, so that it can be a powerhouse for innovation and research and a real regulator and driving force for financial inclusion. When the Minister comes to respond, can he identify how financial inclusion has changed in the almost two years of the current Government? Is it not time for greater focus and effort on this most significant of issues? In many ways, the most significant issue when it comes to financial services is enabling and, in reality, empowering everybody to have a fair go, and to become active and enabled in our economy and our society. Amendment 161 builds on this, but in the specific context of broadening data-sharing requirements—always on a consenting and empowering basis—to look again at what we can do with new technologies. Let us look at other sources of data such as rental history, which can be so helpful in enabling financial inclusion—but currently are far from happening, never mind becoming the norm—to support those millions of individuals. Where is innovation when it comes to financial inclusion? Does the Minister not agree that these amendments would enable the Government to have a human lead on these technologies, with a far greater chance of much greater financial inclusion for all citizens?

My final amendment goes to KYC, or what passes for it. In many ways, you can see this within financial inclusion, where all too often, in whichever context one considers it, “know your customer” means almost completely the reverse or nothing of the sort. Does the Minister not agree that it is time to look again to innovation and the technologies that can be deployed to give us effective KYC and AML? Or does he believe that, because one is able to put a gas bill in paper form in front of a financial services business, it shows just what an upstanding citizen you must be and gives all that is required on KYC and AML? It is so gravely in need of transformation. We have the tools and technologies to achieve this, which would also add to significant financial inclusion. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)This is an important and interesting debate. I want to draw attention to and base my remarks on Amendment 95, which refers specifically to the poverty premium in insurance. This is a theme that runs across financial services. It perhaps does not get the attention it deserves, because one of the main reasons for financial exclusion is of course poverty, and poverty is clearly an issue where the Government have a clear and central responsibility.

In practice, the approach taken by the FCA has been to use the obligation for the consumer duty as the primary vehicle for dealing with the poverty premium. The FCA has directly linked the consumer duty to the poverty premium, with the argument that firms are required to deliver good outcomes for retail customers and ensure that products and services offer fair value. The FCA has not itself specifically tackled the poverty premium head on; in effect it has passed the responsibility to providers.

The most obvious manifestation of the poverty premium arises with premium finance, whereby people have to pay premiums by instalments over the year instead of paying a lump sum at the beginning of the year. The terms on which they are financed have been open to significant criticism. People think they are paying the contributions monthly but, in practice, someone lends them the money to pay the initial contribution and they repay that loan over the year. There is a widespread lack of understanding that, in fact, they have two contracts: the insurance contract and the loan contract. The terms of that loan contract have been called into question. Figures from the FCA suggest that about four-fifths of customers in financial difficulty use premium finance and that, in 2024, 60% of motor insurance customers and 41% of home insurance customers paid by instalments because they could not afford to pay annually. There is probably a series of people who fail to do the sums and just pay monthly because that looks easier.

The FCA has found that the cost of premium finance has fallen since 2022, and made it clear to firms that they are under a clear requirement to ensure that fair value is offered. There is a technical problem here in that, as well as the financial issues, with some forms of insurance there is an underwriting issue. It is possible to argue that someone who pays monthly is not in the same underwriting position as someone who pays yearly. It is very difficult to pin down that aspect of the issue. The FCA accepts that this poverty premium exists and believes that some of the premium finance provides a poor product. It has accepted that

“financial regulation cannot tackle financial exclusion or the related ‘poverty premium’ alone. We must work together across government, regulators, industry and consumer groups”

to deal with it.

The Financial Inclusion Strategy published in November refers to the issue, and we now have the FCA’s 2026 insurance priorities, which include expanding access to insurance as a central priority and emphasise the importance of helping vulnerable groups. However, the campaigning group Fair by Design has argued that the FCA is not doing enough to deal with these issues. It points out that the FCA has said that it has the tools to deal with this but, in practice, is just leaving it to the individual companies to act responsibly.

18:00:00

Essentially, in summary, we can say that the process of relying on the consumer duty and firm, level, fair-value assessments rather than any form of structural intervention has led to concerns that, while the regulatory tools exist, they are not being deployed forcefully enough.

I am pleased to say that the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries has done some work alongside Fair by Design in this area. The issue of the poverty premium does not only affect the issue of premium finance, but it is where the FCA has the clearest responsibility and where the proposals made in Amendment 95 most clearly apply.

However, there is a more general problem. I conclude by just pointing out that in fact there is a responsibility on the Government to ensure that all sectors of society can obtain a minimum desirable level of protection, including those on low incomes, that will enable them to remain financially resilient to shocks, and unexpected shocks, which would typically be insured.

Baroness Kramer (LD)My Lords, I will speak briefly in general across this set of amendments and specifically to Amendment 141 in my name, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann.

In the general remarks, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, that I am excited and thrilled by his amendments in this group and I support every one of them—I would even open champagne; I am that pleased. I say to my noble friend Lady Tyler that I totally support the amendments that she has introduced here. I share with both of them the perception that financial inclusion is absolutely at the core of the requirement that we must place on our financial services sector and on the regulators that deal with it.

To pick up on a point that my noble friend Lady Tyler made, the consumer duty does not deal with financial inclusion, and that is exactly right. The consumer duty is very much a protection against mis-selling. It is not a duty of care, which could indeed have required that gaps left in the market are filled and the regulator take steps to fill them; the regulator was absolutely determined not to have that responsibility when this House attempted to make it address the issue, and the Government of the day were also very determined that the regulator should not play that role. We cannot look to the regulator to be a key player in financial inclusion.

In the five-year strategy of the FCA—I really have read that document—there is reference to financial inclusion; in fact, it is in big, black, bold letters. The problem is that what it anticipates as the role that it will play is to try to address how low financial capability holds people back from accessing financial services and how it could support them in managing their financial life. That is important and it matters, but the reality is that for many people who are excluded, the way to give them support is not to try to get them digital—it would be brilliant if you could but that is not the reality—but to deal with those people as they are in the world that they live in. There is absolutely no reference in this five-year strategy that you could in any way interpret as related to what has become the Richard Lloyd review—to things such as banking hubs. It is focused solely on the individual, whereas issues that we have addressed in previous groups have also been about the financial exclusion of small businesses from financial services. There is no reference to any of that.

I have had so many conversations with the FCA over the years, and it has said things like, “Yes, if we had a set of community banks, that would be absolutely brilliant; CDFIs are absolutely wonderful—not our job. If they appear, we will make sure that we regulate them appropriately, but it is not our job to fill that gap and we resolutely hold to that position”. That clarity needs to be here in this debate. I will not repeat what has been said because it was so well said by the three previous speakers, but I very much hope that the Minister will pay serious attention to this issue. From things that he has said in the past, I hope that he takes it to heart. It very much belongs in a very central way in primary legislation.

The issue I am raising is perhaps not an obvious one to raise in the context of this Bill, but it is in scope. It is dear to my heart, but I think it is widely supported. I am using this opportunity to deal with an issue that, frankly, the Government should have dealt with without any problem. It is child trust funds and the ability of young adults with learning difficulties to access those funds that sit in in their name. My party leader, Ed Davey, who, as I think all in this Committee know, has a son with very severe learning difficulties, has written of his eight-month battle to access the child trust fund put in place and invested in for the benefit of his severely disabled son, who is now 18. The fund should be easily accessible when a child turns 18, but, as the Davey family found out the hard way, this is not true for children with learning or other disabilities who lack the capacity to fill in the forms themselves.

The process of applying to the Court of Protection for a deputyship order is Kafkaesque, consumes endless time and places such a burden and cost that many parents give up altogether. The many steps, and my goodness there are many, include obtaining written permission from three different relatives to demonstrate that you are unlikely to abuse the funds that you will access, and obtaining various doctors’ assessments—well, perhaps that is fair—but then the courts kick in. The Court of Protection charges £412 for a deputyship order. It requires you to obtain insurance against misuse, and the Davey family found that that cost £48. Then comes the Office of the Public Guardian, which charges £100 for its assessment, and it then levies an annual supervision charge of £320. If you add this up, it basically becomes £1,000 to be able to access a child trust fund for your severely disabled child.

What is really extraordinary is that most child trust funds do not have a lot of money in them. I think the average amount is £2,000. You would have to spend 50% of it to be able to access that fund for your child. The people accessing it are parents whom the DWP already relies on to deal with a variety of much more significant pots of money to support that child. I use the Davey family not to ask for any kind of sympathy, but here is an MP whose wife is a lawyer, and they cannot work their way through this maze. How are people without those kinds of expertise going to work their way through this system?

Unfortunately, there is a new legal offering from specialists who will, for a significant sum, offer to negotiate the way through for you. That is a practice that none of us wants to encourage. There are a few child trust fund managers who handle the process a bit better and have been helping some of the people whose funds they manage to minimise the process, but it is a lottery in terms of finding that you have taken out your child trust fund with an entity that takes that approach. Charities estimate that 80,000 to 123,000 young adults are essentially locked out of their child trust funds.

I tried to look for what response the Government have been making to the overtures of the charities and other civic society groups that have been out there trying to speak for these youngsters. Two things came to my attention. The only response I could find from the Department of Justice was that it has now digitised the application form and provided a guide.

My amendment would force the FCA to simplify the whole process for CTFs paying out under £5,000 in any one year. It is formulated around an amendment put before the House in 2021—I am pretty sure that is the correct year—by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, who is really skilled in developing, designing and presenting the appropriate amendments. In speaking to that amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who was the Minister when child trust funds were put in place, made it very clear that no one had thought of this particular set of problems and that that was why the system was designed in a way that set up this obstacle course. It was not intentional or planned; it was simply a failure to recognise what could happen and has in fact happened.

I say this to the Ministerall the arguments we hear in support of the Bill are about deregulation; here is a piece of deregulation that I think no one could argue with, and which I would definitely and clearly support, as would my party and, I suspect, many others. If the Minister cannot control this himself, could he please go away and berate his colleagues? These youngsters need to be able to access their funds. We are talking about small pots. Simply digitising the 106 sections of the application form is not the answer.

Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)My Lords, if I might add to this debate, I begin by noting the huge cross-party agreement we have on lots of the issues the Bill raises, most particularly on this issue of ensuring access to financial services for everyone. That is what is behind so many of the amendments here. It is also the issue that was raised in the debate about affordable credit by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, and at Second Reading by the noble Baroness, Lady Hyde, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. We all, from all parties, want to know that such services are available to everyone. The question is simply how we can make sure that that takes place and that the industry that has to be there to deliver it buys in to making sure that those services take place. We need to be sure that our actions as rule-makers are helpful in that regard.

At Second Reading, I heard a number of speeches about excessive regulation, all doubtless intending to encourage financial services to do their job better. But there is an issue with regulation and how much of it there is. If there is any concern about this amendment, that is absolutely not its objective. Critically, we need financial services to be available to everyone; the question is whether, by regulating them, that gets us to where we want to be. Maybe it will, but we might argue that, unless we have persuaded those whom we wish to influence that they will strive to improve performance in this regard, the danger is that it might just be another regulation. Whatever we ask the FCA to report, we need to first take a step back and think through how this will affect performance on the ground. It is the finance industry that has to deliver this, and we need to be working in partnership with it—with the industry, customers, potential customers, the Government and regulators, moving ahead together. There are also initiatives, some of which might work, and which, if they had real momentum, with everyone behind them, might start to deliver the sort of things we want.

As many noble Lords know, I have done quite a lot of work with the financial services industry in Scotland. Its industry body, Scottish Financial Enterprise, has laid out as its objective that it intends to

“have a financial services system that allows every citizen and business of Scotland to connect and access appropriate services”.

Wow. Is that not exactly what we are trying to get to happen? But who is following up to make sure that that statement, that vision is realised? It feels to me that we need a new settlement, and institutions to see that such a settlement is delivered.

18:15:00

I am quite taken by the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, for a financial inclusion unit: whether that should sit with the FCA or somewhere else, I do not know. He mentioned know your customer being used as an excuse for financial exclusion. In Bangladesh, children can open a bank account if they have 10 cents. I asked the governor of the Bangladesh Bank, “How do you manage to deal with drug dealers who are going to come in and open bank accounts?” He said, “You know, David, I’ve rarely come across a drug dealer who was putting 10 cents through their account every week. If they were, they were very unsuccessful”.

We will have many debates on this Bill, and I hope we will get the Bill right and lay a strong foundation. I am sure we recognise that the Bill alone will not create the purposeful industry we seek, but I wonder whether it can be the start and a catalyst for a better industry of the sort that we have all been talking about. Whether this amendment is pursued or not, I hope that, as part of discussions, we can send that message.

On the issue of access, as with so many other issues, the ultimate aim is not a report by the regulator, though that may be a necessary part; still less is it to place costs on the industry. Our goal goes beyond that and beyond the Bill. We want a financial services system that allows every system and business to connect to and access financial services. That will require partnership between Parliament, Government, regulator, customers—and potential customers—and the providers of financial services to know that the services we so clearly need are delivered and, where there are gaps, to set in place actions to improve things. If our debates on the Bill begin to catalyse that, to hold to account what the financial services industry of Scotland said it could do for the whole country, wow, we would be making progress.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)My Lords, we understand the reasoning behind these amendments. Financial inclusion is, of course, an important objective, as the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, explained so clearly. Indeed, that is precisely why we have tabled amendments on financial education, to be discussed at a later stage. We believe that one of the most effective ways to improve financial inclusion is to ensure that from a young age, people have the knowledge, confidence and capability to understand how to manage their money to avoid harmful financial decisions and to access the products and services that are right for them—and, I should add, to understand new technology, data and digital inclusion, as my noble friend Lord Holmes explained.

However, we are not persuaded that the mechanism proposed in these amendments is the right one. In particular, when it comes to proposals such as expanding the scope of Section 3B of FSMA and adding further regulatory principles, we encounter the same problem that I raised in previous groups: every time Parliament adds another principal duty, reporting requirement or objective to the regulator’s framework, it may sound reasonable in isolation but, cumulatively, these duties feed through into more process, more internal assessment, more reporting and more consultation paragraphs. That is more compliance requirements, more boxes to tick and less overall efficiency for financial services.

We should be careful not to assume that every social or economic objective is best delivered by placing a new statutory duty on the FCA or PRA. Regulators already have extensive responsibilities, so we have to make the choices with care because, at some point, the accumulation of such duties becomes counterproductive. It makes the regulatory priorities less clear and it can slow decision-making and create uncertainty for firms. In short, it is unwise.

As I have explained, we would improve inclusion via improved education, and we are about to introduce an amendment on debanking, which may be relevant. There is a lot of partnership and voluntary activity, as the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, hinted at—and as I remember from my time with Tesco Bank, which was centred in Scotland and did some terrific work.

The problem of child trust funds was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and it seems like a popular cause for deregulation by the Treasury and the regulators. I am sure the Minister will want to comment on that.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler of Enfield and Lady Kramer, of Richmond Park, and other Peers for drawing attention to the important issue of financial inclusion. As someone who grew up in poverty, it is not an abstract concept to me and the community I come from.

The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, asked if I would meet her to discuss this agenda further. I would of course be happy to meet her and any other noble Lords who would like to discuss the topic. I will write to her ahead of that meeting on the FCA’s consumer duty and what it means for financial inclusion, but I assure noble Lords that the Government are not relying on the FCA’s consumer duty as a catch-all solution. The Government agree that people should be able to access the financial services they need—that is an important objective—but we think that these amendments are not necessary to achieve that.

Amendments 124, 128 and 104 would give the Financial Conduct Authority a new statutory financial inclusion objective and require it to establish an independent financial inclusion unit. These amendments focus on action and measurement. Financial inclusion requires all parts of the system to work together. That is why it is important for the Government to lead this agenda, not the FCA. To secure action, we have published a Financial Inclusion Strategy , setting out an ambitious package of measures to improve access to financial services.

The FCA is closely involved in delivering this work. Sarah Pritchard, the deputy chief executive, also sits on the Financial Inclusion Committee, which monitors the strategy and supports its implementation. The Government have taken formal steps to reinforce the FCA’s role in this area. In her most recent remit letter, the Chancellor asked the FCA to have regard to reinforcing financial inclusion, and the FCA is responding to that ask. The FCA’s 2025-2030 strategy identifies helping consumers to navigate their financial lives as one of its four strategic priorities. As part of this, it highlights an increase in the consumers who hold key products as a success metric for its work, and it is acting on this. For example, to advance the Financial Inclusion Strategy ’s aim of boosting savings, the FCA developed a regulatory statement to support the uptake of workplace saving schemes. On measurement, the FCA already plays an important role in tracking progress on financial inclusion through its flagship financial lives survey, which provides a strong evidence base for monitoring outcomes over time.

I recognise Amendment 128’s emphasis on independent scrutiny and prioritisation of financial inclusion in the FCA’s work. As part of the FCA’s statutory framework, the consumer panel is in place to represent the interests of consumers and provide independent advice and challenge to the FCA. As already covered, the FCA’s strategy and membership of the Financial Inclusion Committee means that financial inclusion is embedded in its work. This is more effective than an operationally independent unit.

On oversight and transparency, I understand the intention behind Amendment 104, which seeks to require the FCA and PRA to report annually on financial inclusion, and Amendment 95, which would require the FCA to report on financial inclusion metrics and how it has acted to improve financial inclusion. However, these amendments are not necessary or appropriately targeted. The regulators already report publicly and are accountable to Parliament. Moreover, the FCA’s financial lives survey provides a biannual update on a wide range of financial inclusion metrics in the UK, including the numbers of unbanked people, those who have been declined for a product and the experiences of vulnerable customers. The FCA is also closely involved in the delivery of the Government’s Financial Inclusion Strategy , which is a public document and subject to public review next year. Amendment 104 would place reporting duties on the PRA, whose statutory role is prudential regulation, creating uncertainty about the PRA’s remit and what it would be expected to report against.

Amendment 82 would add financial inclusion to the regulatory principles that the FCA and the PRA must have regard to when discharging their general functions. The Government do not agree that this is the right mechanism to ensure that financial inclusion is prioritised. The amendment would require unclear action from the PRA. Parliament regularly holds the regulators to account for their work on financial inclusion. The Commons Treasury Select Committee recently held a session with the FCA’s deputy CEO for its Financial Inclusion Strategy inquiry. Amendment 97’s requirement that the FCA be prepared to demonstrate to relevant parliamentary committees how it has had regard to financial inclusion is therefore unnecessary. Any relevant Select Committee can call the FCA and hold it to account for its work on financial inclusion.

Amendment 141 seeks to require the FCA to establish a new legal route for third- party access to control another person’s assets, which goes well beyond its regulatory remit. The law requires parents or guardians to have legal authority to make decisions about the financial assets or property of their adult children. This includes accessing funds held in a mature child trust fund. Decisions about who may act on behalf of a person lacking capacity are governed by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and are determined by the courts, reflecting the need for safeguards to protect vulnerable people. It is not appropriate for FCA rules to seek to substitute or override existing rules and processes. The Ministry of Justice recognises that the process of obtaining access can be challenging for the parents and carers of young people who lack capacity. It is exploring how the Government can best facilitate access for parents and carers to child trust funds on behalf of their children. I would be happy to raise this with the MoJ rather than berate it, as the noble Baroness suggests.

Turning to Amendment 161, I recognise how a broader set of data might support a more accurate assessment of underserved SMEs’ creditworthiness. However, it should be noted that the Treasury already has the ability in Section 4(5) of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 to specify the SME information that must be shared. We are actively considering updates to the scope of data in the next phase of the CCDS reforms. However, it will not be expanded in line with this amendment, given that it would require redesigning the scheme entirely, expanding it beyond financial services participants, some of whom see little return for their participation, which already imposes a degree of burden. I do not think it appropriate for financial services legislation to impose regulatory obligations on non-financial market actors in this way, not least without consultation. That is not to say the ambition is misplaced. Indeed, these issues are potentially better addressed through the future development of open finance and smart data initiatives.

Amendment 169 seeks to require a review of know-your-customer requirements. I understand the concern that the current framework may not always operate as it should in supporting access to financial services. As the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, rightly stated, technology is already playing a part but can do better. Indeed, businesses such as Quantexa and Onfido are leading the way in this space. The Government do not believe that anti-money laundering requirements and financial inclusion are mutually exclusive. The money laundering regulations already provide firms with the flexibility to take a proportionate and risk-based approach to customer due diligence. As part of the financial inclusion strategy, major high-street banks have launched pilots on improving access to bank accounts, demonstrating how financial inclusion initiatives can operate within the existing framework.

Reforms to make customer due diligence requirements more proportionate and effective have already been made, including through amendments to the money laundering regulations made via statutory instrument earlier this month. The Government are also taking steps to support the effective use of new technologies, such as through the publication in February of guidance on the use of digital identities to support customer verification. Finally, the money laundering regulations also mandate a review of their regulatory provisions every five years to assess whether they are effective, appropriate and proportionate. The next such review will be published in 2027.

The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, asked how financial inclusion has changed under the current Government. In November, we published the Financial Inclusion Strategy , which supports access to banking for those with no fixed abode and small-sum lending to help people access credit and makes it easier for people to save. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, noted that when a House of Lords Select Committee looked at this topic, it found that 1.7 million people were unbanked. Although it is still too high, I can report that the latest survey data shows that the number of unbanked people has fallen to under one million. As I already set out, with many of the actions we are taking, the Government hope to reduce this further. Financial inclusion is not a gap in the framework. It is an agenda already being delivered by the Government, with the FCA closely engaged in its implementation. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and all noble Lords who have spoken on this group of amendments. The debate has been very thoughtful, and I very much appreciated the collaborative tone of the contributions. I thank the Minister very much for agreeing to meet me and other interested Peers, and I very much look forward to that happening before Report. I was also grateful to the Minister for emphasising the point that the consumer duty cannot be the be-all and end-all. As my noble friend Lady Kramer very clearly put it, it is not a duty of care.

18:30:00

Many of the responses I had from the Minister were pretty much what I was expecting: that the intention of many of these amendments is fine but we do not really need them because we have existing mechanisms. My response to that is, yes, I acknowledge that in some areas there have been some improvements, and I welcome them—the Minister just mentioned the number of people with access to bank accounts—but in other areas, progress has been really stubborn or virtually non-existent. Therefore, I do not think that the mechanisms we have in place at the moment are sufficient for us to feel confident that financial inclusion is, as I think my noble friend Lady Kramer put it, at the very core of the requirements being placed on the sector and the regulator.

I am sure we will return to this issue on Report, so I very much hope that before then, we can all think long and hard about what would make a difference and would move the dial so that we have more improvements in this area. I also hope that before Report we might hear from the consumer panel, who the Minister referred to, to see what they think in these areas.

Finally, I was very taken by the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, that this Bill, apart from being a good piece of legislation, also needs to be a catalyst for a better industry. I am sure that is something that we can all agree on. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 82 withdrawn.

Amendments 83 to 87 not moved.

Debate on whether Clause 17 should stand part of the Bill.

Baroness Scott of Needham Market (LD)I remind the Committee that when a group is led by a clause stand part debate, after the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has spoken, there is no second intervention from me at that point.

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)My Lords, oppose Clause 17 standing part of the Bill. Before turning to the detail, I will explain how Clauses 16, 17 and 18 fit together. They are not independent clauses. They operate as a single, interlocking structural package—an unholy trinity. Clause 16, which we have already debated, starts the move of day-to-day statutory principles out of operational decision-making and into a five-year strategy document. Clause 17 is the moment where it cuts. It removes the operational duty to apply the principles and the duty to explain how they have been applied. The principles remain in the abstract, but the visibility of their application disappears. Clause 18 then seals the trio by removing the remaining statutory mechanisms through which Parliament once saw how those principles were applied.

I said in Committee last week that deregulation of regulators inherently increases the regulation of markets. A regulator’s default setting is caution, not proportionality. That is precisely why Nikhil Rathi asked Parliament for political cover to take on more risk, because he knows that the system will not shift itself.

However, removing the operational “have regards” does not reduce that institutional caution. It simply removes the focus that keeps it directed at the right things. It removes accountability and removes Parliament from the role or possibility of providing support or cover with its eyes open, a direction of travel that Clause 18 then completes. The result is that Parliament loses operational visibility at the very moment when regulators are being asked to take on more risk. This is the context in which Clause 17 must be understood.

By deleting the principles from their operational position, the Government remove the statutory reporting loop. That deletes the audit trail that allows us to test what the regulators have done and why. Crucially, it also removes the only lever of accountability we have. We do not possess direction powers or hold budgetary levers. We do not have judicial review that bites on the substance of expert rules. All Parliament has is the ability to see, to question and, ultimately, to embarrass. An embarrassment card is a fragile card, but it is the final line of democratic accountability in the UK’s financial regulatory system. Clause 17 strips even that card from our hands. This is not simplification. It is a cultural turnabout that systematically switches off operational accountability.

Parliament is not trying to run the regulators. Our role is that of a critical friend: the only body that can speak openly what industry dares not, and test whether the principles that Parliament set are being applied in practice. Under the current framework, regulators must have regard to statutory principles in consultations, rules and supervision. Have they done this perfectly? No. They adopted a tick-box matrix that has become tedious and uninformative, but nothing prevents them shifting to thematic reporting, highlighting where specific principles matter most. Where the system has fallen down most is on the supervisory side, with an explosion of excess communications, overbearing information requests and a proliferation of Section 166 investigations.

Explanations around the “have regards” are the audit trail of how Parliament understands how a regulator weighed proportionality, firm size and sustainability of growth, or where climate change held relevance. A thoughtful narrative is far more informative than a boilerplate matrix, yet Clause 17 removes all requirements to explain or to show the rationale. In its place, the principles are relocated to a five-year strategy document that cannot be specific or enforced by the courts, and cannot be used to test an individual rule or a heavy-handed supervisory decision. This is not simplification; it is opacity. I pose the question: is the role of Parliament wanted?

At the Treasury Committee on 24 March 2026, the FCA’s CEO, Mr Nikhil Rathi, was asked how the system would handle the blistering speed of financial innovation. His answer was striking. He said:

“That is why I asked for a risk appetite from the Government and Ministers and Parliament so that we all know … what guardrails we are operating within, with appropriate democratic input and oversight”.

He also told the committee during the Sexism in the City inquiry that if the FCA were to set thresholds below that which Parliament had established in employment law, it would need a degree of political cover and agreement through Parliament. This is two sides of the same coin. The FCA is actively asking Parliament for guardrails, oversight, democratic accountability and cover because it is being pushed to accept more risk, and with more risk comes more failure or challenge.

However, Parliament cannot share responsibility if we are blinded from seeing how the principles are applied, and we cannot endorse greater risk-taking if we are denied information on where those choices bite in practice. When scandals happen, what angers Parliament most is when the writing was on the wall for a long time. Woodford funds is a textbook example, and London Capital and Finance is another.

The Minister may point to strategies, outcomes reporting, cost-benefit panels and annual reports, but the FCA itself has conceded that these are visibility tools, not accountability tools. Reports describe outcomes after the event, long after the harm has occurred. A strategy document can say all the right, glossy things, while the actual rules produce disastrous outcomes. We have seen before how FCA high-level assurance, even on specific cases, can look immaculate, while operational reality goes badly wrong. We saw that with British Steel pensions, with motor finance and with Woodford. Clause 17 remains the only operational hook that Parliament has to test whether the principles guided the procedure.

Last week, the Minister indicated that perhaps proportionality would be restored. If so, that is welcome, but a verbal concession is not an amendment and patching one leak does not fix a broken hull. If proportionality cannot be functional in a five-year strategy document, how can other principles survive, exiled there? Clause 17 still deletes the operational requirement that regulators must consider the desirability of sustainable growth. Removing this is nonsensical. The Government cannot possibly want unsustainable growth—growth that does not last.

Let us not forget the legal hierarchy. The secondary objective of competitiveness and growth sits higher up the statutory ladder. Precisely because that objective sits higher, there is all the more need to keep the sustainable growth consideration anchored in the operational functions. Right now, we see a political dash to deploy capital productively. If we encourage a reckless sprint when the underlying assets are not yet created, we are building not prosperity but a bubble, creating systemic fragility. So, restoring proportionality but deleting sustainable growth from sight collapses the government logic. It says that an audit trail for a firm’s compliance cost matters but an audit trail for long-term stability of the economy does not.

The consultation spoke about rationalising the number of “have regards”. It did not propose removing them from rule-making. It did not propose isolating them in a five-year strategy. It did not propose weakening the basis on which the courts can test whether regulators have properly considered Parliament’s intent. It did not analyse the interaction with the secondary competitiveness objective. When the Government consult on one minor administrative tweak but legislate for a far-reaching structural overhaul, that raises serious questions of fairness and due process.

I can see what the Government thought they were doing here. They believed that, by removing the operational “have regards”, they would free the regulators from excessive caution and allow the system to move more quickly. But, in practice, this clause disturbs the balance in a way that the Government have not accounted for. It removes not the caution but the focus and visibility that allow Parliament to understand how risk is being taken, to understand where it is being borne and to play its part in the structural balance of the system, which includes giving cover to the regulators when appropriate. That is the constitutional gap at the heart of this clause and why it represents not a simplification but a weakening of the framework of accountability on which our financial regulatory system depends.

This clause, along with Clause 18, has a serious impact on parliamentary scrutiny, as has been raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—so I will not go further into that. But these things collectively are why I oppose that Clause 17 stands part.

18:45:00

Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)My Lords, I have added my name to the Clause 17 stand part notice. As has been explained so clearly, the Government’s intention appears to be to put most of the consideration of the regulatory principles and “have regards” into the five-year strategy created by Clause 16. They believe that, having done that and thereby provided long-term clarity as to how those principles and “have regards” will be met at a strategic level, it is no longer necessary to apply them to the nitty-gritty of individual rule-making, which is why Clause 17 effectively removes them from that process. Rightly, the Government consider the secondary competitiveness and growth objective to be extremely important, so they have singled that one out for special treatment in Clause 20, and it alone must be reported on annually. That, at least, is to be welcomed but does have the somewhat odd effect of making the secondary objective more important than even the primary objectives, or any other principles which are not subject to specific reporting.

As we have heard, there are very real problems with this overall approach in terms of the impact on the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the activities of the regulators, including the committees that have been established for that purpose. As the Minister is aware, the Financial Services Regulation Committee of this House, of which I and a number of others in this Grand Committee are members, has taken the unusual step of writing to the Minister to set out our unanimous concerns in that respect. I very much look forward to the meeting that he will attend next week on that.

In passing, just before we started today, we received a letter and a Treasury note from the Minister. Point 15 in the Treasury note would slightly bring together the strategy and the Clause 17 elements, in that it says:

“The Bill will require the regulators in their annual reports to update on the extent to which, in their opinion, they have implemented their long-term strategy”.

I spent a fair bit of time since I received that trying to find where the Bill actually says that. I may be being very dim, but I cannot find it, so perhaps the Minister could point out specifically where that is. I may well have missed it, and I apologise if I have.

I also spent part of the weekend reminding myself of what the FCA’s existing 2025-30 strategy document looks like. I lead a very exciting life, as you can see. While “vacuous” might be too strong a description, it is a classic of its type, being full of motherhood and apple pie generalities and lots of attractive diagrams and pictures, but very little of real specificity or genuine measurability. Statements such as

“We will be a smarter regulator; predictable, purposeful and proportionate”,

sound great, but is this really something that could be meaningfully scrutinised? When I compare the rules in Clause 16 with what is actually in the current strategy, it appears to me that the current strategy would actually comply with Clause 16.

During the previous day in Committee, the Minister said, in reply to a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about the existing strategy and whether it is the model on which Clause 16 is based:

“this is the starting point. There is definitely work to do and it needs to be improved ”.—[ Official Report , 24/6/26; col. GC 337.] I cannot see how Clause 16 would improve it— I think it already complies—so I have no argument with the FCA having to have a longer-term strategy, but Clause 16 does not provide a sufficient basis on its own for parliamentary scrutiny and accountability, and that is where Clause 17 becomes such a problem. Clause 17 removes the need for the regulators to have regard to the regulatory principles and other “have regards” when going about its general duties, so apart from the annual report on competitiveness and growth in Clause 20 that I mentioned earlier, the only time the regulators will have to consider the regulatory principles—including, but not only, the critical issue of proportionality—will be in its five-year strategy. This would remove the need for regulators to explain how the regulatory principles apply to any draft regulations, at a time when they should be explaining not only the application to individual regulations but the cumulative impact of those regulations.

We debated last week how there is scope for an overhaul of the regulatory principles and other “have regards”, which have a tendency to proliferate. Perhaps that is where the Bill ought to be concentrating its efforts. Clause 17 represents a considerable downgrade on the ability of Parliament and indeed the Treasury to hold the regulators to account. Even as the Bill delegates ever-increasing activities to those regulators, this is a move in the wrong direction. So, by all means let us have a long-term strategy, but that does not substitute for the need for the regulators to have regard to the principles and other “have regards” when setting regulations, and to explain how they have been met. Clause 17 should be removed from the Bill.

Lord Eatwell (Lab)My Lords, I want to follow on from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who commented that the committee was unanimous in its letter to the Minister. It was indeed: Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Labour and Cross-Bench Members were unanimous in rejecting Clause 17. The reason is that Clause 17 embodies the requirement to remove the principles from consideration by the committee. But those principles are the essential toolkit of the committee. This actually neuters the committee and leaves it just examining five-year strategies and annual reports, and without the ability to deal with specific proposals, which is the reason why the committee was established in the first place. By removing that ability, the Bill also weakens the regulators.

I am sure there are regulators in some office who thought that that was a neat way of getting rid of a very awkward committee. But it weakens, because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, of the need for political cover—the need for a relationship between the political decisions and regulatory decisions. At the moment there exists this “proposal, accountability, critique” relationship between the regulators and the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House. Remove that and the regulators are exposed to significant issues in a way they would not have been before.

I cannot see how in any way this measure improves a regulatory system that was built on the principles relationship established in FSMA at the beginning. It became particularly important once we left the European Union and the responsibility to examine the regulatory structure shifted from the European Parliament to this Parliament; and now, Clause 17 is taking away parliamentary accountability in any serious operational sense. It really should not stand part of the Bill.

Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)My Lords, I will speak very briefly on this. I declare my interests as employee adviser to Banco Santander in Madrid and a shareholder in Santander. I also apologise to noble Lords, as I was unable to speak at Second Reading.

I will follow on from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. I think he and I may disagree on certain aspects of the regulatory and supervisory approach, but I fundamentally agree with every single syllable he has just said. I am very queasy about aspects of the Bill. Many of us spent some time in this Room several years ago trying to ensure that we can hold to account in Parliament, both in this House and the other place, the regulators and supervisors, who hold immense power. That was absolutely right. We put in place a number of measures, including the establishment of the new committee, so ably chaired by my noble friend Lady Noakes, to enable us to do that—just one measure. This clause goes very much in the wrong direction.

I read the letter, for which I am very grateful, from the noble Lord, Lord Stockwood, and I have to say that I am somewhat perplexed by it. My wife says that I have a very little brain, so I very much look forward to the noble Lord telling me that I am wrong—I am very used to it. Let me try to understand what it is saying.

It starts by saying—or, rather, several paragraphs in it says:

“Considering separate rules in isolation is not effective for assessing the cumulative effect of the regulators’ actions—both the benefits in terms of advancing their objectives, and the costs to affected businesses”.

It goes on to say, as noble Lords will no doubt have read, that the publication of the overall long-term strategy will somehow address this. It also says:

“Clause 16 is intended to address this feedback”

from the sector—I am not sure from whom—

“and improve transparency around the regulators’ long-term direction and focus”.

I am very happy to have a long-term strategy but we absolutely need to be able to call to account actions that the regulators take, case by case.

I have read the Explanatory Notes, which say that the long-term strategy will be once every five years. I see that as entirely insufficient. Furthermore, in paragraph 170, the Explanatory Notes go on to say:

“The Government expects that the strategies will be high level and focus on the FCA’s and PRA’s top priorities and the outcomes they aim to achieve over that time”.

I do not see this as anything like the accountability that we were looking for when we introduced the measures in the last Bill, now an Act, and in the new committee. As far as I can see, it is not the case that the Government dispute the need for this case-by-case analysis, for they say this three paragraphs down in the same letter that I quoted earlier:

“There appears to be broad agreement that, in some areas, regulatory requirements on firms have become overly prescriptive, in some cases duplicative, and that this results in high costs for firms, and means that they spend a large proportion of their time and resources focusing on regulatory requirements”.

I agree wholeheartedly. We need, therefore, to address these points case by case. All these points tie up. We cannot see the regulatory oversight of this House and the other House diluted in the ways that these clauses do when you put them together. I therefore agree entirely with the noble Lord and those who back these two amendments. I will later press for other measures to tighten, not weaken, regulatory accountability.

Baroness Noakes (Con)My Lords, I will be brief because much of what needs to be said on this topic has already been said. I will not detain the Committee for long but, as I have added my name to the clause stand part notice, I thought that it was worth me reiterating my strong opposition to Clause 17.

Picking up on what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, spoke about, in our debate on the first group, the Minister reiterated that the Government think that the FSMA model is the correct model. I do not think that any of us is seriously disputing that as a broad proposition. What we are focusing on is the detail of how the FSMA model can continue to work. When we left the EU, the huge amount of EU law that became assimilated law changed the name of the game around how financial services regulation is lived out in this country.

As we have heard, the 2023 Act tried to deal with that in part by increasing parliamentary accountability through the committees of each House, including the requirement for individual rules proposed by the PRA or the FCA to be accompanied by explanations of how the regulatory principles had been applied. I do not think that any of us clearly understood the scale of the problem back in 2022, when we were considering the Bill, but we thought that these were sensible moves in the right direction. The only thing that has changed is that, now, the Government are coming along and putting even more into the FCA by way of the consumer credit legislation, which is a good idea.

But this has seriously undermined what was still work in progress on how effective parliamentary accountability could be worked. There were never any discussions with either committee of the Houses of Parliament about how the arrangements for accountability following the 2023 Act worked. We suddenly got this decision by the Government to cut away the legs of the committee through its inability to engage with the individual regulations. It is clearly the case that looking at a five-year strategy will never replace the work that needs to be done at a granular level on some of the proposed regulations that come from the regulators. That is the time for interventions—not by looking back at whether actions have complied with a strategy.

We should use this Bill to refine the FSMA model, to make it workable for the scale of the task that is being given by Parliament to the regulators and to make sure that the strength of the accountability mechanisms matches the scale of that activity. That is all that we are trying to do. The direction of this Bill is the wrong direction.

19:00:00

Baroness Donaghy (Lab)My Lords, I am tempted to say, “What she said” and sit down, but I want to emphasise the unanimity of the Committee on this crucial issue. Some of us think that the FCA has too much to do anyway. Some of us—probably fewer—think that successive Governments have used the regulators as a heat shield and that perhaps the balance has gone the wrong way.

Not to repeat the examples that have been given, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned the five-year strategic plan of the FCA. For some of us it was a glossy PR exercise. Examples have been given, naming and shaming. It took at least two meetings and several bits of correspondence before the FCA even hinted that it might have done it slightly differently had it given some consideration to what it did. In that case, you might argue that it was about a deregulatory issue, trying to hold companies to account. Our committee thought that it had gone too far.

One final example is the issue of cost-benefit analysis, which the Minister used on the first day in Committee. We tried very hard to pin down how the FCA conducted cost-benefit analysis and what was happening to the panels. We heard that they were work in progress. Had the panels met? No, they had not met. What approach did the organisation have to analysing cost-benefit analysis? I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, is not here as he is the expert on the granularity of analysing cost-benefit analysis. It was a poor show. I am sure that it is working to improve, as it is improving in a number of other areas, but it is extremely important that the work of Parliament should not be inhibited by an attempt to tidy up regulation—which is in fact setting aside protections.

The Minister, on the first day in Committee, used the phrase “modernise protections”. I am sure that he meant to say, “Modernise the transparency, modernise the complexity and modernise the general approach so that people can understand them”. I hope that he did not mean “modernise protections” in the sense of setting them to one side.

Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)What she just said.

As the final representative of the committee in this Committee, I agree with what the other members of the Financial Services Regulation Committee have said. It is important. I remember sitting across the Room some years ago when the idea was being discussed. It is worth recalling that the original idea was, I think, a Joint Committee of both Houses but, for whatever reason, the Commons decided that it did not want to adopt that approach. I think there are rules about criticising what the other House does, but there is no doubt that the only effective manifestation of the belief that this sort of work is required has been the work of that committee. It is particularly important that we do not lose something that we achieved through cross-party agreement.

Baroness Bi (Lab)My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of Norton Rose Fulbright. Some of my firm’s clients are regulated by the FCA and the PRA. I am not a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee, which is why I am probably breaking what I have heard as unanimity by speaking in favour of Clause 17 remaining part of the Bill.

I note that the current accountability framework, including the role of the committee, was created only three years ago, pursuant to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 following Brexit. Before that, we have to remember that we were content with what was probably pretty limited oversight by the European Parliament, so hearing about the importance of very detailed parliamentary oversight when it comes to looking at every proposal that the regulators might have is a relatively new innovation for us.

I do not think it unreasonable for the Government now to consider how well that post-Brexit system has been working and to propose changes to a regime that the committee itself has criticised as overly complex and difficult to navigate. I note that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, commented at Second Reading how difficult it had been to hold the regulators to account under the current system. I am therefore curious about why noble Lords are keen to preserve a status quo that is far from ideal.

There has been significant opposition to Clause 17 and concern about the effect it could have on parliamentary oversight, but I am not convinced that that reaction is warranted. I do not think Clause 17 is a retreat from scrutiny, but it is looking to make it more targeted and effective by merely removing the obligation on the regulators to consider every step they take by reference to the eight FSMA regulatory principles for every day-to-day function. The obligation to notify all those processes to the parliamentary committee does not always lead to the kind of analysis or response and targeted feedback that we have been discussing. That volume of information that the regulators are producing has not led to a better system.

The result is that that documentation requirement has become a burdensome compliance exercise and not truly analytical. The Government’s consultation confirmed that the information produced is too granular to support effectively an overall assessment of regulatory performance, and nearly three-quarters of those who responded to that consultation were supportive of or broadly sympathetic to the approach the Government are proposing, and these are the customers, the regulated body, of the people that the FCA and the PRA are supposed to protect.

We should also acknowledge that Clause 17 does not abolish the Section 3B regulatory principles. The FCA and the PRA will continue to be bound to have regard to those principles when they are preparing or revising their five-year strategy plans, for which they will be held accountable not just by the parliamentary committee but by society as a whole. Those strategies will be subject to consultation and will create a public benchmark against which the regulators’ subsequent rule-making can be assessed and progress against the stated strategy can be monitored, in their annual reports if nothing else. I am not referring just to the glossy brochure that we have heard about.

It is also important to note that Clause 17 does not alter the requirement for the regulators to consider and document to the committee how they are pursuing their statutory objectives. In the case of the FCA, so much of the focus is on the competitiveness and growth objectives. That gives the committee a powerful accountability tool. There is nothing to stop the committee calling them in whenever it likes to talk to them about how they are meeting those objectives in line with the principles. The requirement of the regulators to present their analysis to the committee on each of the eight regulatory principles in relation to each consultation is disproportionate. Its removal does not reflect a material dilution of the regulators’ obligations because the substantive matters of concern continue to bind the regulators in any event. Is it necessary for the committee to be involved in all the detailed work that the regulators need to do in order to exercise proper parliamentary oversight in what we all accept is a fast-changing financial services market in a post-Brexit regulatory environment where the FCA and the PRA now bear responsibility for significantly more rules than was contemplated when Section 3B of the original FSMA 2000 was drafted?

As a common law legal system, it is right that the Government ask the regulators to comply with broad principles and hold them accountable for the outcome without requiring parliamentary oversight of all operational steps and without expecting the regulators actively to consider and document their analysis of how they have complied with each principle every time they exercise their general functions, however routine they are. I know that there is a discussion about the system being modified and improved through this Bill, but that is not what we have at the moment.

The committee’s mandate is to scrutinise whether the UK’s regulatory framework and regulators operate effectively. That requires the committee to have access to meaningful information and a coherent standard against which to test the regulators’ conduct. The long-term strategy provides that broad standard, and the committee will still receive consultations and examine how individual proposals advance the strategy that the regulator has publicly committed to. Its constitutional role could therefore be strengthened rather than rendered ineffective. Clause 17 keeps the Financial Services Regulation Committee’s oversight where it should be: on the substance of regulatory performance, the delivery of publicly stated strategies and the real-world impact of regulation. It also frees the regulators from unnecessary procedural burden, so that they can focus on regulating well. The mechanism does not have to be the same as before, and keeping Clause 17 could materially improve it.

Baroness Kramer (LD)My Lords, I did not intend to speak in this debate because the case has been put so well. However, having heard the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, I want to join the conversation because I think she has a very different perception of the role of Parliament from that of many others here. We have a responsibility as Parliament collectively—we are not the elected House but the appointed House—directly to the people of this country. The regulators are servants of that responsibility, not masters of it.

What the noble Baroness described is the ability for Parliament to intervene only at the very highest level in a very limited way and to pass huge authority over the financial sector, our financial stability and the economy to the regulators and then walk away. If we were to do that, we would be absenting ourselves from the very requirements that are at the core of a parliamentary system. She dismissed the pretty five-year strategy plan that we have from the FCA for 2025 to 2030, but it is exactly what is envisaged in this legislation: fairly high-level, simplistic comments of the kind that were probably developed by the public relations department.

The committee we put in place in 2023 was put in place not at the proposal of the Government or the regulators but by a Parliament utterly frustrated in not being able to carry out the responsibilities that it has as a Parliament. I have to say that the Labour Party was in a completely different place in 2023—it has now switched; I do not know why it has made such a volte-face. The Government of the day, the regulators and the financial sector were determined to narrow the capacity to scrutinise, to have a parliamentary view and to allow this Parliament to live up to its responsibilities. If we cannot have an expert committee able to look in detail at factors that so fundamentally affect the economy and well-being of the UK, we are, frankly, derelict in our duties. That is why this is a huge constitutional issue. If we were to repeat this in the area—

19:15:00

Baroness Bi (Lab)I am not sure that we disagree very much on what the purpose of Parliament is and its relationship with the people of Britain, but the FCA asked for a risk metric from Parliament and did not get one. I have heard a lot about the obligations to the people but, if Parliament is so crucial to what the regulators need to do, why was no guidance given to the regulators about the extent of risk they should take in their operations?

Baroness Kramer (LD)I am not on the committee, so I cannot answer that particular question—I am sure others would be able to consider this issue. However, if the noble Baroness thinks that, because Parliament did not, in her words, provide political cover for activity that the regulators wanted to carry out, Parliament should then be removed so that the regulators would somehow be exposed, who would they be exposed to? They would not be exposed to a committee. The public does not have the ability. I do not see the regulators going around the country talking to ordinary people in regular communities about what they are doing; they do not engage at that level. Many APPGs in this House have asked the regulators to come and talk to them. They are nearly always refused or somebody junior is sent, so it is only through a limited committee structure that this Parliament has been able to hold the regulators to account at all.

I give huge credit to the committee that sits under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which was created against the resistance of the regulators and the Government. This, now, is their attempt to try to unravel what is turning out to be a very effective committee that is raising really important issues, creating a requirement for proper answers and initiating real investigation. That is what lies at the heart of this: an attempt to negate the effectiveness of a committee that has been making its mark, and which leaves the regulator feeling uncomfortable because it has to answer questions.

Baroness Noakes (Con)I shall make a brief comment on why Parliament has not offered any guidance on risk metric. The committee was well aware that the FCA sought to get clarity about the risk appetite that it was taking. The PRA had not made that request; it regards it as its responsibility to judge the balance of risk. There is no unanimity in the regulator community on this, but we reported the issues as we found them in one of our reports.

The noble Baroness asks why Parliament has not given its answer. The straightforward answer is that the Government have not brought forward anything. Parliament gives an answer only when it approves something that the Government bring forward. When we asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether she intended to operationalise the giving of a more specific risk appetite to the FCA, she said pretty clearly that she thought that the Government would not do that.

If the Government do not bring forward something for Parliament to approve, it is not going to happen. Parliament does not act in the way that the noble Baroness seemed to think that we would act, which is that a committee would somehow produce an answer on risk appetite. The committee can comment on the issue of risk appetite and has done so, but it is fundamentally for the Government to take any action that is to change the way in which the risk appetite is specified for any regulator.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)My Lords, this is an important clause, and I understand why noble Lords wish to probe the Government’s approach to Clause 17. It is always right that we scrutinise carefully any change to the statutory framework governing our financial regulators, and the sponsors have set out their case well. I note that they were introduced into the 2023 Act for good reason: to try to ensure that financial regulation in the UK is proportionate, accountable, flexible and aligned with economic and market objectives.

As I said earlier, I am glad that a meeting with the Financial Services Regulation Committee will take place next week. Certainly, I would like to get to the bottom of whether the change neuters the committee, as has been suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and my noble friend Lady Noakes; indeed, I think that committee was unanimous that there was a problem. I thought it was interesting that my noble friend Lord Bridges echoed concerns that key, case-by-case analysis by the committee would disappear, and that the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, expressed concern about the way that her questions about cost-benefit analysis had been answered, presumably under the existing system.

These are all very legitimate questions, but there are other considerations—the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, touched on some of them. Our position is that we do not want to perpetuate overburdensome regulation. In discussions with industry, we have heard repeatedly that the regulatory principles in Section 3B of the 2000 Act can themselves lead to tick-box exercises. That is particularly true where the principles require regulators to consider wider public policy objectives, which may have only a very indirect connection with the firms being regulated or the activities in question. For example, Section 3B(1)(c) includes

“the need to contribute towards achieving compliance by the Secretary of State with section 1 of the Climate Change Act”—

the net-zero target—

“and … the Environment Act 2021 (environmental targets) where each regulator considers the exercise of its functions to be relevant to the making of such a contribution”.

My own experience of serving on a challenger bank’s board is that there is already a lot of climate-related activity required by the regulators that creeps into many aspects of governance. It is generally costly and sometimes of little worth. That was before the regulatory principles were added. That reflects, harking back to our earlier conversation, the extensive net-zero regulations that exist, the remit letters and the sustainability reporting network, all of which were cited earlier. Therefore, the real question is whether financial regulation is the right vehicle through which to pursue such goals and whether embedding such considerations produces better regulation or simply more process, as we suspect.

The Bill is meant to be deregulatory, and it is meant to simplify the regulatory environment and to support growth and competitiveness. I think the Government may be genuinely reducing a burden that has been identified by industry. We should be careful before assuming that every principle must remain in place. For me, the real tests are about what improvements are coming about here. I am interested in the detail. Does it make the FCA or the PRA more effective? Does it protect consumers? Does it support financial stability? Does it help growth? Alternatively, does it simply create another layer of process, the cost of which falls on firms?

I would be grateful if the Minister could explain more clearly the Government’s rationale for Clause 17. What burdens have been identified and what will the impact be of the changes proposed here? What evidence have the Government received from industry and regulators about the operation of the current Section 3B principles? How will the Government ensure that removing or amending such principles reduces unnecessary burdens, without weakening the core protections that consumers and markets expect?

As the Official Opposition, we are, in essence, in listening mode on this quite radical proposal. We would like to understand whether the “whereases” that are being partially abolished are a burden on only the regulators or whether that feeds through to industry and consumer protection—and, if so, how. I believe that, sometimes, a clearer, simpler and more focused framework is more effective. If Clause 17 helps move us in that direction, it may be needed in the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, suggested. However, it also seems very important to work out how the two parliamentary committees will exercise proper oversight going forward in a post-Brexit regulatory environment, and to ensure that any regulatory resistance, which we have been hearing about this evening, is minimised.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)My Lords, it is clear that the Committee places a strong emphasis on getting the regulatory principles right. The Government also take this matter very seriously and genuinely value the contributions made in this debate. Before I start, it is important to remember that the regulators have both principles and objectives. The regulators need to advance these objectives—regulatory principles are something that they consider only when doing so—and the Bill does not change that. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, asked me whether the regulators will be required to report on the long-term strategy. Clause 16(6) amends Schedule 1ZA to FSMA so that the FCA must explain, in its annual report, the extent to which it has implemented its long-term strategy. Clause 16(7) does the same for the PRA.

The Government agree that the regulatory principles are an important part of the statutory framework. They are also aware that each of these principles has strong support, so, while there may be a view that some could be removed, there is no consensus on which ones it would be suitable to remove. This is why, when the Government reviewed the principles, they concluded that none of the individual principles should be removed from legislation. Instead, the Government concluded that the regulatory principles must continue to play a significant part and a central role in the work of the regulators through new long-term strategies. The regulators will be required to have regard to those principles when preparing or revising their strategies, ensuring that they are applied in a more coherent and visible way at the strategic level and in a manner that supports an overall assessment of the regulators’ performance and actions.

In our debates on other clauses, there has been a widely shared view that, in some areas, regulatory requirements on firms have become overly prescriptive and, in some cases, duplicative. The Government consider that, in some areas, this is also true of the regulators, and that, over time, various requirements have been added to and extended. This places the resourcing burden on the regulators, which is ultimately paid for by firms and can reduce their capacity to act quickly and effectively.

That is why the Government consider it appropriate to change the way in which the regulatory principles in FSMA are applied to the regulators. The Government consider that this new approach will support more meaningful scrutiny of the regulators’ strategy, as opposed to repetitive and fragmented processes across the individual exercising of their functions. As I explained earlier, it would mean that, for example, rather than considering whether an individual proposal is proportionate, the regulators will be required to set out clearly how they have considered whether their strategies and work plans as a whole will result in a proportionate burden on firms.

Let me be clearthe regulatory principles will remain central to the regulators’ work under the new framework. Parliament will continue to have the full range of statutory and constitutional levers through which it can hold the regulators to account, including scrutiny by parliamentary committees and review of the regulators’ publications, such as their annual reports, on how they have advanced their statutory objectives and their annual responses to the Treasury’s letters of recommendation on economic policy—both of which the Treasury is required to lay before Parliament. The requirements for the regulators to consult on proposed rules and demonstrate how they have advanced their objectives will remain. If the rules on which the regulators are consulting will impose costs, their cost-benefit analysis must also be published. The regulators must also notify the chairs of parliamentary committees when they issue consultations. This requirement is also unchanged. If a parliamentary committee writes to a regulator concerning a publication, the regulator must respond to that committee in writing. The Government consider that these are the most effective ways of holding the regulators to account.

The accountability of financial services regulators is a significant matter for this Committee—I have heard that loud and clear. The regulatory principles are important for shaping the work of the regulators, and I recognise the strength of feeling on how they operate. However, the way in which they currently operate can reduce the regulators’ agility while doing little to support effective overall scrutiny or to materially benefit firms. Reforming how the regulatory principles work will ensure that these principles continue to be central to the work of the regulators and will support enhanced scrutiny of their overall performance. I therefore move that Clause 17 should stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 agreed.

19:30:00

Amendment 88

Moved by

88: After Clause 17, insert the following new Clause— “Treasury statement of concern(1) Where the Treasury considers that rules or guidance made by the Financial Conduct Authority or the Prudential Regulation Authority are inconsistent with primary legislation or statutory objectives, the Treasury may publish a statement of concern.(2) Where a statement of concern is published under subsection (1), the Financial Conduct Authority or the Prudential Regulation Authority must, within 60 days, publish a response explaining—(a) whether it agrees with the concern, and(b) what action it proposes to take.(3) The Treasury must lay before Parliament any statement of concern published under this section, together with any response received from the Financial Conduct Authority or the Prudential Regulation Authority.”Member’s explanatory statement This new Clause would enable the Treasury to publish a statement of concern where regulator rules or guidance appear inconsistent with primary legislation or statutory objectives, requiring a published response and Parliamentary transparency.

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)In a way, it is a pity that I tabled this amendment, because it would probably be a whole lot more informative for us to go straight on to Clause 18. However, Amendment 88 would introduce a new mechanism that was suggested to me: a formal Treasury statement of concern. The idea is that it would fill a gap that has always existed—one that becomes all the more glaring alongside the opacity created by the Bill. The FSMA 2000 settlement imagined a world in which Ministers were hands off and regulators were left to get on with it. That world has long gone. The Government are now highly interventionist in the name of growth. More generally, they signal priorities, express expectations and raise concerns, but almost all of that happens privately or through speeches and press releases that are approximate and not subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

My amendment would formally put the record straight. If the Treasury considers that

“rules or guidance … are inconsistent with primary legislation or statutory objectives, the Treasury may publish a statement of concern”

and the regulators must respond publicly within 60 days. That is all. It is not a direction, and it is not interference; it is a constitutional signalling mechanism. It would simply show that the Government have taken action on a concern, which otherwise might be unknown. The Government may say that they do not wish for such a mechanism—they do not have to use it—but legislation is not written for the preferences of a particular Minister at a particular moment in time; it is written for the system. The truth is that the Government already intervene with regulators, only informally, privately and without transparency. Why not have a formal system as part of escalation or as a pre-legislative tool?

There is also a practical point. Parliamentary time is limited, and correcting regulatory inconsistencies through statutory instruments can take months, if it happens at all. A statement of concern is a stage earlier. It would allow the Treasury to flag a potential inconsistency without immediately reaching for legislation. It would also allow the regulators to respond and, where appropriate, adjust course. It could also help resolve issues that arise when different things are said or interpreted differently in different places.

In that sense, this mechanism’s greatest strength may lie in its quiet deterrent effect: it would rarely need to be used because its existence would encourage early correction and avoid the need for statutory intervention later. A statement of concern provides exactly that. It would allow the elected arm of government to say transparently, on the record, “We see a potential inconsistency. We are not directing you, but we expect a reasoned response, and we think that this needs to be done publicly”. It would also have the benefit to the Government of them showing formally that they have taken a concern forward.

As I say, this was proposed to me, and I think that there is a point to it. There is a missing link. The Treasury often says that it does not interfere, but there has been an awful lot of correspondence and hugger-mugger between regulators and the Treasury recently in order to come forward with the growth strategy. This is a missing link. The power of Parliament has been eroded. I did not recognise a lot of the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, said about how the system works. There is a missing link in terms of what the Treasury is able to do. I beg to move.

Baroness Noakes (Con)My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 88 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It would be a useful addition to FSMA to have a specific power for the Treasury to issue a statement of concern; I particularly like the fact that it could be used without the full parliamentary process of regulations. As the noble Baroness may recall, when we debated the then Bill in 2023, the Treasury took a power to tell regulators to make rules. However, that power has to be exercised via regulation, so it needs to go through the whole statutory instrument procedure. It has not yet been used, as far as I am aware, but it is a useful backstop that the Treasury has if it wants to direct the work of the regulators, which is a perfectly reasonable thing for it to do in certain important areas.

The existence of the Treasury’s ability to issue a statement of concern would be particularly useful when interested parties were trying to get a point about things that were not working heard by the regulators. The ability to engage the Treasury in that would be very helpful, although I am sure that it would be used more as a background factor in the relationship than as an active part of the Treasury’s relationship with the regulators. I applaud the noble Baroness on her ingenuity in bringing this amendment forward.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for bringing forward these amendments. They raise two very salient points about the accountability of the financial regulators and the mechanisms by which Parliament, the Treasury and the public can scrutinise how those regulators use their powers.

One of the core functions of the Bill is to increase the power and scope of the remit of the regulators, in particular the FCA. Across the Bill, more responsibility is being transferred, more detail is being left to rules and more of the practical operation of the regime will depend on regulatory judgment, rather than primary legislation. My concern is that although the Bill increases the power of the regulators, it does not always provide a corresponding increase in oversight or scrutiny of them; as an ex-Treasury Minister, I am slightly surprised that the Treasury is entirely happy with that.

To me, Amendment 88 seems a sensible and proportionate form of challenge. It would create a formal and transparent way for the Treasury to say that, in effect, a regulator may have gone beyond what Parliament intended or may have acted in a way that is not consistent with its statutory remit. This matters because the Treasury is directly accountable to Parliament in a way that independent regulators are not. If regulators are to exercise substantial powers delegated by Parliament, there must be some meaningful mechanism by which Ministers can challenge, explain and account for how these powers are being used. We will come back to this point again at a later stage in Committee; my noble friend Lord Bridges has tabled an amendment that speaks to this same broad issue.

The underlying point is simpleif regulators are powerful, they must also be accountable. How best to achieve this should be a key objective of our scrutiny in Committee and on Report. I would be grateful, therefore, if the Minister could set out the Government’s position on this wider issue. He wrote to us shortly before Committee—a little too shortly before Committee; I say that politely—but I am not sure whether what he sent us, including the Treasury memorandum, answers our outstanding questions. So do the Government accept that the Bill increases the powers and responsibilities of the FCA and PRA? If so, do they accept that stronger oversight mechanisms are called for? What formal routes currently exist for the Treasury to raise concerns about regulator rules or guidance that may not reflect Parliament’s intention?

Also, what is the Government’s objection, if any, to periodic independent reviews of regulator performance and burden? As a former Minister, I found that, although such requirements were unpopular with the department at the time they were put into law, they proved useful in helping me keep on top of the responsible regulators and their policies.

I very much hope that the Minister will engage constructively with the problem, answer my questions, on both the previous group and this group, and appraise in a constructive spirit the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. Above all, we need reassurance that the Government recognise the importance of scrutiny, transparency and trust in the regulatory system.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)My Lords, the accountability of our financial regulators is a serious matter, and Parliament rightly takes a close interest in how the FCA and PRA exercise their powers. We have extensively discussed the FSMA model of regulation today. It is the foundation of a system of regulation under which Parliament sets the regulators’ objectives, invests them with the powers that they need to further those objectives and sets out a clear system of governance and accountability under which the regulators are required to account for their actions and effectiveness in furthering the objectives that Parliament has set for them. As I said before, the Government remain of the view that this is the most appropriate and effective model of regulation available. It has served us well and is internationally respected.

The difficulty with this amendment, therefore, is that it would cut across the foundational principle of our regulatory architecture. The FCA and PRA are operationally independent bodies. That independence is not incidental; it is the source of their authority and credibility and, ultimately, their value to the consumers and markets they serve. Under the FSMA model, it is the responsibility of the regulators to interpret their statutory objectives. It is not the role of HM Treasury to do so. This amendment would, over time, erode precisely the independence that makes those regulators effective. Markets, firms and consumers need to know that regulatory decisions are made on the merits, free from political pressure. This amendment, however well-intentioned, risks compromising that assurance.

Of course, Parliament can and does challenge the regulators where it thinks they have done something wrong. Given that their authority ultimately flows from Parliament, the regulators take that incredibly seriously. Parliament can and does make its views known to the regulators on key issues. For example, after a highly critical report from the House of Lords’ Financial Services Regulation Committee, and in recognising the lack of consensus among the stakeholders, in 2024 the FCA dropped plans to change the way that it publicised ongoing enforcement cases.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked whether the Government are satisfied with the current framework. There is an appropriate requirement already set out in FSMA that is designed to support scrutiny and oversight and, in certain circumstances, to allow the Government to give the regulators some level of direction. For example, the Government can require a regulator to review one of its rules or to appoint an independent person to review those rules where they consider this would be in the public interest. The Government can also require the regulators to make rules but cannot direct their content or purpose.

The regulators have a statutory duty to keep their existing rules under active review. This is contained in Section 3RA of FSMA. Furthermore, the Treasury has an ability to direct regulators to launch an independent review of specified rules, with the outcome laid before Parliament. The regulators are also subject to robust wider parliamentary accountability, including through the information they are required to provide to relevant committees and the vital role those committees play in questioning the regulators and critiquing their work. Those are the appropriate channels for testing the consistency of regulators’ actions with legislation or statutory objectives, not a ministerial statement of concern, which starts to undermine the principles of independent regulation. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)My Lords, I still think that there is a missing link here, but I heard what the Minister said and it is what I was expecting: the Government are frightened that this would look as if they were going to undermine independence in some way. I fully understand that. There are other regulatory interventions that Ministers make with other regulators, so it is not an entirely off-the-wall idea. It certainly was not meant to be part of the routine kind of application of day-to-day accountability. A “very rare or never” kind of application is what was envisaged, but we have given it an airing. It is not going anywhere. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 88 withdrawn.

19:45:00

Clause 18FCA and PRA reporting and consultation requirements

Amendment 89

Moved by

89: Clause 18, page 22, line 32, leave out subsections (2) and (3) Member’s explanatory statement This amendment, together with another in the name of Baroness Noakes, ensures that the FCA and the PRA continue to give guidance about how they intend to advance their objectives.

Baroness Noakes (Con)My Lords, we now come on to a bit of a ragbag group of amendments, which I should probably have split into more than one group. In moving Amendment 89, I shall also speak to Amendments 92, 93, 94, 96 and 98.

I will start with the FCA’s guidance. At present, the FCA has a power under Section 139A of FSMA to give guidance on, for example, the operation of specific parts of FSMA or its rules. Section 1K says that the guidance must—that is, must—

“include guidance about how it intends to advance its operational objectives … in relation to different categories of authorised person or regulated activity”,

and, inter alia, it has to consult on that guidance. What does this Bill do? Predictably, it eviscerates the provisions. Clause 18(2) removes Section 1K from FSMA, and Clause 18(8) takes all the substance out of Section 139A. This is part of the insidious pattern of this Bill, removing information that regulated persons might find useful—removing guidance about how a regulator would advance its objectives—and removing the requirement to consult on what is left of Section 139A. This is a Bill solely for the regulators’ convenience, regardless of the needs of those subject to regulation. Similarly, Section 2L of FSMA currently requires the PRA to consult those it regulates about how its general policies and practices are consistent with its general duties, and Clause 18(3) removes this. My Amendments 89 and 92 would remove these retrograde provisions from the Bill.

Amendments 96 and 98 are rather different. They concern statutory references to the Financial Services Regulation Committee, and I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for adding their names. The current FSMA wording about parliamentary committees derives from the 2023 Act, which, as initially drafted, referenced only the Treasury Select Committee in the other place, but that was amended during the passage of the Act to encompass any committee of your Lordships’ House set up to deal with financial services regulation or indeed any Joint Committee of both Houses. Following the passing of the Act, your Lordships’ House decided to set up the Financial Services Regulation Committee, to which I, like others, have referred several times in this Committee. Amendments 96 and 98 merely amend the 2023 wording inserted into FSMA to reflect the fact that your Lordships’ House now has a specific committee which should be referred to in legislation.

When the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Act was passed last year, we managed to get it amended to incorporate a specific reference to the Financial Services Regulation Committee, and I am a bit disappointed that the Treasury, which agreed to those amendments last year, has already forgotten that the FSMA wording is out of date and needs to be amended. I therefore hope that Amendments 96 and 98 are non-controversial and that the Government will accept them. I should explain for those noble Lords who did not take part in the passage of the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Act that the references in the amendments to the Chairman of Committees are in fact references to the Deputy Lord Speaker—when that role was created, it encompassed the function of the Chairman of Committees, but that nomenclature remains in statute. That is the Committee’s fun fact of the day.

My remaining two amendments in this group, Amendments 93 and 94, are pretty arcane for those who have not audited a bank or sat on a bank or insurer’s board. For my sins, I have done both. Following the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, FSMA was amended to require meetings at least annually between the regulators and the auditors of PRA-regulated persons. This was definitely overkill, and I am pleased that the Government have decided to delete most of Section 339B of FSMA, through Clause 18(11). They have, however, retained the requirement for the PRA to do those meetings, even if it no longer has to report on them; my Amendment 93 would remove Section 339B in its entirety. This does not mean that the PRA will never meet the auditors of the bodies it regulates: it used to meet the auditors before Clause 339B was enacted in 2013 and can continue to do so if the clause is eliminated, but it would remove the obligation on the PRA to do so. Clause 339B has in fact spawned a small industry of the PRA thinking up questions to ask the auditors to report on. The auditors then go away and write a report, usually asking their client to produce a lot of information first, and then the auditors ask the client for a fat fee. It is not value-added activity. We should leave meeting auditors to the regulator’s discretion.

In a similar vein, my Amendment 94 would amend Section 340 of FSMA, which requires the PRA to make rules about auditor co-operation. It has a similar provision for the FCA, but that merely empowers the FCA to do so. My amendment is unlike most “may”/“must” amendments in your Lordships’ House. We normally seek to replace “may” with “must”. My Amendment 94 does the reverse, so that the PRA “may” make rules if it chooses to do so, and hence aligns with the FCA by giving discretion to the PRA, which is also what my Amendment 93 aims to do. I beg to move.

Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)My Lords, before we continue the debate, we have started group 6 and we have one more complete group to do. We are going to finish at 8.45 pm and I would hate to think that we would finish mid-group, but I am in your Lordships’ hands as to whether we do that.

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)My Lords, this is the third of the trio. Clause 18 is a deletion clause, the final clause in the trio that removes consideration of the regulatory principles from the context of actual rule-making. It strips out the guidance duties, reporting duties and consultation hooks that once gave Parliament visibility into how the regulators applied their objectives and principles. Let us look at what is being systematically dismantled here. There is some overlap here with some of the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has addressed.

Clauses 18(1) and (2) delete the FCA’s and PRA’s guidance about their objectives—the very provisions which, as the Explanatory Notes admit, required the regulators to explain how they advanced those objectives. It is not a question that they still have to explain now; that has gone. Clauses 18(3) and (4) remove the explanations required on directions on consolidated supervision and authorised decisions. Clause 18(7) removes the FCA’s obligation to notify, consult or explain when issuing guidance relating to its objectives. Clauses 18(9) and (10) delete large parts of the FCA’s and PRA’s annual reporting requirements, one of the most sensible and accessible ways for Parliament to understand how objectives were dealt with in practice and would ideally be built upon. Clauses 18(12) to (14) remove linkages to other Acts of Parliament, including the auditor engagement duties that once provided an additional source of supervisory insight.

What is left? Guidance? Gone. Explanations? Gone. Participation? Gone. Annual reporting? Gone. Audit? Gone. These were the exact mechanisms through which Parliament and others scrutinised how the regulators applied their objectives and principles. Clause 18 removes them all. It is the inevitable consequence of the Clause 16 and 17 shift: the practical reality of decoupling principles from operational effectiveness and removing Parliament’s line of sight. It leaves us with no checks and absolutely no balances. For these reasons, I oppose Clause 18 standing part of the Bill.

Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 93 and 94. I have not audited a bank or sat on a bank board, but I was a member of the Sharman committee that looked at the problems with auditing following the global financial crisis. I sat on the board of one of the big four auditors, chairing its public interest committee, and I talked to a number of partners who audited the banks.

I think that we agree that audit is absolutely a foundation stone for the integrity of the capital markets. For those who are interested, it was part of the settlement following the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 that we would have audits of limited liability banks. It is particularly critical where entities are highly geared or where there is a considerable element of judgment in determining their value. If we look at the banks, they are hugely geared. People like to talk about the common equity tier 1 ratio, but if we look at the gearing that most companies use, it is the equity versus the liabilities. For a typical bank, equity is about 6%: on the back of that, you can borrow £94 and lend £100. That means that, if you have overvalued your assets by 3% and undervalued your liabilities by 3%, you end up with no equity whatever.

This is a really sensitive calculation and, historically, it would have been made with a degree of prudence and conservatism. Prudence and conservatism have now gone as guiding principles, and valuations are done neutrally. For example, this would allow a bank to declare a profit on a zero-interest credit card, on the grounds that it can bring forward the profits it thinks it will make in future. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has been great in raising these issues for some time.

There are of course huge temptations to optimism. Indeed, it is surely testament to the professionalism of our bankers, and the independent agents we employ to monitor and control bank behaviour, that banks have not got into greater trouble. There are four such agents: the independent non-executive directors; the auditors; the investors and the regulators. Many more resources are devoted to auditing banks than to regulating them, and vastly more than fund managers devote to their role as stewards. The auditors have inside knowledge and huge expertise, and it is precisely that insight, given independently, that regulators need in order to play their role.

I think that that was recognised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, when she suggested that the PRA “may” ask to speak to the auditors. The problem is that the auditors have a delicate job: they are referees. The report is done for the investors, but they need the trust of the audited entity. Indeed, they are, in effect, appointed by the audited entity, and they even sometimes describe the audited entity as a client. They are unlikely to go to the regulator without having profound concerns.

Regulators may find it helpful to call in the auditors because of problems that are visible to them: the known knowns. Under those circumstances, this amendment would of course work. However, what the regulator really needs to know is the unknown knowns: something that is known by the auditor, who has gone inside, but not known by the regulator. That is why it makes sense to mandate that the regulator “must” talk to the auditor to hear their concerns, to pick up potential emerging problems before they become critical, and to understand how the auditor judged the numbers to be true and fair.

The audit is the foundation of the integrity of our capital markets. For auditors to have material knowledge of a bank’s position that is relevant to the stability of the system and for that not to be known by the regulator seems to be completely perverse and potentially very dangerous. With that perspective, I wonder whether the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, might be content with Clause 18, on audit reporting, to remain as it stands.

20:00:00

Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)My Lords, we are sympathetic to the concerns raised by noble Lords across this group. I was glad to add my name to several amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes. I entirely agree with her and with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that the role of the relatively new and very effective Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee should be added to the 2023 Act. We are lucky to have such an assembly of experts and effective questioners, as well as Lords clerks, to help with the enormous task of scrutiny in the financial services sector.

We have just been discussing the accountability of the regulators, the importance of scrutiny and the need to ensure that the FCA and PRA exercise their considerable powers in a way that is transparent, proportionate and properly justified. This group raises those same issues in the more specific context of guidance, consultation, cost-benefit analysis and the way regulators explain the impact of what they do. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. Our Amendment 90 asks a serious question about cost determination. The cost-benefit analysis panels within the regulators are an existing mechanism of accountability. They are designed to provide scrutiny of the costs and benefits of regulatory proposals and to help ensure that regulators properly consider the burden that their rules impose.

But there is a significant limitation. As I understand it, the cost-benefit analysis panels are engaged only where the regulator makes a rule change that the regulator itself considers to be materially significant. Should there not be a more independent mechanism for testing whether a regulator’s view that a proposal has no or minimal cost impact is actually correct? If the regulator decides that a proposal has no or only minimal cost impact, then the process may not trigger a cost-benefit analysis—but that judgment may itself be contestable, especially if it is a net threshold, hiding both the costs and the benefits. Firms may take a very different view about the practical cost of implementation, the operational burden, the systems changes required and the cumulative impact when viewed alongside other requirements. Indeed, cumulative effect is a concern rightly enshrined in my noble friend Lady Noakes’s Amendment 119, which we will discuss on a later group.

There is also a wider issue. The cost-benefit analysis panels are not generally able to assess changes in guidance or enforcement activity. Guidance can be hugely significant in practice. Enforcement activity can create powerful incentives and costs across the sector, even beyond the firm that is directly affected. So the question is not simply whether a formal rule change has costs; it is whether the regulators’ activity as a whole is proportionate, whether it is evidence-based and whether the burden it places on firms is properly understood. That is why we want to press the Minister on whether the Government will give thought to expanding the remit of the cost-benefit analysis panels. For example, how will they operate in relation to the FCA’s new powers on credit, on in-person banking and on payment regulation?

Equally importantly, should they not be able to consider whether guidance, supervisory expectations and certain enforcement-related approaches carry material cost implications? Cost-benefit analysis forces a discipline on regulators. It requires them to summarise what they are doing succinctly and clearly, and to ask whether the benefit justifies the burden, whether the same objective could be achieved in a less costly way and whether the cumulative effect of regulations is proportionate. I always turn to the impact assessment of a rule if it is available, as it allows one to get to the heart of what is happening.

The broader point is that transparency, consultation and cost scrutiny are not bureaucratic obstacles to good regulation; they actually help to prevent unintended consequences and excess red tape, and they sometimes draw attention to harm to SMEs. They give Parliament and industry confidence that regulatory powers are being exercised responsibly.

So I would be grateful if the Minister could address the specific issues raised by Amendment 90. I have five questions, to which the Minister may want to respond by letter if necessary. First, who in practice decides whether a proposed regulatory change has no or minimal cost impact? Secondly, what is the threshold, in millions of pounds, and is it gross or net of benefits? What safeguards exist to test that judgment? Fourthly, are the Government satisfied that the cost-benefit analysis panels have a sufficiently wide remit? Fifthly, will the Minister consider whether that remit should be expanded to include guidance, supervisory expectations and other regulatory activity that may impose material costs on our important financial services sector?

As we have said throughout Committee, accountability must keep pace with regulatory power. If regulators are to be given more responsibility, the scrutiny of their decisions, their processes and their costs must be strengthened. I will listen carefully to all the Minister’s responses on cost-benefit and, unless these are satisfactory, the Opposition will want to bring forward an amendment on Report.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)My Lords, I begin by explaining the Government’s purpose behind Clause 18 and why it should stand part of the Bill. Over time many reporting and procedural requirements have been placed on the FCA and the PRA, increasing burdens, introducing duplication and in some cases complicating oversight, scrutiny and accountability. There is broad agreement that this dynamic is true for firms subject to regulation. I ask noble Lords to reflect on whether it might also be true for the regulators and on whether that is slowing them down and ultimately having a negative impact on firms and consumers.

These burdens are not without consequences. The regulators must follow the letter of these requirements, diverting time and resources away from other work. Ultimately the cost of that work is passed on to firms through the levy they pay and through their engagement with the asks of the regulator. The Government’s view is that there is scope to rationalise parts of this approach to enhance the effect of scrutiny and to help regulators become more agile and ultimately better support innovation and growth.

The Government sought feedback on which regulator publications stakeholders found most useful and then worked closely with the regulators to consider this feedback and further assess the range of requirements placed on them. Feedback to the regulatory environment consultation indicated very low engagement with certain types of regulator publications, and the regulators’ data confirms this. In recent years, the FCA and the PRA consulted on several proposals to which they received zero responses, although I accept that not all publications are created equal.

I have listened carefully to the concerns raised, particularly the argument that these provisions remove practical tools that help Parliament and stakeholders understand what the regulators are doing and why. I recognise that concern, and that is why the Government have approached this area carefully. Clause 18 is carefully targeted and relatively modest. The Government are retaining the vast majority of the existing transparency and reporting framework. Clause 18 is focused on removing a small number of requirements where the burden of complying is disproportionate to their value. These changes do not prevent the regulators undertaking any of these activities where they judge it useful to do so. Instead, they give the regulators greater flexibility to focus on delivering their strategic priorities.

This clause must also be read in the context of the wider framework. The Bill introduces new long-term strategies, maintains the requirement for regulators to respond annually to Treasury recommendation letters and provides for an additional annual report on how the FCA and the PRA have complied with their competitiveness and growth objectives. Taken together with the existing framework in FSMA, these measures are intended to strengthen overall transparency, not weaken it.

I turn to the amendments, starting with Amendment 89—

Baroness Noakes (Con)Before the Minister moves on, can I just press him on the evidence of stakeholders that has been relied upon to sweep away so much stuff in Clause 18? Did the stakeholders specifically say they were not interested in guidance that was issued by the regulators or in the consultation on that guidance?

Lord Stockwood (Lab)Unfortunately, the precise question was not asked in the consultation.

Baroness Noakes (Con)So on what basis are the Government making the decision to remove the requirement under FSMA to issue the guidance, and obviously, therefore, to consult on it?

Lord Stockwood (Lab)I will have to come back to the noble Baroness. The broader requirement is that we are trying to streamline the process to take the regulatory burdens away. We recognise that we need to give a precise answer on that.

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)The Minister mentioned taking away regulatory burdens, but the Government are actually taking away regulator burdens. They are not the same thing.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)They are not the same thing. The approach we are trying to take is to streamline duplication while not in any way detracting from the overall process. That is the principle we are trying to follow here.

Amendment 89 would preserve the statutory requirements on the FCA and the PRA to give guidance about how they intend to advance their objectives. This requirement was introduced by the Financial Services Act 2012, and since it came into force, both the FCA and the PRA have published guidance fulfilling this requirement, which is updated when necessary. For example, most recently the PRA updated this approach to policy statements in February 2025. Removing these statutory requirements will not prevent the regulators giving such guidance where they consider it beneficial to do so. These requirements would also be duplicative with the new long-term strategies, which will set out the regulators’ approach and priorities for advancing their objectives, as well as other statutory publications, such as the regulators’ annual reports.

Baroness Kramer (LD)Is the Minister suggesting that, in dealing with the long-term strategy, there will be the same level of detail as is normally provided in guidance? I am somewhat confused when he explains that one is a substitute for the other.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)Could you repeat the question?

Baroness Kramer (LD)If I understood the Minister correctly—do correct me if I am wrong—the FCA or the PRA will have the opportunity to provide guidance if they deem it necessary. But if they choose not to, that should not be worrying, because the equivalent statement will occur either in the five-year strategy or in a report on how the FCA is achieving its five-year strategy. Is he suggesting that that will be at the same level of detail as the guidance that is required today? That is what I am trying to understand.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)I believe that they still have to publish the full guidance, but let me come back with a written response on that.

Turning to Amendments 90 and 92, the Government recognise the impact that changes in rules and guidance can have on firms, particularly smaller firms and regulated persons trying to understand what is expected of them. The government reforms are intended to avoid imposing full consultation and cost-benefit analysis requirements where proposals are genuinely minor or low impact, while preserving the wider consultation framework for substantive changes. Minor changes to rules include corrections, clarifications or minor technical updates, and it will be for the regulators themselves to determine whether a rule change meets this definition, as they are best placed to assess the impact of such changes. For example, last year, the FCA consulted on reducing late filing charges from £250 to £100. Under this provision, the FCA would not be obliged to consult and could make these changes faster.

Baroness Kramer (LD)What if the change had been in the other direction and had added an additional £100 pounds? Would the FCA have been in a position to decide that that was not material for consultation?

Lord Stockwood (Lab)I think there is a broad principle: we are trying to give the FCA the power to make those small changes in both directions.

Baroness Noakes (Con)Where does that power begin and end? I can understand it when we are talking about hundreds of pounds; I am not sure I understand how much flexibility is now being given to the regulators to do things. We can probably recognise, at one end of the spectrum, something that is very significant, but who is the arbiter of what is so unimportant that it does not have to be consulted on? The regulator. Are the regulators the right people to make that decision? No, they are not, because they are not the people affected by the change.

Lord Stockwood (Lab)Our overarching principle is that we are trying to show trust in the regulators while recognising the significant feedback from the debate today. We are hoping that minor changes will be in their gift and their expertise.

I will come back to my notes here. The measure is about giving the regulators the flexibility to gather industry input in more efficient ways. It is not about bypassing industry, but rather about recognising that the industry’s time is valuable and should be focused on engaging with consultations that genuinely have impact. Other channels, such as round tables with firms, supervisor interactions, meeting with trade bodies and engagement with statutory panels, can provide a more efficient route to understand industry’s issues on what are minor or technical changes. The Government’s view is that retaining these specific requirements in all cases would preserve unnecessary process, even where it adds little value in practice, and that the Bill preserves consultation requirements in most cases and where there is genuine value for the sector, as well as regulatory oversight.

Amendments 93 and 94 seek to remove all requirements on the PRA to meet the auditors or PRA-authorised persons. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, noted, the Bill removes the requirement for the FCA to meet at least once a year with the auditor of any PRA-authorised firm that has been designated as important to the stability of the UK financial system. Requiring both the FCA and the PRA to meet PRA-authorised firms is duplicative and unnecessarily burdensome in terms of the effective use of resources. However, the Government’s view is that removing all requirements around engaging this important group of auditors would go too far. It is vital that the PRA continues to engage with these auditors and plan for meetings to take place at least annually, to ensure that the PRA can secure the valuable insights into the health of systemically important, regulated firms that auditors can provide. It is for this reason that the Government cannot accept these amendments.

20:15:00

Turning now to Amendments 96 and 98, the Financial Services Regulation Committee plays an important role in scrutinising the financial services regulators and holding them to account. The Government recognise this and thanks the committee for its work. However, the existing references in Schedules 1ZA and 1ZB already operate effectively and are clearly capable of covering the Financial Services Regulation Committee. In other words, there is no legal gap here that requires correction for the scrutiny framework to function. I note that a comparison has been drawn with more recent legislation, but the fact that express drafting was used in a later Act after the committee had been established does not mean that the current provisions are defective or unworkable in FSMA. For those reasons, the Government do not think these amendments are necessary.

I hope that I have reassured noble Lords about the importance the Government place on accountability, transparency and Parliament’s access to useful information. The Government’s view is that these amendments or the removal of Clause 18 would not improve the Bill. Clause 18 removes the targeted subset of lower value requirements while preserving the broader transparency framework and complementing the new report in a strategic accountability measure elsewhere in the Bill. In the interests of time, I will respond in writing to the five questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Noakes (Con)My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. Clause 18, guidance, consultation and whether regulators can be trusted is unfinished business as far as this Committee is concerned. I look forward to getting the answers on questions that have been put, but my instinct is that the Government’s approach is going too far in favour of letting the regulators determine what their interactions will be with the regulated community. On the one hand, there are independent regulators which need forms of oversight, and this Bill is just chipping away all the time at those points at which there can be some interaction between those charged with the oversight of them. By constantly removing these points at which there can be some intervention, we end up with a weaker situation overall. I will need to think very carefully about what we do about Clause 18 in general when we get to Report. I think it is part of the issues that we have been developing. Clauses 16, 17 and 18 are all part of one picture that we need a more satisfactory answer to.

Turning to the auditors. I was not trying to stop auditor meetings—

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)I mentioned at the beginning of this afternoon that when an amendment is being pressed, noble Lords have to be short. The withdrawal of amendments is starting to take longer and longer, which eats into the time for the other groups.

Baroness Noakes (Con)I hear what the noble Lord has said. I think it is important that we have the opportunity to comment before withdrawing amendments. It is not simply a case of getting up and saying, “I withdraw”.

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)I just say to the noble Baroness that it is clear in paragraph 8.82 of the Companion that noble Lords should

“be brief and need not respond to all the points made during the debate”.

Baroness Noakes (Con)My Lords, I had no intention of responding to all points made in the debate. There are a number of different amendments in this group. They could have been degrouped into four or five separate groups, and we could have had a short winding-up on each one of them. We have effectively four groups here, so we are going to be talking about all of them.

On auditors, I was not trying to suggest that auditor meetings should not take place: of course, there is value in those meetings, which have taken place for decades. They were not invented when FSMA was being drafted; they were already part of the thing. The amendments are not that important; I was simply trying to give the PRA the same flexibility that the FCA has.

On the nomenclature in the Act and the Financial Services Regulation Committee, I give notice that I will return to that matter in Committee. My committee will think that it is important that, now that it exists, it is reflected in statute. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 89 withdrawn.

Amendments 90 to 98 not moved.

Clause 18 agreed.

Clause 19 agreed.

Amendment 99

Moved by

99: After Clause 19, insert the following new Clause— “FCA and PRA secondary competitiveness and growth objectivesThe Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows—(a) in section 1EB (competitiveness and growth objective) for “aligning with” substitute “consideration of”;(b) in section 2H (secondary objectives and duty to have regard to regulatory principles) for “aligning with” substitute “consideration of”.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment modifies the secondary competitiveness and growth objectives of the FCA and the PRA by requiring international standards to be considered rather than aligned with.

Baroness Noakes (Con)My Lords, I will speak also to Amendments 100 and 102 in this group. I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for adding her name to Amendments 99 and 102, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for adding his name to Amendments 99 and 100. My noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral is unable to be with us today, as he is on our Front Bench in the Chamber dealing with the Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill, so I shall also speak briefly to his Amendment 101.

Amendment 99 concerns the secondary competitiveness and growth objective, which applies to both the FCA and the PRA. When it was introduced in the 2023 Act, it was no secret that the regulators were less than enthusiastic. Our regulators have always been heavily involved with the international financial institution community. They often act as chairmen, as is currently the case with the Governor of the Bank of England and the Financial Stability Board. They are members of as many committees as they can get on, and they are completely embedded in the international standards infrastructure. It was unsurprising, therefore, when they managed to convince the Treasury that it should make the secondary competitive and growth objective subject to alignment with international standards.

During the passage of the 2023 Act, I tried to get this watered down, because I had a real concern that the PRA and the FCA would hide behind international standards when making rules, in a way that does not optimise UK competitiveness and growth. International standards are a good thing, but only if all the major countries implement them. In fact, there is a history of patchy adoption—not least by the United States of America, which is, of course, one of our main competitors in financial services. Unfortunately, the Treasury supported the regulators and kept alignment in the 2023 Act.

I return to this theme with Amendment 99, which would change the words of the competitiveness and growth objective so that the regulators must consider international standards only, rather than automatically aligning with them. We have had three years of experience of the operation of the Act. It is time, I believe, that we made growth and competitiveness an unambiguous part of the regulators’ objectives.

In the past three years, we have seen the continuation of US exceptionalism. It has not implemented Basel III, and we have to remember that it never implemented Basel II. To be fair to the PRA, it has found reasons to follow what other countries are doing to delay certain aspects of Basel III and has performed contortions to justify implementing other aspects in a way that does not fully hit smaller UK banks, but the fact is that other countries are implementing Basel III in ways that suit them, and it would be more honest if our own regulators were given that freedom.

Another problem area in bank capital is the requirement to hold MREL, the minimum requirement for eligible liabilities. This started as a European requirement that went way beyond the international rules for total loss-absorbing capital for global systemically important banks. The UK has just three G-SIBs out of 29. Unfortunately, the UK sets MREL for many more banks than three. This is not set by the PRA, which might have a problem justifying it by reference to international standards, because the international standards are clearly less than the European model which we are sticking to. It is in fact set by the Bank of England, which does not have a competitiveness and growth objective. This shows what happens when regulation is detached from the interests of the UK economy.

I turn to the FCA. When the Financial Services Regulation Committee looked at stablecoins, we asked the FCA about its work on stablecoins aligning with the secondary competitiveness and growth objective. The director of payments and digital assets at the FCA was keen to tell us what the FCA did on committees at IOSCO, how it helped to draft the FSB’s paper on stablecoins and how it brought together regulators and standard-setting bodies in London. Although the executive director for payments said that the FCA was trying to find solutions right for the UK, it is clear that the instincts of the regulators’ staff is to look to international standards bodies rather than to think about what is best for UK competitiveness and growth. I do not think that the secondary objective’s potential will be maximised while the comfort blanket of international standards is reinforced by the FSMA requirement to align with them.

Amendment 100 is much more straightforward and I hope that it is uncontentious. I fully support Clause 20’s requirement for the regulators to report annually on the secondary objective. The two initial reports required by the 2023 Act make it clear that the competitiveness and growth objective is not a finite event but a continuing challenge. This was also one of the key findings of the first report by the Financial Services Regulation Committee. My amendment would merely require the Treasury to lay the annual reports before Parliament. It is customary to lay key accountability documents before Parliament. If this is not a key accountability document, I do not know what is. I hope that the Minister can accept this amendment.

I was going to go on to Amendment 101 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, in anticipation of his absence, but I see that he is with us, so I will not speak to his amendment but will conclude with my final amendment in this group, Amendment 102.

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, was not here at the start as he came into the Room two minutes late, so the noble Baroness may go ahead.

Baroness Noakes (Con)I thank the noble Lord for telling me about my noble friend’s disqualification from speaking; I will now speak to his Amendment 101. I find that it would be a useful addition to Clause 20, by imposing some modest requirements such as making the reports comparable with previous reports and covering things such as the cumulative cost of regulation and an explanation of how proportionality has been applied, including for SMEs. I do not think that any part of this amendment should be controversial, and I hope that the Minister will be able to accept it.

Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)I thank my noble friend.

Baroness Noakes (Con)My last amendment in this group, Amendment 102, is also about the secondary competitiveness and growth objective, but, this time, for the Financial Market Infrastructure Committee of the Bank of England. The FMIC was set up with a secondary innovation objective, and there is clearly a link between innovation and growth and competitiveness—but they are not synonymous. I am not sure why the FMIC was set up with innovation objectives rather than full competitiveness and growth objectives, and I do not recall a substantive debate on that during the passage of the 2023 Act.

20:30:00

Again, the work of the Financial Services Regulation Committee has highlighted the disparity between the Bank of England and the FCA. We recently concluded our report on stablecoins. The regulation of stablecoins is split between the Bank and the FCA, with the FCA regulating both prudentially and for conduct for all stablecoins other than those designated as systemic by the Treasury. Once a stablecoin has been designated as systemic, prudential regulation shifts to the Bank and the FCA confines itself to conduct regulations.

Stablecoins are an example of how the financial services world is rapidly reshaping itself. Regulation clearly needs to ensure that these new services operate safely in all dimensions but also in a way that allows the financial services sector to maximise its commercial potential. Our system of regulation clearly has to support the competitiveness of the UK in this new digital world. I do not think that it is sensible for the biggest players, which are likely to be designated as systemic, to be regulated primarily by the Bank of England, which does not have a secondary competitiveness and growth objective, but for the smaller players to be regulated by the FCA, which does. That is what my Amendment 102 seeks to change.

I beg to move.

Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)My Lords, I agree with all the amendments to which my noble friend Lady Noakes just spoke, but Amendment 99 merits attention. I will speak to it very briefly, as I get a sense that everyone is wanting to get out of this lovely Room to eat something.

This amendment asks an interesting question; perhaps the Minister can answer it when he winds up. I am interested in what is more important. Is it the alignment with global international standards, or is it the competitiveness and growth objective? When one is thinking about these international standards, do we think that it is more important to align with those standards than it is to improve the competitiveness and growth of the financial services sector? I ask this as a genuine question. I can see an argument for saying that alignment with international standards adds to competitiveness and growth, but, if we believe that those international standards undermine growth, what is more important?

I ask that because—once again, I draw your Lordships’ attention to my entry in the register—every day, I am seeing, as my noble friend Lady Noakes alluded to, the fragmenting of international standards. Noble Lords may take very different views on that, but it is undeniably the case that the overall approach of the large financial sectors to adhering to those standards, if they ever really existed, is now under enormous pressure. Therefore, if we want to retain the competitiveness of the City and its contribution to the growth of this country, we need to be very mindful of that. If we want to continue to attract high levels of global capital here, we cannot, to my mind, just blindly say, “We must align with international standards”, without being fully cognisant of the consequences.

The amendment moved by my noble friend asks a very big question, which I look forward to hearing the Minister address.

Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)My Lords, I rise briefly to speak against all of these amendments, but the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, has asked an interesting question here: are we making this legislation for the City or for the country? My question to the Minister, therefore, is: does aligning with international standards mean that we can actually set higher standards? That is certainly what I would like us to do in terms of money laundering and the other issues that I raised earlier, but I think that the assumption in this amendment is that we might set lower standards.

One of the things that aligning with international standards would do is improve our international standing in this uncertain geopolitical age. Undercutting standards would be severely damaging to our international standing in the world. That is a much broader question than just the City.

I will cover all these amendments collectively. It is no secret that throughout all the previous financial services Bills I have worked on, I have opposed competitiveness and growth objectives. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, will be delighted to know that it was his earlier contribution to the clause stand part debate that helped me to see clearly that what we are doing here is singling out the growth and competitiveness objectives from everything else. One of the ways in which noble Lords tried to deal with that in earlier groups was by adding crucial issues such as climate. The other way of approaching the problem, which I may well be tempted to do on Report, is by proposing that Clause 20 does not stand part.

It is important to raise the issue again now, given that just this week the Bank for International Settlements has spoken about the financial risk associated with big tech’s AI spending spree—in its terminology—which could lead to a prolonged investment bust that could have significant impacts on financial markets and the global economy. It produced the figure that the five biggest hyperscalers expect to invest more than $1 trillion from 2025 to the end of 2026. We are in a position of risk, so I believe we should look at growth and competitiveness again.

Amendments 102 and 104 seek to extend further than the Government have gone on the growth and competitiveness agendas. That is an extraordinarily bad and extremely risky idea. I am happy to carry forward that idea and keep saying it on Report.

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)My Lords, we have come to the end of the time available for Grand Committee today. Although it is unusual, I beg to move that the debate on this amendment be adjourned. We will return to this debate on the next day in Committee. Only those noble Lords present at the start of this group can speak when the group resumes. I have asked the clerk to circulate a list of those present in the usual channels.

Debate on Amendment 99 adjourned.

Committee adjourned at 8.37 pm.