Making public services work for you with your digital identity – Consultation document (PDF)
Above all, the digital ID will be useful. It will help people to prove who they are and things about themselves, like their age, in the public and private sectors.
Cabinet Office
Making public services
work
for
you
with
your
digital
identity
Presented to Parliament by the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister at the Cabinet Office by Command of His Majesty March 2026 CP 1498
© Crown copyright 2026
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Office
Contents
Ministerial foreword .......................................................................................................... 9 Executive summary ......................................................................................................... 11 How to respond to this consultation ......................................................................... 14 Part 1: Our ambition ....................................................................................................... 15 Proving identity digitally ............................................................................................ 16 Chapter 1.1: Our proposed solution ............................................................................ 17 Chapter 1.2: What the digital ID means for you .......................................................... 18 Chapter 1.3: Next steps .............................................................................................. 19 Part 2: Our approach ...................................................................................................... 21 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 21 Chapter 2.1: Creating the digital ID ............................................................................. 21 Building on existing infrastructure ............................................................................ 21 Underpinning the digital ID in law ............................................................................. 22 Issuing the digital ID ................................................................................................. 22 Devolved and Common Travel Area considerations ................................................ 24 Chapter 2.2: Storing, managing and using the digital ID ............................................. 26 Storing the digital ID ................................................................................................. 26 Digital verification services ................................................................................... 26 Updating the digital ID .............................................................................................. 26 Deleting and revoking the digital ID ......................................................................... 27 Using and checking the digital ID ............................................................................. 27 Intermediary services ............................................................................................ 28 Government Checker service ............................................................................... 28 Part 3: Useful .................................................................................................................. 32 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 32 Chapter 3.1: Information contained in the digital ID .................................................... 32 Core information about an individual ....................................................................... 33 Information to support joined-up public services ...................................................... 34 Consideration of further information ......................................................................... 34 Address ................................................................................................................. 34 6
Sex or gender information .................................................................................... 35 Keeping details up to date ....................................................................................... 35 Chapter 3.2: Transforming public services .................................................................. 38 How digital ID can help ............................................................................................ 39 Digital ID as the foundation of transformed public services ..................................... 40 Chapter 3.3: Utility in the wider economy .................................................................... 44 Chapter 3.4: Tackling illegal working ........................................................................... 48 How right to work checks could change ................................................................... 48 Business support ...................................................................................................... 49 Part 4: Inclusive .............................................................................................................. 51 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 51 Chapter 4.1: Eligibility for the digital ID ....................................................................... 51 Minimum age for eligibility ........................................................................................ 51 Lowering the minimum age of eligibility to 13 ....................................................... 51 Providing everyone with the ability to have a digital ID from birth ........................ 52 Chapter 4.2 Unlocking access across society ............................................................. 55 Traditional identity document exclusion ................................................................... 55 Digital inclusion ........................................................................................................ 55 Groups requiring targeted support ........................................................................... 56 Chapter 4.3 Commitment to supporting inclusion ....................................................... 59 Practical onboarding support ................................................................................... 59 Digital inclusion support ........................................................................................... 59 Chapter 4.4 Accessibility ............................................................................................. 61 Chapter 4.5: Alternative access routes ....................................................................... 63 Part 5: Trusted ................................................................................................................ 65 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 65 Chapter 5.1: Data protection and privacy .................................................................... 65 Building on existing progress ................................................................................... 65 Exercising greater consent and control .................................................................... 66 Privacy by design and default .................................................................................. 67 Chapter 5.2: Securing the national digital ID system .................................................. 70
7
Building on existing cyber security best practice and processes ............................. 70 Vulnerable and at-risk individuals ............................................................................ 70 National security ....................................................................................................... 71 Lawful access ........................................................................................................... 71 Police powers ........................................................................................................... 71 Chapter 5.3: Fraud as a national challenge ................................................................ 74 Chapter 5.4: Ensuring strong oversight and governance ............................................ 77 Existing oversight structures .................................................................................... 77 Additional oversight arrangements ........................................................................... 77 Part 6: Wider Summary of Impacts ................................................................................. 81 Impact on households .............................................................................................. 81 Impact on the public sector ...................................................................................... 82 Impact on the Economy ........................................................................................... 84 Impacts on the existing DVS sector ...................................................................... 84 Impacts on relying parties ..................................................................................... 85 Impacts on employers ........................................................................................... 86 Impact on illegal workers ...................................................................................... 87
8
Ministerial foreword
Currently, it’s too hard to get what you need from the government, when you need it. The current legacy system of call centres, paperwork and the need to tell your story
multiple
times
to
different
parts
of
government,
with
hours
on
hold
and
not
knowing
where
you
are
in
the
process,
is
not
good
enough.
In its place, we will build a truly modern Britain where public services work for you. A new digital state – that will be there for you when you need it most. But first, we need to build the foundations for these new modern public services. That’s what the digital ID system is for. It will be free to access for anyone who wants it and it will be built on three core
principles:
●
It must be usefulIt needs to be easier than the old telephone and paper-based
system.
●
It must be secureYou will have more control over what data you share and we
expect
nothing
less
than
banking
levels
of
security.
●
It must be for everyoneWe won’t leave people behind and will help you if you
struggle
with
technology
or
don’t
have
other
forms
of
ID,
like
a
passport,
for
example.
With digital ID, you’ll be able to login to the GOV.UK App and prove who you are. But
unlike
an
ordinary
login,
digital
ID
will
work
across
different
departments
and
come
together
in
the
GOV.UK
App
on
your
phone
–
so
you
can
access
all
of
the
services
you
need
in
one
place.
We know there’s been a significant level of public interest in the digital ID system, which
is
why
we’re
launching
this
national
conversation,
so
you
can
have
your
say
on
how
it
is
built.
This consultation seeks your feedback on how to build a system that is useful for
everyone,
to
help
you
access
the
services
you
need.
For example, what information could be useful to include in the new digital proof of
identity
to
stop
the
rummage
for
a
utility
bill
or
bank
statement?
Which
government
services could
be
improved?
Like
getting
a
driving
licence
or
checking
your
tax
code?
And
how
will
we
make
sure
everyone
is
included?
Our baseline is to start with the fewest data points possible, enough to simply prove you
are
who
you
say
you
are
and
nothing
more
–
but
if
more
is
needed
to
support
the
uses
you
and
other
members
of
the
public
want,
like
proving
your
address,
that’s
something
we’ll
explore.
We cannot continue on this two-track approach where services in the private sector are
fast,
easy
and
digital
and
those
in
the
public
sector
are
slow,
clunky
and
disjointed.
9
This is why this government is doing the hard work to build the foundations of the
modern
state
and
the
public
services
of
the
future.
The digital ID system will help transform public services but we want you to want it and
be
part
of
it.
Now is your chance.
Rt Hon Darren Jones MP
Chief
Secretary
to
the
Prime
Minister
10
Executive summary
The government intends to introduce a national digital ID (identity document) system.
This
will
sit
at
the
heart
of
next-generation
digital
public
services
in
the
UK
and
support
innovation
in
the
wider
economy.
It
will
help
unlock
entirely
new
ways
to
offer
goods
and
services,
and
be
key
to
making
people’s
interactions
with
the
state
as
efficient
and
useful
as
those
they
are
accustomed
to
in
the
private
sector,
like
online
banking.
At its heart, this system is about making people's everyday lives easier by modernising
old-fashioned
processes.
The
new
digital
ID
will:
● be a convenient way for people to prove who they are ● be secure and put people more in control of their data ● offer everyone eligible access to an inclusive ID, without up-front charges ● help government to reduce bureaucracy and build the intuitive, efficient, and
responsive
public
services
the
UK
deserves
11
We want people in the UK to shape the system and how it will work to ensure these
objectives
can
be
achieved.
This
is
why
we
are
running
a
wide-reaching
and
inclusive
consultation
to
gather
views
and
bring
people
together
for
discussion
and
debate,
ultimately
informing
our
future
design
choices.
We propose that three core principles will guide the design of the new digital ID. It must
be:
● Useful : widely usable across the economy as a way for individuals to prove their
identity
–
and
central
to
the
next
generation
of
public
services
● Inclusive: available to create and access at no cost to individuals and inclusive
by
design
–
helping
those
who
currently
struggle
to
prove
who
they
are
or
are
digitally
excluded
● Trusted: underpinned by robust privacy, resilience and security measures that
put
people
in
control
–
built
to
rigorous
government
standards
for
digital
verification
services
We are designing the new digital ID as something people will want to get, rather than
something
they
must
have.
There
will
be
no
legal
obligation
for
people
to
have
or
present
the
digital
ID.
The digital ID will primarily be stored as a digital document on someone’s device, such
as
compatible
smartphone
or
tablet.
We
expect
it
to
include
their
full
name,
date
of
birth,
a
photo
and
nationality
–
though
not
all
of
this
information
will
need
to
be
shared
in
full
when
the
digital
ID
is
used.
For
example,
where
possible
it
will
just
share
that
a
person
is
‘over-18’
or
has
a
right
to
work,
rather
than
sharing
their
full
date
of
birth
or
nationality.
To deliver the new system in the most cost-effective way possible, we will be expanding
on
existing
government
systems
which
are
already
successfully
proving
and
verifying
people’s
identities.
This consultation is structured as follows● Part 1: Our ambition introduces the current landscape before setting out our
goals
for
the
new
system
and
the
high-level
benefits
it
will
bring
to
people
across
the
UK
● Part 2: Our approach describes how we are intending to build the digital ID
system,
harnessing
the
government’s
existing
investments
in
developing
a
digital
state.
It
explains
the
lifecycle
of
the
digital
ID
–
how
it
will
be
issued,
where
it
will
be
stored
and
how
it
can
be
shared
and
checked
● Part 3: Useful discusses how the digital ID system has the potential to help us
consistently
identify
people,
so
we
can
reduce
bureaucracy
and
build
more
intuitive,
efficient,
and
responsive
public
services
in
the
future.
It
explains
how
it
will
be
usable
in
the
wider
economy,
and
how
we
will
make
use
of
the
digital
ID
to
12
help tackle illegal working, so that only those with the right to work in the UK can
do
so.
These
chapters
ask
questions
about
what
information
should
be
included
on
the
digital
ID
and
how
it
could
be
most
useful
to
you
● Part 4: Inclusive covers the government’s plans for an ID and digital inclusion
drive,
to
make
the
digital
ID
available
and
accessible
to
all.
It
discusses
who
will
be
eligible,
including
the
minimum
age
for
the
digital
ID. It
invites
views
on
what
groups
may
need
extra
support,
what
their
needs
are
and
what
alternative
access
routes
could
look
like
● Part 5: Trusted includes information on how we will design the new system to
ensure
that
everyone
can
have
confidence
that
it
will
protect
their
data.
It
includes
discussion
of
technical
security
measures,
data
protection
standards
and
how
people
can
exercise
greater
consent
and
control
when
using
the
digital
ID.
There
is
also
a
chapter
on
governance
and
oversight
● Part 6: Wider considerations outlines our early assessment of the potential
impacts
of
the
system
and
the
value
we
believe
it
could
have,
from
helping
us
build
more
intuitive,
efficient,
and
responsive
public
services
to
reducing
friction
in
the
wider
economy
A national digital ID system is vital public infrastructure for the digital age. We want to
draw
on
the
expertise
and
wisdom
of
a
wide
range
of
stakeholders,
from
businesses
to
trade
unions,
technologists
and
civil
society,
as
well
as
leaders
in
the
public
and
private
sectors
who
can
use
the
digital
ID
to
improve
services
for
people
in
the
UK.
Key
design
decisions
will
only
be
taken
after
this
consultation,
to
build
the
best
possible
product
for
everyone.
We
are
grateful
to
everyone
who
takes
the
time
to
participate.
13
How to respond to this consultation The consultation is open from 10 March to 5 May.
You can respond to the consultation questions via this survey link: http://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/making-public-services-work-for-you-with-your-digital-identity.
Alternatively, you can send responses to consultation@digitalid.cabinetoffice.gov.uk.
You will receive an automated email confirmation if your email response is successfully
received.
Responses can be sent by post toc/o Digital ID
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London
SW1A 2AS When responding, please state whether you are responding as an individual or
representing
the
views
of
an
organisation.
Your response will be most useful if it is framed in direct response to the questions
posed,
though
further
comments
and
evidence
are
also
welcome.
You can find the privacy notice for this consultation here.
Following this initial 8-week consultation period, we will be running a ‘People’s Panel on
Digital
ID’
–
an
in-depth
deliberative
engagement
process
with
a
broadly
UK
representative
sample
of
120
individuals
to
discuss
the
policy
in
detail.
Individuals
will
be
selected
through
sortition
(civic
lottery).
Participants will be invited to a series of in-person and online workshops where they will
learn
about
the
policy
area
through
expert
presentations
and
panel
discussions.
They
will
be
supported
by
expert
facilitators
to
consider
diverse
perspectives
and
weigh
trade-offs
before
working
towards
a
shared
set
of
recommendations
for
government.
This
process
will
conclude
on
21
June,
which
will
be
the
end
of
the
formal
consultation
process.
14
Part 1Our ambition
In the UK, we lack a single, authoritative way to prove that we are who we say we are.
Online
and
offline,
public
and
private
services
frequently
ask
us
to
prove
our
identity,
but
we
have
to
do
so
using
a
range
of
documents
that
were
never
intended
to
play
this
part
–
like
passports,
driving
licences
and
utility
bills.
This
generates
needless
bureaucracy
and
leaves
many
struggling
to
afford,
find
or
assemble
evidence
of
their
identity
in
their
interactions
with
government
and
in
the
wider
economy.
This leads to several problems● Proving identity is confusing, complex and burdensome – people can find
having
to
navigate
different
documents
and
paperwork
for
different
purposes
frustrating
and
repetitive,
while
government,
businesses
and
other
organisations
must
also
juggle
this
complexity.
This
places
unnecessary
burdens
on
people
and
creates
unnecessary
cost
and
administration,
undermining
efficiency
in
both
the
public
and
private
sectors.
● Government cannot deliver the modern public services that many people
expect
–
not
having
a
single
proof
of
identity
which
allows
public
services
to
consistently
refer
to
people
hampers
this
government’s
ambition
to
make
them
easy
to
access,
more
joined-up
and
responsive
to
people’s
needs
and
entitlements.
This
prevents
faster,
more
proactive
and
personalised
digital
transformation
in
the
public
sector,
trapping
people
in
rounds
of
bureaucracy.
● Unnecessary data security risks are created – in order to prove their identity,
people
must
hand
over
substantial
amounts
of
personal
data;
usually
more
than
is
necessary.
Worse,
organisations
often
store
copies
of
physical
documents
used
for
identification,
increasing
the
risks
of
data
leaks
and
knock-on
issues.
● A core group of disadvantaged people face persistent exclusion – Cabinet Office research shows that 1 in 10 people in England, Scotland and Wales do not hold an in-date and recognisable photo ID, and the Lloyds Bank 2023 Consumer Digital Index indicates around 25% struggle to use digital services online. The most trusted documents – like passports and driving licences – come with a cost
to
obtain,
while
a
lack
of
digital
skills
and
smartphone
ownership
can
create
further
exclusion.
This
locks
people
out
of
society,
and
especially
the
benefits
of
digitalisation.
● We are saddled with high levels of fraud – relying on a variety of physical
documents
also
leaves
room
for
abuse.
Between
June
2024
and
2025,
fraud
accounted for 44% of crime in England and Wales, according to the Office for National Statistics. Fake or stolen driving licences and passports are used by criminals to circumvent identity checks, and over 118,000 identity fraud cases were reported to the National Fraud Database in the first half of 2025. This costs people and organisations time and money to correct when things go wrong. 15
Proving identity digitally Evidence suggests there is a better way to do identity verification. Digital identity
documents
(‘IDs’)
have
clear
advantages
over
paper-based
alternatives
–
they
can
be
safer,
more
secure
and
more
convenient.
For
instance,
digital
anti-fraud
and
security
checks
can
provide
greater
confidence
that
someone
is
who
they
say
they
are.
And,
if
someone’s
device
is
stolen,
they
can
protect,
lock
and
wipe
it
remotely.
This
helps
keep
people’s
information
safe
and
makes
it
harder
for
criminals
to
misuse
identities
that
do
not
belong
to
them.
A digital ID system also helps unlock entirely new ways to offer goods and services,
such
as
the
intuitive,
efficient,
and
responsive
public
services
the
UK
deserves.
An
authoritative
understanding
of
someone’s
identity
must
underpin
this
work,
giving
public
services
confidence
in
who
they
are
dealing
with
and
the
means
to
support
people
across
departmental
siloes.
With
this
key
building
block
in
place,
public
services
could
better
work
for
individuals,
moving
away
from
old-fashioned
and
bureaucratic
processes,
towards
proactive,
hassle-free
services
that
are
delivered
when
people
need
them
and
in
ways
that
work
for
them.
For
example,
when
changing
their
name,
someone
could
tell
us
once
–
with
the
change
automatically
updated
across
government
services,
without
needing
to
tell
departments
one
by
one.
People across the EU and the rest of the world are already enjoying the many benefits
of
digital
identities:
●
In Australia , people can use their digital ID to access over 246 government
services
alongside
a
range
of
private
services,
from
banking
to
buying
alcohol.
This
reduces
the
need
for
multiple
separate
accounts
and
pieces
of
paper
●
In Denmark , 97% of residents over the age of 15 use the national digital ID
system,
transforming
their
daily
lives.
For
example,
students
can
log
in
and
automatically
retrieve
their
education
records
and
qualifications
in
job
and
university
applications
●
In Estonia , digital signatures enabled by the digital ID system are estimated to
save
the
nation
2%
of
its
entire
economic
output
annually.
The
system
also
saves
people
time
and
effort,
meaning
they
never
have
to
provide
the
same
information
to
government
twice
However, progress in the UK has been slower. Within government, initiatives like
GOV.UK
One
Login
and
the
GOV.UK
Wallet
are
beginning
to
revolutionise
how
people
access
online
public
services
–
providing
a
single
‘front
door’
to
government
and
allowing
people
to
store
secure
digital
documents
instead
of
paper.
In
the
private
sector,
digital
verification
service
(DVS)
providers
operating
under
the
Data
(Use
and
Access)
Act
2025,
are
also
popularising
digital
identities.
But,
in
many
scenarios,
how
we
prove
and
demonstrate
our
identity
in
the
UK
is
still
too
burdensome,
complex
and
outdated,
16
with many people unable to benefit from a DVS. Without government providing a
foundational
digital
ID,
many
in
the
UK
will
continue
to
rely
on
paper-based
documents,
especially
those
who
face
ID
or
digital
exclusion.
If the UK is to fully realise the benefits of digital identities, we must ensure that everyone
can
access
a
secure
digital
ID,
and
that
they
are
supported
to
do
so.
To
keep
pace
with
the
private
sector
and
be
a
world
leader
in
digital
public
services,
we
must
modernise
our
approach
to
identification,
using
the
best
of
technology
to
ensure
everyone
in
the
UK
can
access
the
public
and
private
services
they
need,
when
they
need
them.
Chapter 1.1: Our proposed solution
To realise these benefits in the widest possible range of scenarios, the government has
committed
to
creating
a
new
national
digital
ID
that
will
be
useful,
inclusive
and
trusted.
Above all, the digital ID will be useful. It will help people to prove who they are and
things
about
themselves,
like
their
age,
in
the
public
and
private
sectors.
It
will
enable
them
to
access
a
range
of
services
more
easily,
better
safeguard
their
information
and
privacy
and
give
them
more
control
over
how
their
data
is
handled
by
others.
If
trusted
by
the
public
and
widely
adopted,
this
will
save
time,
reduce
duplication
and
create
a
basis
for
future
innovation,
driving
down
traditional
forms
of
fraud.
The digital ID system will also be inclusive. For the first time, a digital identity solution
will
be
freely
available
for
all
eligible
British
and
Irish
citizens
and
foreign
nationals
with
permission
to
be
in
the
UK.
As
part
of
the
system,
we
will
launch
an
inclusion
programme.
This
will
also
help
ensure
those
who
do
not
have
a
compatible
device,
such
as
a
smartphone
or
tablet,
are
less
digitally
confident
or
face
particular
challenges
–
such
as
those
without
permanent
addresses
–
are
not
excluded.
This
will
include
looking
at
alternative
access
routes,
such
as
physical
products
that
still
facilitate
digital
checks
and
in-person
support,
as
well
as
the
ability
to
have
trusted
individuals
(e.g.
carers,
parents)
act
Wal
of
others.
Finally, the digital ID will be trusted. Experts at the National Cyber Security Centre will
provide
advice
on
its
design
from
the
outset.
Core
principles,
such
as
data
minimisation,
will
be
built
in
from
the
beginning,
and
the
solution
will
build
on
existing
secure
infrastructure,
including
the
passport
service,
the
eVisa
service,
GOV.UK
One
Login
and
the
GOV.UK
Wallet.
This
means
the
new
digital
ID
will
be
saved
securely
on
a
person’s
phone,
putting
them
in
control
of
that
information,
with
most
government
data
staying
where
it
is
already
safely
stored,
in
government
departments.
17
Chapter 1.2: What the digital ID means for you
The range of ways people can choose to use their digital ID will grow over time. Early
on,
we
expect
it
will
be
usable
for
simple
things
in
the
private
sector,
like
proving
age
when
purchasing
alcohol.
In
these
use
cases,
people
will
also
be
able
to
continue
using
any
other
alternatives
they
already
use
if
they
prefer
–
there
will
be
no
requirement
to
use
the
new
digital
ID.
Access to public services will not be made dependent on having the digital ID. However,
for
those
who
choose
to
take
part,
the
digital
ID
system
will
provide
a
simple
access
point
for
new,
modern
digital
public
services,
deepening
and
accelerating
the
work
GOV.UK
One
Login
is
already
doing.
By
providing
everyone
eligible
with
a
trusted
digital
identity,
which
will
support
government
to
match
and
verify
existing
information
about
people
across
multiple
public
services
in
responsible,
privacy-enhancing
ways,
it
will
be
possible
to
deliver
the
services
they
need
more
quickly
and
effectively
–
without
creating
a
single
database
of
all
government
data
about
a
person.
This
will
also
support
the
delivery
of
more
proactive
public
services,
meaning
people
could
be
able
to
automatically
get
the
support
to
which
they
are
entitled
in
a
personalised
way.
Another early priority for the digital ID system will be to support further efforts to tackle
illegal
working.
Those
who
work
in
the
UK
without
the
right
to
do
so
undermine
those
who
play
fairly
by
the
rules.
By
the
end
of
this
Parliament,
the
digital
ID
will
therefore
have
a
central
role
in
the
UK’s
right
to
work
regime.
All employers in the UK already have a responsibility to prevent illegal working.
Currently,
they
can
do
this
by
conducting
prescribed
right
to
work
checks
before
employing
someone.
As
part
of
this
consultation,
we
are
proposing
to
legislate
so
that
evidence
must
be
checked
digitally
as
part
of
a
prescribed
right
to
work
check.
The
evidence
which
can
be
checked
by
a
robust
digital
process
will
include
the
digital
ID,
alongside
British
and
Irish
biometric
passports
(and
Irish
passport
cards)
and
eVisas.
This
will
be
the
only
way
for
a
business
to
demonstrate
that
they
have
carried
out
a
right
to
work
check
to
prevent
illegal
working.
The move to digital checking against this narrowed range of evidence will simplify
compliance
for
individuals
and
businesses.
For
individuals,
it
will
be
easier
to
demonstrate
a
right
to
work,
while
it
will
streamline
the
recruitment
process
for
businesses
and
create
a
digital
audit
trail
of
where
checks
have
been
carried
out
to
support
enforcement.
Removing
reliance
on
paper
documents
will
also
make
it
harder
for
criminals
to
use
forged
documents
to
gain
employment
and
prevent
unscrupulous
employers
from
turning
a
blind
eye
to
questionable
documentation,
helping
ensure
fairness
in
the
labour
market.
18
Chapter 1.3: Next steps
We intend for the digital ID to be available to those who want one by the end of this
Parliament,
following
the
necessary
technical
build
and
Parliamentary
approval
for
the
underpinning
legislative
changes.
Further
benefits
will
follow
as
the
system
helps
us
to
enable
the
streamlined,
digital,
lifelong
public
service
provision
that
people
expect
from
government.
The digital ID system will only be a success if people trust it. This trust will only be built
if
they
have
a
genuine
opportunity
to
shape
the
system,
which
is
why
we
have
decided
to
take
a
new
approach
to
this
consultation
that
goes
beyond
simply
asking
for
comments
on
proposals.
We
will
ensure
we
make
targeted
efforts
to
involve
those
who
may
be
most
affected
by
the
proposals,
along
with
including
those
whose
voices
are
often
missing
from
more
traditional
consultations
because
of
digital
exclusion
or
other
systemic
barriers.
This exercise will be conducted in two stages. The first will involve 8 weeks of open
engagement
–
running
from
10
March
to
5
May
–
where
anyone
who
wants
to
take
part
can
share
their
views.
Alongside
an
online
engagement
platform,
we
will
support
local
conversations
and
events
across
the
UK.
This
includes
roadshows,
roundtables,
as
well
as
resources
to
help
communities
run
their
own
discussions
in
ways
that
work
for
them.
In the second stage, which will follow the open engagement, we will bring together a
broadly
representative
group
of
100-120
people
from
across
the
UK
to
take
part
in
a
‘People’s
Panel
on
Digital
ID’
–
an
in-depth
deliberative
engagement
process.
This
group
will
hear
views
shared
during
the
open
engagement
stage,
discuss
different
perspectives,
and
openly
debate
areas
of
disagreement.
We
will
support
them
to
work
together
to
weigh
the
trade-offs
involved,
explore
common
ground
and
develop
shared
recommendations
for
government.
This
group
will
not
make
decisions,
but
their
recommendations
–
shaped
by
views
shared
in
the
open
engagement
phase
–
will
help
to
inform
next
steps.
Together, these two stages will create an open and inclusive way for the public to be
involved
in
shaping
decisions
about
the
digital
ID
system.
We
will
also
continue
to
engage
with
expert
stakeholders
throughout
the
duration
of
the
consultation
and
beyond.
Views shared in both these stages will be carefully considered by the government to
develop
next
steps
for
the
digital
ID
system.
A
formal
government
response
to
the
consultation
will
be
published
once
all
stages
of
the
consultation
have
concluded
and
all
responses
have
been
properly
considered.
You can find more information about the consultation and how to get involved in the two stages on GOV.UK. You can also access the full text in a range of accessible formats. 19
Questions on Part 1Our Ambition
1.0.Q1. What do you think the main benefits will be, if any, for the government’s
new national digital
ID system?
1.0.Q2. What do you think the main drawbacks will be, if any, for the government’s
new national digital
ID system?
1.0.Q3. One of the government’s aims for the new national digital ID system is to make
it
easier
for
people
to
prove
who
they
are. To
what
extent
do
you
agree
or
disagree
that the proposed system could help achieve
this
aim,
and
why?
a. Strongly Agree
b. Somewhat Agree
c. Neither agree nor disagree
d. Somewhat Disagree
e. Strongly Disagree
f. Don’t know
i. 1.0.Q3.1 Please explain your answer
1.0. Q.4 The government proposes to use the digital ID system to enable more modern,
efficient
and
personalised
public
services. Which
public
services
would
you
want
the
government
to
prioritise
making
faster
or
more
efficient
using
the
system?
20
Part 2Our approach
Introduction
As set out above, the government intends to create a national digital ID that will be
useful,
inclusive
and
trusted.
To
support
informed
discussion
of
how
the
digital
ID
system
could
work
in
practice,
this
consultation
begins
by
outlining
our
approach
to
creating,
storing
and
using
the
digital
ID.
While
final
design
decisions
have
not
yet
been
made,
this
explanation
will
be
vital
for
engaging
meaningfully
with
the
remainder
of
the
consultation.
Chapter 2.1: Creating the digital ID
Building on existing infrastructure In January 2025, we set out our diagnosis of the problems the government faces with
digital
technology
in
the
State
of
Digital
Government
Review
.
This
was
accompanied
by
our
plan
of
action
in
the
Blueprint
for
Modern
Digital
Government
,
which
this
year’s
Roadmap
for
Modern
Digital
Government
has
put
into
motion.
As
part
of
the
six-point
plan
for
government
digital
reform,
we
have
committed
to
strengthen
and
extend
our
digital
and
data
public
infrastructure
and
join
up
public
services.
This
means
improving
the
interface
between
people,
the
government
and
public
services
through
the
use
of
technology.
Being
able
to
prove
your
identity
quickly
and
securely
through
the
digital
ID
system
is
key
to
delivering
on
this
vision.
Where possible, the digital ID will build on existing systems that are already operating
as
trusted
parts
of
government.
This
infrastructure
will
be
expanded
and
improved
to
meet
the
increased
demands
of
the
digital
ID
system
and
to
bring
its
benefits
to
people
sooner
–
leveraging
the
expertise
that
has
already
gone
into
creating
secure
and
accessible
digital
solutions.
The four most relevant existing services are● GOV.UK One Login allows people to prove their identity once before using that
digital
identity
to
access
more
than
122
services
across
government.
It
is
being
rolled
out
across
all
central
government
services
to
replace
the
previous
landscape
of
siloed
and
duplicate
sign-in
methods
for
public
services.
All
government
services
are
due
to
be
onboarded
by
the
end
of
2027
● The GOV.UK Wallet enables GOV.UK One Login users to store and present
digital
versions
of
government-issued
documents
on
their
phones.
This
includes
the
Veteran
Card
and
soon
to
be
introduced
Digital
Driving
Licence.
It
provides
21
users with greater security when sharing government documents, and gives
users
more
control
over
what
information
they
share
when
proving
things
about
themselves,
like
age
or
identity
● The passport service, which is administered by HM Passport Office, part of the
Home
Office.
HM
Passport
Office
is
the
sole
issuer
of
UK
passports
and
is
an
authoritative
source
for
information
about
nationality
for
British
citizens
● The eVisa service , which is administered by UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI),
part
of
the
Home
Office.
eVisas
are
the
authoritative
source
for
identity
and
information
about
immigration
status
for
foreign
nationals
in
the
UK,
and
have
largely
replaced
physical
immigration
documents
(such
as
biometric
residence
permits).
This
improves
efficiency
for
service
providers
and
increases
security
and
fraud
prevention,
helping
to
deliver
a
modern
border
and
immigration
system
Additionally, an infrastructure for the trusted creation and use of digital identities already exists, including the UK digital identity and attributes trust framework (the ‘trust framework’). This is a statutory framework of standards, rules and best practice that
government
publishes
to
show
what
a
good
digital
verification
service
(DVS)
looks
like,
against
which
a
DVS
can
be
independently
certified.
Certified
DVS
providers
can
apply
to have their services appear in the statutory register of digital identity and attribute services, maintained on GOV.UK. This infrastructure helps people and organisations to find a trustworthy DVS. We intend for the national digital ID to operate within this
ecosystem.
We
expect
the
GOV.UK
Wallet
(which
will
hold
the
digital
ID)
to
be
certified
as
a
DVS,
and
GOV.UK
One
Login
(as
the
umbrella
service)
will
seek
to
maintain
its
certification
against
the
trust
framework.
Underpinning the digital ID in law Unlike other digital versions of government-issued documents, like the forthcoming
Digital
Driving
Licence,
the
digital
ID
will
have
no
direct
historical
precursor.
The
government
will
be
issuing
eligible
applicants
with
a
new
digital
document, explicitly
meant
to
serve
as
a
standalone
and
authoritative
proof
of
identity.
We
intend
to
legislate
and
ensure
Parliamentary
scrutiny
of
new
measures
to:
● create and issue the digital ID ● administer relevant identity and eligibility information on an ongoing basis ● manage the digital ID throughout its lifecycle (for more information on storing,
managing
and
using
the
digital
ID,
see
Chapter
2.2)
Issuing the digital ID In general terms, issuance will proceed via the following steps:
● An individual will apply online for the digital ID, prompting them to login or create
an
account
with
GOV.UK
One
Login
22
● The individual may need to verify their identity (if they have not sufficiently done
so
previously)
and
will
need
to
prove
their
eligibility
for
the
digital
ID.
This
will
depend
on
what
evidence
they
can
present,
leading
them
down
one
of
the
following
routes:
o If they can verify their identity using a UK passport or eVisa, their
information
is
automatically
checked
with
the
authoritative
source
(HM
Passport
Office
or
UKVI)
o If they are a British citizen and do not have a UK passport, they will be
directed
to
a
service
that
will
inclusively
support
them
to
prove
their
identity
and
nationality
(similar
to
HM
Passport
Office’s
first
adult
passport
service)
o If they are an Irish citizen, or cannot follow one of the above routes, they
will
need
to
provide
appropriate
evidence
of
their
identity
and
nationality.
As
outlined
below,
this
will
take
account
of
the
arrangements
of
the
Common
Travel
Area
(CTA)
as
well
as
the
rights
recognised
under
the
Good
Friday
Agreement
● On successful verification of their identity and/or eligibility, the government will
issue
the
individual
with
a
digital
ID,
tied
to
their
GOV.UK
One
Login
account
The digital ID will primarily be issued to people in a digitally protected format – known as
a
‘verifiable
credential’
–
that
can
be
stored
on
a
device,
such
as
a
compatible
smartphone
or
tablet.
This
will
be
similar
to
how
people
already
store
digital
payment
cards
and
tickets.
Key
considerations
for
the
standards
it
will
be
built
to
will
include:
● security ● widespread acceptance across a range of businesses and organisations ● potential for interoperability (within the UK, Common Travel Area and abroad) ● support for privacy-enhancing technologies like selective disclosure
Box 2.1.1. What is a verifiable credential?
Verifiable credentials are digital documents. Like physical documents, people can use
verifiable
credentials
to
confirm
their
eligibility
to
perform
specific
activities
or
verify
claims
about
themselves.
They
typically
contain
information
about
the
person
they
belong
to,
such
as
their
name
and
photograph.
As
they
are
secured
and
presented
via
technical
means,
verifiable
credentials
can
also
be
confirmed
as
genuine
when
they
are
used
–
for
instance,
proving
they
have
been
issued
by
an
authoritative
body
like
a
government
department,
and
have
not
been
faked,
tampered
with
or
revoked.
23
In addition to this standard route, we are also considering whether alternative routes to
accessing
the
digital
ID
will
be
needed,
to
ensure
that
all
eligible
individuals
can
access
the
system.
More
details
can
be
found
in
Part
4,
on
making
the
digital
ID
inclusive.
Devolved and Common Travel Area considerations We want to ensure that all British and Irish citizens, and people with permission to be in
the
UK,
can
use
and
benefit
from
the
digital
ID.
We
are
committed
to
working
with
the
devolved
governments
to
ensure
that
the
digital
ID
system
will
work
effectively
across
the
whole
UK,
recognising
that
many
of
the
services
where
citizens
could
benefit
from
the
use
of
digital
ID
are
devolved
matters,
which
are
the
responsibility
of
the
devolved
governments.
The introduction of this new system will take account of the arrangements under the
Common
Travel
Area
(CTA)
as
well
as
the
rights
afforded
to
people
under
the
Good
Friday
Agreement.
In this regard, we respect the right of the people of Northern Ireland under the Good
Friday
Agreement
to
identify
as
Irish,
British,
or
both,
and
to
hold
British
and/or
Irish
citizenship
without
differential
treatment.
There
will
be
no
requirement
that
Irish
nationals
take
British
citizenship
in
order
to
benefit
from
the
digital
ID
system.
We will also respect the arrangements under the CTA between the UK, the Crown
Dependencies
(Bailiwick
of
Jersey,
Bailiwick
of
Guernsey
and
the
Isle
of
Man)
and
Ireland.
British and Irish citizens will continue to be allowed to move freely, as now, to reside in
either
jurisdiction,
and
to
enjoy
associated
rights
and
privileges
including
the
right
to
work,
study
and
vote
in
elections,
as
well
as
to
access
social
welfare
benefits
and
health
services.
The
rights
of
cross-border
workers,
who
live
in
Ireland
and
work
in
Northern
Ireland
or
Great
Britain
and
then
return
home
(or
vice
versa),
will
be
carefully
considered.
The Government will continue to work with the Northern Ireland Executive, the Welsh
Government,
the
Scottish
Government,
the
Crown
Dependencies,
and
the
Government
of
Ireland
with
the
aim
of
ensuring
the
digital
ID
system
is
developed
in
line
with
the
commitments
outlined
above.
The
Government
will
continue
to
discuss
those
aspects
of
its
digital
ID
proposals,
which
the
Irish
Government
has
an
interest
in,
to
ensure
that
they
are
compatible
with
existing
legal
obligations
and
the
long-standing
arrangements
between
both
countries.
24
Questions about Chapter 2.1: Creating the digital ID
These questions are for experts speaking in their own capacity and for organisations:
2.1.Q1. The national digital ID will be issued as a credential (or digital document) for
storage
on
a
compatible
device,
similar
to
how
people
already
store
payment
cards
and
tickets
on
their
smartphones.
Are
there
technical
issuance
standards,
beyond
those
already
used
by
the
GOV.UK
Wallet,
that
we
should
be
building
the
national
digital
ID
to?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 2.1.Q1.1. Please explain your answer and provide examples of the
technical
standards
that
should
be
used.
This question is for everyone2.1.Q2. Do you have any concerns about the impact of the national digital ID that are
specific
to your part of
the
UK? If
so, please
select
which country and why?
a. Northern Ireland
i. 2.1.Q2.1. Please explain your answer
b. Scotland
i. 2.1.Q2.2. Please explain your answer
c. Wales
i. 2.1.Q2.3. Please explain your answer
d. England
i. 2.1.Q.2.4. Please explain your answer
e. No impact
f. Don’t know
25
Chapter 2.2: Storing, managing and using the digital ID
Storing the digital ID While all users will have the choice to store their digital ID in their GOV.UK Wallet, we
are
open
to
exploring
whether
and
how
it
could
be
made
accessible
through
digital
verification
service
(DVS)
providers,
including
via
storage
in
third-party
holder
(often
referred
to
as
‘digital
wallet’)
services.
Our
main
objective
is
that
any
storage
and
use
of
the
digital
ID
is
secure,
with
only
the
entitled
user
able
to
access
and
use
it.
Digital verification services
It could be possible for an individual to store their national digital ID in third-party holder
services,
via
either
a
direct
download
functionality
or
by
sharing
a
copy
from
their
GOV.UK
Wallet.
People
may
already
use
holder
services
other
than
the
GOV.UK
Wallet
and
prefer
these
for
a
number
of
reasons,
including
perceived
privacy
benefits
and
preferences
around
user
experience.
However, these benefits may be outweighed by reduced public understanding and
reduced
security,
especially
if
information
is
improperly
secured
by
third
parties.
For
instance,
in
Chapter
5.3
we
discuss
how
criminals
could
promote
unofficial
apps
claiming
to
be
the
digital
ID
or
GOV.UK
Wallet
to
trick
users
into
downloading
malware
or
submitting
sensitive
data.
Alternative
holding
solutions
would
therefore
need
to
be
at
least
as
secure
and
resistant
to
fraud
as
the
GOV.UK
Wallet
and
not
introduce
weaknesses
to
the
system.
For
this
reason,
we
would
only
consider
allowing
a
third-party
to
hold
the
national
digital
ID
if
certain
conditions
were
met,
including:
● It was certified as a ‘holder service’ under a current version of the UK digital identity and attributes trust framework, maintained by the Office for Digital Identities and Attributes (OfDIA) in the Department for Science, Innovation and
Technology
(DSIT)
● It appeared on the digital identity and attribute services register ● It had reached a specific agreement with government, including agreement to
any
necessary
terms
and
conditions
that
may
be
informed
by
this
consultation
Updating the digital ID Some information held in the digital ID will be static, like a date of birth, assuming it has
been
correctly
verified.
Other
information
may
change
over
time,
like
someone’s
name
(if
they
get
married
or
change
it
by
deed
poll)
or
their
photo.
However,
in
principle,
any
attribute
about
a
person
will
need
to
be
alterable,
and
their
digital
ID
credential
reissued,
in
case
of
errors
in
the
issuance
process.
Each
digital
ID
will
also
need
to
be
updated
or
reissued
periodically
to
accommodate
technology
changes
or
expiry
dates.
Further
consideration
of
users’
roles
in
keeping
their
digital
ID
up
to
date
is
in
chapter
3.1.
26
Deleting and revoking the digital ID Once issued, an individual may wish to delete their digital ID, or it may need to be
revoked
(i.e.
cancelled),
at
a
later
date.
For
instance,
someone
might
wish
to
remove
their
digital
ID
from
their
own
GOV.UK
Wallet.
They
will
be
able
to
do
this
at
any
time,
and
the
process
will
be
designed
to
be
simple
and
quick.
When a user makes a deletion request, the digital ID will be permanently removed from
their
own
device,
and
will
no
longer
be
usable
unless
they
choose
to
redownload
it.
Relevant
government
departments
will
retain
any
relevant
records
that
underpin
the
individual’s
digital
ID
in
line
with
their
data
retention
policies
and
privacy
notices
–
much
like
how
deleting
an
app
does
not
automatically
delete
any
account
needed
to
use
that
app.
This
is
necessary
to
meet
legal
and
regulatory
obligations,
such
as
ensuring
the
security
and
integrity
of
the
service
and
preventing
fraud.
Users
will
need
to
contact
the
relevant
department
directly
if
they
wish
to
exercise
their
right
to
object
to
this
processing.
As
we
continue
to
join
up
public
services
through
this
system,
we
will
explore
how
this
process
could
be
simplified.
The government will also need the power to revoke a person’s digital ID in limited
circumstances,
such
as
if
fraudulent
usage
is
identified.
Revocation
will
only
occur
in
strictly
controlled
circumstances,
and
robust
processes
will
be
designed
to
govern
revocation
and
other
procedures.
For
more
information,
see
Chapter
5.4
on
Oversight
and
Governance.
Using and checking the digital ID Once a digital ID has been created, people will need ways of reliably sharing it with
those
who
need
to
check
it,
whether
that
is
a
public
service,
a
business,
charity
or
another
person.
These
checkers,
known
as
‘relying
parties’,
need
to
have
confidence
that
the
data
is
accurate
and
has
not
been
tampered
with
so
that
they
can
rely
on
it.
Unlike with physical documents, information on the digital ID should not be relied upon
without
being
checked
through
technological
means.
This
is
because
‘visual
inspection’
(i.e.
where
a
person
simply
shows
their
digital
ID
on
their
device’s
screen
to
a
relying
party)
could
allow
someone
to
show
a
faked
or
edited
screen
that
human
eyes
cannot
detect.
Instead,
the
digital
ID
will
need
to
undergo
a
technical
check,
via
a
process
called
‘programmatic
verification,’
whenever
it
is
presented.
For instance, rather than someone just showing their digital ID to a shop assistant, they
would
present
it
from
their
GOV.UK
Wallet
to
be
scanned
by
the
shop
assistant.
The
assistant
might
use
a
device
provided
by
their
employer
or
a
physical
terminal,
like
a
payment
terminal
used
for
contactless
payments,
to
do
this.
This
will
help
confirm
that
a
digital
ID
has
not
been
faked,
tampered
with
or
revoked.
27
Intermediary services
We expect most checking in the wider economy to be done by intermediary DVS
providers
–
and
remain
committed
to
the
model
underpinned
by
the
Data
(Use
and
Access)
Act
2025.
To
deliver
on
our
goals
of
maintaining
end-to-end
security
and
trust,
only
DVS
providers
that
are
certified
under
a
current
version
of
the
trust
framework
and
present
on
the
government
register
will
be
able
to
programmatically
verify
a
digital
ID
presented
from
the
GOV.UK
Wallet,
offering
robust
checks
as
a
service
to
relying
parties.
Several
such
‘orchestration’
services
are
already
available
from
providers
on
the
government
register.
We expect DVS will want to provide a variety of checking services (with user
agreement),
such
as:
● offering sophisticated checks which are suitable in commercial settings or
regulated
industries
● including functionality such as record keeping for auditing purposes ● integrating the digital ID into existing user journeys in the wider economy (such
as
payments
journeys)
Separately, we intend for suitably certified and registered DVS providers to be able to build on the digital ID in the same way that we have discussed elsewhere for other credentials in the GOV.UK Wallet. For example, a DVS provider could use information
from
the
national
digital
ID
in
the
GOV.UK
Wallet
to
create
their
own
new
digital
credential,
potentially
combined
with
other
information
they
have
sourced.
This
is
also
known
as
a
‘derived
credential’
which
could
be
used
to
prove
a
range
of
different
things
about
someone.
Government Checker service
We also intend to develop a ‘Government Checker’, which will support orchestration and
credential
verification.
This
service
will
support
public
sector
relying
parties
to
consume
and
trust
credentials,
including
the
national
digital
ID,
in
a
range
of
scenarios.
We
intend
for
the
Government
Checker
to
be
certified
and
registered
as
a
DVS
under
the
Data
(Use
and
Access)
Act
2025.
When someone presents their digital ID (or another credential) from their GOV.UK
Wallet,
the
relying
party
checking
the
credential
will
be
able
to
scan
it
using
the
Government
Checker.
The
person
whose
GOV.UK
Wallet
it
is
will
then
be
asked
to
approve
sharing
the
requested
information,
before
the
relying
party
is
likely
to
receive:
● confirmation that the presented digital ID is valid and trustworthy ● the key data for that use case, which could be limited so that only necessary
information
is
shared
(for
instance,
that
the
person
is
over
18,
rather
than
sharing
their
full
date
of
birth)
28
● a photo of the person to whom the digital ID belongs so they can confirm it is
being
presented
by
the
right
person
Given the importance of programmatic checking and robust data sharing for all
transactions,
we
are
also
exploring
whether
a
basic
Government
Checker
service
should
be
made
available
for
free
or
at
low
cost
to
relying
parties
in
the
private
and
third
sector.
In
these
instances,
we
would
envisage
several
limitations
to
the
service
by
design.
For
instance,
it
would
only
verify
government-issued
credentials,
not
those
made
by
private
sector
DVS,
and
could
have
other
functionality
or
usage
limits.
This
is
because
the
Government
Checker
would
not
be
meant
for
verification
at-scale
or
use
in
most
commercial
settings.
Outside
of
government,
it
would
instead
be
intended
to
remove
the
risk
of
visual
presentation
in
certain
low-volume
use
cases.
For
instance,
even
if
it
was
made
widely
available,
we
expect
that
companies
conducting
large
numbers
of
right
to
work
or
age
verification
checks
would
be
better
served
by
third-party
DVS
providers
providing
a
specialist
service.
We
welcome
views
on
this
proposal.
29
Questions about Chapter 2.2: Storing, Managing and Using the digital ID
These questions are for everyone:
Someone might wish to delete their own digital ID from their device. They will be able to
do
this
at
any
time,
and
the
process
will
be
designed
to
be
simple
and
quick.
2.2.Q1. Are there any ethical factors government should consider that relate to an
individual
deleting
their
digital
ID?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 2.2.Q1.1 Please explain your answer.
Under strictly controlled circumstances, the government may also have the power to
revoke
(i.e.
cancel)
someone’s
digital
ID
–
for
instance,
if
someone’s
digital
ID
has
been
identified
as
stolen
or
used
fraudulently.
This
will
be
governed
by
robust
processes.
2.2.Q2. Are there any ethical factors government should consider that relate to revoking
(i.e.
cancelling)
an
individual’s
digital
ID?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 2.2.Q2.1 Please explain your answer.
2.2.Q3. Do you think people should be able to choose to store their national digital ID
directly
in
holder
services
(sometimes
known
as
‘digital
wallets’)
other
than
the
GOV.UK
Wallet, that are
certified
to meet
government
standards?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 2.2.Q3.1. Please explain your answer.
30
These questions are for experts speaking in their own capacity or for organisations:
2.2.Q4. To support secure use, there needs to be a robust way to check the national
digital
ID
presented
from
the
GOV.UK
Wallet.
This
will
help
confirm
it
has
not
been
faked,
tampered
with
or
revoked.
The
private
sector
has
already
developed
free
and
paid-for
checking
services.
In
addition,
we
are
considering
creating
a
‘government
checker’
service. To
what
extent
do
you
agree
or
disagree
with
the
proposed
government
checker
service
being
made
available
for
use
in
the
private
and
third
sectors,
at
low
or
no
cost?
a. Strongly agree
b. Somewhat agree
c. Neither agree nor disagree
d. Somewhat disagree
e. Strongly disagree
f. Don’t know
i. 2.2.Q4.1. Please explain your answer
2.2.Q5. We are considering several limitations to the government checker service, by
design.
For
instance,
it
could
only
be
able
to
check
government-issued
credentials,
like
the
national
digital
ID.
This
is
intended
to
leave
room
for
third-party
checking
services.
Are
there
any
specific
limitations
you
think
we
should
set
for
the
government
checker?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 2.2.Q5.1. Please explain your answer
31
Part 3Useful
Introduction
The national digital ID will be transformative for government services and sectors across
the
economy.
Our
aim
is
that
the
national
digital
ID
will:
1. sit at the heart of next-generation public services 2. give people a foundational and trusted proof of identity for use across the
economy
3. underpin a simpler and more secure model to prevent illegal working
The digital ID is being designed as something which people will want to have, rather
than
something
they
are
forced
to
get.
In
all
cases,
our
intention
is
that
it
will
be
acceptable
alongside
other
suitable
proofs
and
not
replace
other
government-issued
documents
people
might
already
have.
For
example,
the
digital
ID
will
not
assert
entitlement
to
drive
or
entitlement
to
cross
borders
–
which
will
continue
to
require
a
driving
licence
and
passport,
respectively.
However,
we
expect
it
will,
in
time,
reduce
reliance
on
physical
documents
as
people
choose
to
apply
for
and
use
the
digital
ID.
How the digital ID can be used may also vary across the devolved governments of the
UK.
While
immigration
policy
(and
therefore
right
to
work
regulation)
is
reserved,
so
can
be
set
centrally
by
the
UK
government,
devolved
governments
can
have
different
requirements
for
accessing
and
joining
up
public
services,
and
for
some
use
cases
in
the
wider
economy,
such
as
acceptable
proofs
for
age
restricted
goods.
As
outlined
above,
we
will
work
with
the
Welsh
Government,
Northern
Ireland
Executive
and
Scottish
Government
to
seek
consistency
and
usefulness
across
the
country.
Chapter 3.1: Information contained in the digital ID
For the digital ID to be useful in any given setting, it needs to be able to prove
information
relevant
to
that
scenario.
That
information
also
needs
to
be
trusted
by
the
person
or
organisation
checking
it,
and
appropriate
for
the
regulatory
landscapes
in
which
it
operates.
However, no digital ID can, or should, be the definitive proof of every piece of
information
about
an
individual.
The
digital
ID
will
therefore
seek
to
strike
a
balance,
32
holding enough information to usefully prove identity information, without requiring
unnecessary
data
collation
or
storage.
Core information about an individual Each digital ID will contain core information about a person. We propose that this will
include:
● full name (as it appears in official documentation like a passport) ● date of birth (which could be selectively disclosed in different ways, including as
just
an
‘over
18’
or
‘over-65’
attribute)
● nationality (which could be selectively disclosed in different ways, including as
confirmation
that
someone
has
a
right
to
work
in
the
UK)
● a current, high-resolution biometric facial image that meets specified
requirements
Box 3.1.1 Data minimisation and selective disclosure
Data minimisation is a privacy-preserving principle that encourages not collecting,
sharing
or
otherwise
processing
more
personal
data
than
is
necessary
for
a
specific
purpose.
It
is
enshrined
in
the
UK
General
Data
Protection
Regulation
(UK
GDPR).
While the principle is being applied to how the national digital ID is designed, created
and
managed,
it
also
applies
to
how
it
is
used.
For
example,
the
practice
of
‘selective
disclosure’
gives
people
specific
control
of
what
information
they
share,
and
with
who.
When
someone
shows
their
physical
driving
licence
at
a
bar,
they
have
no
choice
but
to
disclose
all
the
information
on
it
–
including
unnecessary
attributes
like
full
name
and
address
–
alongside
relevant
information
like
date
of
birth
and
a
photo.
By contrast, the digital ID will go further in preserving privacy by minimising the data it
discloses.
For
example,
where
possible
it
will
just
share
basic
information,
such
as
that
a
person
is
‘over-18’,
rather
than
sharing
their
full
date
of
birth.
The
digital
ID
is
being
built
with
this
functionality
in
mind
to
help
ensure
no
more
personal
data
is
shared
than
necessary
when
the
digital
ID
is
used.
In addition to this core identity information, the digital ID may also need to store and
share
additional
information
or
metadata
(i.e.
data
about
information
held).
This
could
include:
● the level of confidence which government has in the individual’s identity, based
on
the
evidence
provided,
to
help
relying
parties
understand
if
it
meets
their
needs
● whether the person to whom the digital ID relates has an authorised
representative
acting
with
delegated
authority
on
their
behalf,
such
as
through
a
power
of
attorney
33
● other information identified as necessary via this consultation or further policy
development
We believe the information above will provide sufficient basis for the intended uses for
the
digital
ID
(see
the
remainder
of
this
Part),
without
requiring
any
unnecessary
information
to
be
collected
or
shared.
Information to support joined-up public services We are exploring what information is needed to better link public services. Currently,
people
in
the
UK
have
multiple
identifiers,
for
example
National
Insurance
numbers
and
passport
numbers.
This
means
we
cannot
know
when
it
is
the
same
person
accessing
different
services.
Without
this,
it
is
very
difficult
to
match
people
across
services
so
they
can
be
delivered
in
a
personalised
and
efficient
way.
We are considering developing a universal unique identifier (or similar approach) tied to
the
digital
ID
and
GOV.UK
One
Login,
to
enable
consistent
reference
across
government
services.
This
will
be
key
to
delivering
next-generation,
digital
public
services
in
the
UK.
This
identifier
would
not
need
to
be
visible
or
used
outside
the
public
sector,
and
we
are
exploring
providing
it
only
to
those
choosing
to
use
the
digital
ID.
More
information
can
be
found
in
Chapter
3.2
on
Transforming
Public
Services.
Over time, such an approach could streamline information updates, ensuring verified
changes
are
reflected
across
services
and
reducing
the
need
for
people
to
repeatedly
provide
core
information.
It
could
also
support
more
proactive,
personalised
services.
For
example,
if
you
update
your
name
on
the
digital
ID,
this
could
be
updated
automatically
across
other
connected
government
services.
Any
implementation
would
require
appropriate
legal
gateways
and
robust
privacy,
security
and
transparency
measures.
Consideration of further information Address
Being able to prove current address through the digital ID could be a more efficient and
easier
option
than
relying
on
physical
evidence,
such
as
council
tax
bills
and
bank
statements.
If
your
digital
ID
were
able
to
provide
an
authoritative
proof
of
your
current
address,
it
could
reduce
friction
and
save
you
the
burden
of
finding
recent
physical
documents
to
prove
this.
It
could
also
support
public
services
where
this
information
is
relevant.
However, it is unclear how cost effective it would be for us to provide authoritative
current
address
information
on
the
digital
ID,
and
the
extent
of
the
complexities
involved.
Existing
documents,
such
as
driving
licences,
‘verify’
address
by
sending
the
document
to
the
address
provided.
This
is
not
an
option
for
the
digital
ID
and,
as
such
it
is
difficult
to
be
confident
that
a
provided
address
is
accurate
and
in
use
–
for
example,
34
in circumstances where someone might move addresses often. Developing a way to
verify
current
address
information
to
a
sufficient
level
of
confidence
for
it
to
be
relied
upon
as
a
sole
proof
of
address
would
therefore
have
implications
on
the
cost
and
complexity
of
the
system.
We are interested in further understanding the ways that verified current address
information
could
be
used
and
how
the
government
could
verify
address
information
and
keep
it
up
to
date,
while
not
adding
an
extra
burden
on
people
who
face
exclusion.
Sex or gender information
In the UK, sex and gender data can cover three categories:
● Biological sex .
● Legal or certified sex . This is sex as recorded on your original birth certificate or
as
amended
under
the
Gender
Recognition
Act
2004.
In
almost
all
cases,
legal
or
certified
sex
reflects
a
person’s
biological
sex.
● Gender . A broad term that is sometimes used interchangeably with sex or when
specifically
referring
to
social
rather
than
biological
differences
between
sexes.
It
can
also
capture
data
that
equates
to
biological,
legal
or
certified
sex.
Information about sex and gender is not necessary for the intended purpose of the
digital
ID.
Inclusion
of
this
information
would
not
enhance
checks
that
the
digital
ID
belongs
to
the
person
presenting
it.
Checks
will
be
done
programmatically
and
through
biometric
authentication,
neither
of
which
require
specific
sex
or
gender
data.
Additionally, digital right to work checks and many checks in the private sector (including
Know
Your
Customer
(KYC)
and
simple
age
verification
checks)
do
not
require
the
collection
or
sharing
of
information
about
a
person’s
sex
or
gender.
Similarly,
access
to
most
public
services
does
not
require
this
information.
In
specific
scenarios
where
sex
or
gender
information
is
required,
it
is
better
collected
and
verified
by
other
means
appropriate
to
that
scenario,
rather
than
contained
in
the
digital
ID.
For these reasons, and in line with data minimisation principles, we do not intend to
include
sex
or
gender
information
in
the
digital
ID.
Keeping details up to date For the digital ID to be useful and trusted, it is important that the information it contains
remains
up
to
date.
Changes to an individual's core identity information, such as name
changes,
can
occur
for
legitimate
reasons
and
are
common.
We are exploring whether people should be legally required to inform the government,
within
a
suitable
timeframe,
of
any
errors
or
changes
to
personal
information
held
in
their
digital
ID,
so
that
it
can
be
updated,
and
what
an
appropriate
form
of
enforcement
35
could be. We are mindful that putting an obligation on users to keep their digital ID up to
date
may
be
unduly
burdensome
or
disproportionate,
especially
for
some
groups
with
protected
characteristics.
36
Questions about Chapter 3.1: Information contained in the digital ID
This question is for everyone:
3.1.Q1. The national digital ID will include a person’s full name, date of birth, nationality,
and
a biometric
facial
image (photo). What
further
information,
if
any,
should the
digital
ID
also include?
This question is for organisations3.1.Q2. The government is not planning to initially include address information on
the national digital
ID, but we
may review
this
position in
the
future. If
your organisation were to
rely
on this information, what
would
help
you
trust an
address
on
the
digital
ID?
This question is for everyone3.1.Q3. Businesses and organisations accepting the national digital ID need to trust that
the
information
on
it
is
up
to
date
and
accurate.
We
are
exploring
whether
people
with
a
digital
ID
should
be
legally
required
to
inform
the
government
within
an
appropriate
timeframe
of certain changes (such
as
a
name
change) or
errors
to
their
personal
information, so that their digital
ID can
be
updated.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with a legal requirement to inform the
government
of
changes
or
errors
within
an
appropriate
timeframe?
a. Strongly agree
b. Somewhat agree
c. Neither agree nor disagree
d. Somewhat disagree
e. Strongly disagree
f. Don’t know
i. 3.1.Q3.1. Please explain your answer
37
Chapter 3.2: Transforming public services
The national digital ID system is key to enabling streamlined, digital, lifelong public
service
provision.
To
be
clear:
access
to
public
services
will
not
be
made
dependent
on
having
the
digital
ID.
However,
should
people
choose
to
get
the
digital
ID,
it
will
be
possible
to
help
reduce
the
time
and
effort
they
spend
interacting
with
the
state
to
access
the
services
to
which
they
are
entitled.
This
is
because
identifying
ourselves
and
proving
our
entitlements
is
the
first
step
to
many
interactions
with
the
public
sector.
People will come into contact with public services many times over the course of a
lifetime.
Half
of
UK
adults
interact
with
government
administrative
services
around
once
a year, according to research from the Office for National Statistics. These interactions are likely to be more frequent for people who need additional support. At the same time,
people
who
need
additional
support
can
often
be
those
who
struggle
the
most
to
prove
their
identity
using
existing
forms
of
evidence,
like
passports
or
driving
licences
(as
outlined
in
Part
4
of
this
consultation,
on
being
inclusive).
Below are some examples of why someone might need to interact with a public service
and,
in
doing
so,
prove
who
they
are
or
their
entitlement
to
that
service.
From birth , a parent or guardian may need to engage with the state numerous times to
access
essential
services,
including
when:
● applying for a first passport ● checking a child’s eligibility for or applying for help with childcare costs ● adding a child element to a Universal Credit account ● accessing emergency housing or financial support
As a young person , someone may need to engage with the state to access services
such
as:
● proving a right to work for their first job ● applying for or proving eligibility for a student loan ● accessing inclusion and digital access support for people not in education,
employment
or
training
(NEET)
or
the
young
people’s
services
Throughout adult life , after the age of 18, someone may need to● access Universal Credit ● apply for or renew a full driving licence ● register a marriage ● register as homeless or in need of housing support
Later in life , someone may need to: ● claim a state pension ● apply for or check eligibility for winter fuel payments or warm home discount ● apply for an older person’s bus pass 38
● register a power of attorney
While proving identity is often the first step to accessing these services, in the UK this is
too
regularly
an
imperfect
and
inefficient
process
that
relies
on
people
finding
and
providing
the
right
combinations
of
physical
evidence.
Additionally,
because
different
government
departments
often
work
in
siloes,
people
can
feel
like
they
are
starting
from
scratch
each
time
they
interact
with
a
different
part
of
the
public
sector.
How digital ID can help We want public services to be easily accessible throughout a person’s life – whether
that
means
a
student
using
their
digital
ID
to
easily
access
services
for
themselves
or
a
parent
accessing
services
on
behalf
of
their
child.
Our
vision
is
to
make
people’s
interactions
with
the
state
as
efficient
and
useful
as
possible,
as
is
already
the
norm
in
areas
of
the
wider
economy,
such
as
in
online
banking,
and
in
other
countries.
Below is an example of how Estonia has personalised child benefit administration by
using
a
foundational
digital
identity
to
underpin
modernised
public
services.
This
example
is
included
for
reference
only
–
the
national
context
in
Estonia
varies
significantly
to
that
of
the
UK.
However,
it
still
provides
a
useful
illustration
of
what
a
national
digital
ID
system
could
make
possible.
Box 3.2.1: Case Study Streamlining Child Benefit Administration
When a child is born in Estonia, parents experience a seamless, digital-first system for
accessing
financial
support.
Using
their
digital
identity,
parents
register
the
birth
online
within
minutes.
Immediately
afterward,
a
tailored
benefits
offer
appears
in
their
government
account.
Parents
simply
review
and
accept
the
offer
–
no
additional
forms,
uploads,
or
supporting
documents
are
required.
Behind the scenes, eligibility checks continue automatically. Population and school
records
are
linked
to
ensure
that
payments
remain
accurate
and
up
to
date
until
the
child
turns
18.
Parents
or
guardians
only
need
to
report
major
changes,
such
as
a
new
address,
which
can
be
done
quickly
through
the
same
digital
portal.
Estonia’s example demonstrates how fully integrated, proactive digital services can
reduce
administrative
burden
for
people
while
ensuring
more
accurate
and
responsive
delivery
of
support.
This
stands
in
contrast
to
the
experience
people
currently
have
across
much
of
the
UK.
Parents,
carers
or
guardians
must
usually
determine
their
own
eligibility
via
guidance
found
on
GOV.UK,
navigate
multiple
and
sometimes
complex
application
routes
depending
on
their
specific
situation,
and
gather
physical
documents
to
evidence
their
claims.
If
their
circumstances
change,
they
often
need
to
revisit
this
process
from
the
beginning
–
rechecking
eligibility,
resubmitting
documents,
and
repeating
applications
to
different
schemes.
39
Digital ID as the foundation of transformed public services This government is committed to bringing public services into the twenty-first century.
The
digital
ID
system
will
be
the
cornerstone
of
this
transformation
–
learning
from
successful
systems
around
the
world
while
keeping
the
UK
government’s
values
of
privacy,
transparency
and
inclusion
front
and
centre.
We
expect
the
digital
ID
will
help
us
to:
● remove persisting barriers to public services, like ID exclusion (see Part 4 on how
the
digital
ID
system
will
be
inclusive)
● speed up service delivery by further eliminating repetitive and inefficient
identification
processes
● save taxpayers’ money and lower costs to government by reducing reliance on
paper-based
identity
documents,
which
can
be
more
easily
faked
● give people more control over how they interact with public services and how
they
prove
their
identity
and
eligibility
From the outset, the digital ID system will offer people a secure, inclusive and reusable
credential
that
can
be
used
across
the
public
sector
to
prove
their
identity
–
the
first
step
for
proving
eligibility
for
many
public
services.
This
will
build
on
work
that
GOV.UK
One
Login
is
already
doing
to
reduce
duplication
of
identity
processes
across
government.
While
applying
for
and
using
the
digital
ID
will
not
be
required
to
access
public
services,
in
time,
we
expect
it
will
reduce
reliance
on
physical
documents
as
people
choose
to
adopt
it,
while
making
processes
easier
and
quicker
than
they
are
today.
In time, the digital ID system will also help enable modern, personalised and joined-up
public
services.
A
trusted
digital
identity
will
provide
the
foundation
for
government
to
deliver
the
services
they
need
more
quickly
and
effectively
–
without
creating
a
single
database
of
all
government
data
about
a
person.
Instead,
this
will
support
public
services
to
match
and
verify
existing
information
about
the
people
they
serve
in
responsible,
privacy-enhancing
ways
–
such
as
via
a
universal
unique
identifier
(or
similar
approach).
This
means
public
services
could
better
work
for
individuals,
when
they
need
them
and
in
ways
that
work
for
them,
letting
government
move
away
from
old-fashioned
and
bureaucratic
processes,
towards
proactive,
hassle-free
services
that
are
available
at
the
point
of
need.
How this will look and feel will evolve over the coming years, as we hear from people
throughout
the
consultation
and
beyond.
It
will
take
time
to
fix
the
foundations
of
the
digital
state.
However,
below
are
three
illustrative
examples
of
how
we
envisage
the
digital
ID
system
could
help
transform
public
services:
● Enabling inclusion. The digital ID system will reduce existing, systemic barriers
to
accessing
public
services.
A
free
to
access,
digitally
verifiable
credential
will
help
address
traditional
identity
documents
being
financially
or
otherwise
out
of
40
reach for many people. For example, it will give people who do not already have
one
an
authoritative
proof
of
identity
when
applying
for
funded
childcare
schemes.
This
will
help
ensure
people
can
access
the
services
to
which
they
are
entitled
● Saving people time. The digital ID system could also help ensure that people no
longer
waste
time
proving
to
public
sector
organisations
who
they
are
or
chasing
the
support
they
need.
For
instance,
by
underpinning
a
way
to
consistently
reference
people
across
government
services,
it
could
enable
more
proactive
and
personalised
public
service
delivery.
In
the
future,
integration
with
national
and
local
services
could
fundamentally
reshape
the
interaction
with
individuals
and
communities,
with
a
shift
from
impersonal
processes
to
outcomes
that
meet
the
specific
needs
of
individuals
● Reducing fraud . The digital ID system will lessen our reliance on insecure
physical
forms
of
evidence.
When
a
service
needs
to
verify
something
about
a
person,
their
devices
will
perform
a
secure
digital
‘handshake’
using
trusted
technical
standards.
This
will
mean fewer
photocopies
of
documents
being
stored
or
shared
insecurely
and
safer
interactions
for
people
and
the
organisations
they
interact
with.
This
will
make
it
harder
for
criminals
to
exploit
weaknesses,
whether
that
be
using
fake
documents
or
impersonating
someone.
This
could
free
up
government
resources
for
inspecting
other
access
routes
more
thoroughly
We recognise that these potential outcomes cannot be achieved without the support
and
cooperation
of
devolved
governments,
local
authorities
and
other
delivery
partners
who
understand
issues
people
face
at
the
grassroot
level.
We
are
committed
to
working
closely
with
these
groups
to
help
ensure
that
the
benefits
of
the
digital
ID
system
are
realised
similarly
across
the
length
and
breadth
of
the
country.
41
Questions about Chapter 3.2: Transforming public services
These questions are for everyone:
3.2.Q1: We know that people can struggle to access or claim the public services to
which
they
are
entitled.
We
want
to
identify
key issues in
these
interactions,
so
that
we
can
explore
how
the
digital
ID system could
help
address
these,
making
people’s
lives
easier. When
people
are
interacting
with
public
services,
some
common issues
could
be:
●
Signposting – people might not know what public services are available to them
●
Privacy concerns – people might be concerned about who information about
their
situation will
be
shared with
●
Time and effort – people might not find the time to complete the processes
needed
to
access
public
services
they
are
entitled
to
●
Proving their identity/eligibility – people might not have access to the required
letters,
documents,
or
reference
numbers
needed
to
check
their
eligibility for, or to, access
public
services
Are there examples of any barriers or inefficiencies that prevent you (or people you
support) from interacting
with
public
services, that
you
think
the
digital
ID system could help with?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 3.2.Q1.1. Please explain your answer
3.2.Q2: Have you ever faced issues with knowing which public services are
available to you based
on
your
circumstances or,
if
you
support other
people,
have
you faced
similar
issues when
supporting
them?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 3.2.Q2.1. If YES, please explain your answer
42
3.2.Q3: Have you ever been unable to or had difficulty accessing a public service
because
you
were
unable
to
prove
your
identity or,
if
you
support
other
people,
have
you
faced
similar
issues
when
supporting
them?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 3.2.Q3.1. Please explain your answer
3.2.Q4. For those who opt for a digital ID, government would develop a
method to securely identify
and match people across different public
services to
simplify
everyday
interactions
between
individuals
and
the
state.
For instance, such an approach could help ensure changes in an individual’s
information
are easily
and
quickly reflected
across
services,
like
a
name
change.
This
would
reduce the
need
for
people
to
update
their
information
separately
for
each
service. It
could
also let
government
move
away
from
old-fashioned
and
bureaucratic
processes,
towards
proactive,
hassle-free
services
that
are
available
at
the
point
of
need.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the adoption of such an approach
to public
sector
transformation?
a. Strongly agree
b. Somewhat agree
c. Neither agree nor disagree
d. Somewhat disagree
e. Strongly disagree
f. Don’t know
i. 3.2.Q4.1. Please explain your answer
3.2.Q5. What ethical issues, if any, can you think of when designing a way
to identify and
match people
across
services?
This question is for experts speaking in their own capacity and organisations3.2.Q6. What technical issues do we need to think about when designing a way
to correctly identify and
match people across public services?
43
Chapter 3.3: Utility in the wider economy
While the national digital ID will not completely remove the need for individuals to collate
other
evidence
and
paperwork
in
some
transactions,
an
inclusive,
purpose-built
and
privacy-centric
credential
has
the
potential
to
revolutionise
how
people
prove
things
about
themselves
in
their
daily
lives.
In areas without specific regulatory requirements, there are unlikely to be inherent
barriers
to
the
use
and
acceptance
of
the
digital
ID.
This
includes
situations
such
as
proving
who
you
are
when
collecting
parcels
or
joining
a
gym.
This
means
the
digital
ID
could
be
useful
for
people
in
the
short
term
across
a
range
of
different
scenarios.
Across the economy, there are many other transactions where regulatory or other
requirements
mean
an
individual
must
present
proof
of
identity
or
eligibility.
This
includes
regular
experiences,
like
buying
a
bottle
of
wine
or
visiting
age-restricted
websites,
to
more
significant
and
infrequent
occurrences
like
getting
a
mortgage.
Diagram 3.3.1 – Indicative age and identity use cases in the private sector where
the
digital
ID
could
be
acceptable
For the digital ID to be trusted and accepted across the economy, we will need to
remove
barriers
to
its
use
and
create
a
framework
of
safeguards
and
operational
requirements.
Work
is
already
underway
to
deliver
many
of
the
necessary
changes
in
44
regulated sectors, so that a digital verification service (DVS) can be used safely and
securely,
alongside
physical
documents.
This
includes:
● Ofcom has listed digital identity services as a potentially highly effective method of age assurance, with DVS certification one way to provide evidence of compliance ● the Home Office will update the alcohol mandatory licensing conditions to allow
for
age
verification
using
registered
DVS
when
buying
alcohol
● the Tobacco and Vapes Bill will provide a regulation-making power, which will
enable
specific
provision
to
be
made
to
make
clear
how
DVS
can
be
used
securely
for
tobacco
and
vape
sales
● the Home Office intends to follow the same approach of providing a
regulation-making
power
in
the
Crime
and
Policing
Bill,
to
make
clear
how
DVS
can
be
used
securely
for
the
sale
of
knives
and
other
bladed
articles
● DSIT has worked with HM Treasury to jointly produce guidance on using digital identities for identity and Know Your Customer checks as required under the Money Laundering Regulations
As we expect the GOV.UK Wallet (which will hold the digital ID) to be certified as a DVS
under
the
Data
(Use
and
Access)
Act
2025,
these
changes
could
pave
the
way
for
people
to
choose
to
use
the
digital
ID
across
the
economy.
For
instance,
the
digital
ID
could
support
the
use
of
trustworthy
electronic
signatures,
providing
a
way
for
people
to
prove
their
identity
before
digitally
signing
a
document
in
the
homebuying
process.
These changes will also unlock opportunities for people to use other certified DVS
providers
and
documents
in
the
GOV.UK
Wallet
should
they
wish.
Government
remains
committed
to
the
work
that
is
already
ongoing
to
enable
the
use
of
digital
verification
services
in
a
range
of
further
scenarios,
and
to
encourage
the
use
of
DVS
for
digital
right
to
rent
checks
and
Disclosure
and
Barring
Service
identity
checks
by
those
who
would
like
to
conduct
a
check
digitally.
The government has also recently launched an evidence-led consultation on how to ensure children’s experiences online are safe and enriching. The consultation asks
about
how
children
use
digital
technology,
as
well
as
potential
new
measures
for
keeping
them
safe
online,
and
will
be
open
until
26
May
2026.
It
includes
questions
about
how
age
verification
technologies,
like
the
national
digital
ID,
could
support
effective
implementation
of
current
and
future
protections.
Where appropriate, we are working across government and with regulators to ensure
that
where
any
digital
identity,
including
the
national
digital
ID,
is
accepted,
it
is
done
in
a
robust
way
–
for
instance
with
sector
specific
regulatory
and
legislative
requirements
for
programmatic
checking
(see
chapter
2.2).
This
is
intended
to
prevent
organisations
from
relying
on
insecure
visual
inspection
methods.
45
In some cases, the relevant legislation, regulation or guidance which is necessary to
enable
acceptance
of
the
digital
ID
may
be
devolved.
We
will
work
closely
with
the
devolved
governments
and
seek
to
secure
legislative
consent
as
necessary
so
that
people
across
the
UK
can
make
the
same
choices
about
whether
to
use
their
digital
ID
in
their
daily
lives.
Across all uses, the digital ID will be optional. It will give people more choice for how
they
operate
in
the
economy
and
share
their
data,
rather
than
becoming
the
only
choice.
46
Questions about Chapter 3.3: Utility in the wider economy
This question is for everyone:
3.3.Q1. The national digital ID would be useable across the private and public sectors,
alongside
other
options
like
physical
documents
and
other
appropriate
digital
identities
from
third
parties.
To what extent do you agree or disagree that the private sector and third
parties should be
able
to
use the digital
ID
alongside
other
options?
a. Strongly agree
b. Somewhat agree
c. Neither agree nor disagree
d. Somewhat disagree
e. Strongly disagree
f. Don’t know
i. 3.3.Q1.1. Please explain your answer
47
Chapter 3.4: Tackling illegal working
As part of the digital ID system, we are exploring changes to how right to work checks
are
conducted
in
the
UK
to
more
effectively
tackle
illegal
working.
Under
UK
legislation,
access
to
work
is
reserved
for
those
with
a
right
to
work.
This
includes
British
and
Irish
nationals,
and
those
whose
immigration
status
entitles
them
to
work.
All
employers
in
the
UK
already
have
a
responsibility
to
prevent
illegal
working
by
those
individuals
who
are
not
entitled
to
do
so.
An employer can check someone’s right to work by conducting prescribed checks
before
employing
someone.
The
checks
apply
irrespective
of
nationality
and
include
British
and
Irish
citizens.
Conducting
these
checks
ensures
an
individual
is
not
disqualified
from
carrying
out
the
work
in
question
by
reason
of
their
immigration
status.
It
also
ensures
businesses
can
obtain
a
statutory
excuse
(a
defence)
against
liability
for
a civil penalty where illegal working is detected.
There are currently three main ways a business can complete a right to work check:
● A manual check of original documents from a prescribed list of accepted documents (all citizens) ● A digital check using a digital verification service (DVS) that offers Identity
Document
Validation
Technology
(valid
British
passport
and
Irish
passport
or
Irish
passport
card
holders
only)
● A Home Office online check (non-British and non-Irish citizens with an eVisa only)
How right to work checks could change Our ambition is that digital right to work checks will be mandatory by the end of this
Parliament
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
a
statutory
excuse.
The
evidence
which
can
be
checked
by
a
robust
digital
process
will
include
the
digital
ID
(including
any
alternative
access
solutions),
alongside
a
British/Irish
passport
(or
Irish
passport
card)
or
an
eVisa.
We are therefore proposing to legislate so that evidence must be checked digitally as
part
of
a
prescribed
right
to
work
check.
Amendments
will
be
made
to
the
secondary
legislation
and
statutory
codes
of
practice
to
prescribe
robust
digital
checks
as
the
only
acceptable
means
by
which
the
above
evidence
can
be
checked
and
the
statutory
excuse
obtained.
We
will
also
remove
alternative
forms
of
evidence
deemed
no
longer
valid
to
establish
a
statutory
excuse,
such
as
birth
certificates,
and
set
out
within
the
code
of
practice
how
businesses
can
conduct
digital
checks
using
the
narrowed
range
of
evidence
–
including
via
an
appropriate
DVS.
48
The move to only digital checks will● make it easier for people to demonstrate their right to work by not having to find
and
potentially
post
original
physical
documents
to
prove
their
identity
● make unreliable manual checks of varied paper documents unacceptable,
making
it
harder
for
criminals
to
use
forged
documents
to
gain
employment
and
helping
to
mitigate
fraud
● reduce the risk of people’s data being misplaced or leaked by replacing copies of
paper-based
documents
with
secure
digital
checks
● create a digital audit trail of where checks have been carried out, helping
businesses
to
demonstrate
compliance
and
supporting
enforcement
● minimise the data people share with businesses for right to work checks ● make it simpler and quicker for businesses to conduct checks, and therefore
comply
with
government
requirements,
by
standardising
the
process
● increase the accuracy of checks through automated validity checking and
minimising
the
potential
for
human
error
We recognise that some right to work checks may still need to be carried out via an
exceptions
handling
process.
This
will
be
set
out
in
the
statutory
codes
of
practice.
Business support All businesses recruiting from the date of implementation of these changes will need to
carry
out
a
digital
right
to
work
check
for
new
workers
to
obtain
a
statutory
excuse
against
a
civil
penalty.
This
means
that
there
will
be
no
need
to
retrospectively
carry
out
right
to
work
checks
for
workers
already
in
post.
The government is committed to ensuring that businesses are supported in the
transition
to
digital
right
to
work
checks.
We
will
therefore
be
implementing:
● a transition period between the introduction of the digital ID for individuals and
mandating
digital
right
to
work
checks
to
obtain
a
statutory
excuse
● a communications campaign and business engagement ● business training to support the move to exclusively digital checks
As set out in Chapter 2.2, we are also considering whether the government should
make
available
a
free
or
low-cost
checker
service,
known
as
the
‘Government
Checker’,
to
support
checks
of
the
digital
ID.
49
Questions about Chapter 3.4: Tackling illegal working
As a reminder: please do not include information that could identify a specific individual
in
any
free
text
responses.
These questions are for everyone3.4.Q1. Are there any additional challenges not captured in the
consultation that businesses would
face
in
carrying
out
fully
digital
right
to
work
checks
for
all
new
workers?
a. Yes
b. No
i. 3.4.Q1.1. Please explain your answer
3.4.Q2. Would any additional support not captured in the consultation be required for
business
to
comply
with
fully
digital
right
to
work
checks?
a. Yes
b. No
i. 3.4.Q2.1. Please explain your answer
This question is for organisations:
3.4.Q3. What information would your organisation require to have confidence that
a digital
right
to
work check
has
been
completed?
a. Date of completion
b. Length of right to work
c. Condition of working
i. 3.4.Q3.1. Any other information not listed above. Please provide details.
50
Part 4Inclusive
Introduction
The national digital ID system provides an opportunity for government to accelerate its
mission
towards
a
digitally
inclusive
UK,
and
ensure
that
everyone
can
participate
in,
and
benefit
from,
a
modern
digital
society
and
economy.
Inclusion
will
therefore
be
at
the
heart
of
how
we
design
and
deliver
this
system
to
the
public,
and
how
we
support
individuals
who
struggle
to
prove
their
identity
or
engage
with
digital
services.
Inclusion and security measures will be developed in tandem from the outset. See
chapter
5.2.
on
security
for
more
detail
on
keeping
the
digital
ID
system
secure.
Chapter 4.1: Eligibility for the digital ID
All British and Irish citizens, and foreign nationals with permission to be in the UK, who
are
above
an
agreed
minimum
age,
will
be
eligible
for
the
digital
ID.
Minimum age for eligibility We plan to make the digital ID available for those who meet the above criteria and are
aged
16
or
older.
This
is
because
Right
to
Work
checks
are
required
from
age
16.
However,
we
want
to
gather
views
on
either:
● lowering the minimum age of eligibility to 13, or ● removing a minimum age so that everyone can have the digital ID from birth
Such changes have advantages and disadvantages, and we invite views to inform a
final
decision.
Regardless
of
the
minimum
age
chosen,
the
Age
Appropriate
Design
Code
(AADC)
and
its
principles
will
apply
to
all
children
using
the
digital
ID,
even
16-
and
17-year-olds.
Appropriate
parental
supervision
mechanisms
will
also
need
to
be
designed
to
be
proportional
to
the
risks
and
benefits
to
the
child.
Lowering the minimum age of eligibility to 13
There are currently relatively few occasions when children aged 13-15 are required to
prove
their
age
or
identity.
Accessing
online
platforms,
including
social
media
platforms,
51
is an important exception, as the legal age from which people in the UK can provide
consent
to
the
processing
of
their
personal
data
for
most
online
services
is
13.
As
a
result
of
this,
m
any
online
services
have
a
minimum
age
of
access
of
13.
Additionally,
the
Online
Safety
Act
2023
requires
in-scope
services
that
do
not
prohibit
certain
types
of
content
harmful
to
children,
including
pornography
and
suicide
content,
to
use
highly
effective
age
assurance
to
prevent
children
from
encountering
it.
Some online services use certified DVS providers as a method of age assurance. This
allows
children
aged
13
or
over
to
use
their
services
if
they
can
sufficiently
verify
their
identity
with
a
DVS.
However,
any
child
that
does
not
have
access
to
enough
evidence
of
their
identity,
like
a
passport,
to
allow
online
services
to
be
confident
in
their
age,
will
be
unable
to
benefit
from
these
services
and
may
be
prevented
from
accessing
age-appropriate
online
content.
Making the digital ID available for those aged 13 and over could help address these
inclusion
concerns
by
being
free
for
children
to
access
and
use.
It
could
help
services
to
accurately
distinguish
a
child’s
age
or
age
group
between
13-17
and
thereby
deliver
more
tailored
and
age-appropriate
experiences.
We
do
not
propose
mandating
the
digital
ID
as
the
only
way
to
prove
your
age
or
age
range
on
online
services
and
we
will
continue
to
support
innovation
and
user
choice
in
age
assurance
technologies.
Further, making the digital ID available to additional age groups may bring some public
service
benefits.
Parents
and
guardians
typically
need
to
register
and
manage
access
to
services
on
the
child’s
behalf.
The
more
complex
the
child’s
individual
circumstances,
the
more
frequently
their
parent
or
caregiver
may
need
to
provide
this
same
information
to
a
variety
of
services.
Broadening
access
to
more
age
bands
may
help
to
reduce
this
administrative
burden
on
more
parents,
and
support
more
efficient
public
services.
However, lowering the minimum age to 13 would also bring unique privacy, inclusion
and
design
challenges
as
children’s
personal
data
must
be
afforded
the
right
levels
of
protection.
Younger
teenagers
are
also
more
likely
to
require
accessible
language
and
inclusive
parental
supervision
mechanisms.
Additionally,
explicit
parental
or
guardian
consent
may
be
necessary
for
anyone
under
16
to
access
the
digital
ID,
or
it
may
need
to
be
managed
entirely
by
a
parent/guardian
on
a
child’s
behalf.
Providing everyone with the ability to have a digital ID from birth
Enabling people to participate in the digital ID system from birth could support
streamlined,
digital,
lifelong
public
service
provision.
Enabling
parents
and
guardians
to
prove
information
about
their
children
digitally
from
birth
would
mean
that
parents
or
guardians
of
younger
children
could
have
the
same
benefits
as
those
of
older
children.
52
Parents or guardians would be able to decide whether to obtain a digital ID for their
child.
We
also
recognise
that
children
under
the
age
of
13
would
not
be
able
to
manage
their
own
digital
ID.
Instead,
this
would
be
done
by
a
parent
or
guardian.
We further recognise that removing a minimum age for digital ID eligibility would raise
additional
challenges
compared
to
having
a
minimum
age
of
13
or
16.
This
includes
additional
privacy
issues,
and
issues
around
how
parental
management
of
the
digital
ID
would
work
in
specific
instances,
such
as
where
parents
are
separated.
We
also
need
to
understand
whether
children
would
be
placed
at
a
disadvantage
if
their
parent
or
caregiver
decided
not
to
obtain
a
digital
ID
on
their
behalf,
and
if
this
would
create
new
safeguarding,
exclusion
or
other
risks.
53
Questions about Chapter 4.1: Eligibility for the digital ID
These questions are for everyone:
4.1.Q1. All British and Irish citizens, and foreign nationals with permission to be in the
UK,
who
are
above
an
agreed
minimum
age
will
be
eligible
for
the national digital
ID.
Are
there
any other groups
that
should
be
included?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 4.1.Q1.1 Please list which groups you believe should be included, and
why
4.1.Q2. Which of the following ages do you think is most suitable to access the digital
ID system from?
a. 16 years old
b. 13 years old
c. Birth
d. Other
e. Don’t know
i. 4.1.Q2.1. Please explain your answer
54
Chapter 4.2 Unlocking access across society
It is our intention that the national digital ID system enables every eligible individual to
engage
with
the
many
benefits
of
this
technology,
and
the
resulting
improvements
in
greater
ID
(identity
document)
ownership
and
increased
digital
inclusion.
Both
ID
and
digital
exclusion
are
tackled
in
turn
below.
Traditional identity document exclusion ID exclusion is a persistent issue in the UK. In 2021, the Cabinet Office found that 1 in 10 eligible voters in England, Scotland and Wales did not hold an in-date and
recognisable
form
of
photo
ID.
Due
to
a
combination
of
financial,
practical
and
other
barriers,
many
people
struggle
to
access
identity
documents
like
passports
or
driving
licenses,
which
are
commonly
used
as
proof
or
evidence
of
identity.
For
instance,
an
adult
British
passport
is
priced
between
£94.50
and
£107,
depending
on
the
application
route,
which
can
place
them
out
of
reach
for
low-income
individuals.
In
addition,
some
applicants
for
existing
government
IDs
may
struggle
to
obtain
supporting
evidence,
such
as
birth
or
adoption
certificates,
or
access
to
a
counter
signatory
required
to
successfully
navigate
application
processes.
An
individual’s
level
of
trust
in
government
can
also
affect
whether
they
choose
to
engage
with
formal
identity
systems
in
the
first
place.
Those without the ability to prove identity to the required standard are at a disadvantage
when
it
comes
to
engaging
with
government
and
wider
services,
whether
online
or
offline.
In
the
most
extreme
cases,
this
may
mean
that
people
can
struggle
to
open
a
bank
account,
buy
or
rent
a
home,
or
prove
their
right
to
work
status.
The digital ID system offers a unique opportunity to support these people. It will allow
them
to
access
a
free
(i.e.
without
up-front
charges
for
use
and
access)
digital
ID
that
could
transform
their
ability
to
engage
with
relevant
services
and
level
the
playing
field
for
those
currently
experiencing
disadvantage.
It
is
our
intention
that
the
digital
ID
system
enables
every
eligible
individual
to
engage
with
modernised
digital
services
across
government.
More
details
can
be
found
in
Part
3
on
how
the
digital
ID
system
will
be
useful.
Digital inclusion The digital ID system will also be rolled out with a core focus on digital inclusion. Many
people
lack
the
access,
skills,
support
and
confidence
to
participate
in
and
benefit
from
our
modern
digital
society.
Addressing
this
will
be
critical
to
their
ability
to
use
the
digital
ID.
For
example:
● The Lloyds Consumer Digital Index Report finds 1.6 million people in the UK are living offline, meaning they do not use the internet at all
55
● The Lloyds Essential Digital Skills report finds 8% of UK adults (approx. 4 million people) do not have the essential digital skills needed for everyday life ● Age UK research finds 37% of those aged over 65 who want to be online more, do not trust the internet ● Ofcom’s technology tracker finds 6% of UK households do not have a smartphone
Groups requiring targeted support Our inclusion work will focus on supporting a variety of different groups. Below is a
non
-
exhaustive
list
of
those
who
may
benefit
most
from
additional
support
measures
to
ensure
they
are
able
to
access
the
digital
ID,
and
a
range
of
challenges
that
could
limit
individuals’
ability
to
access
it:
● those on a low income, who may face data or device poverty ● people who have legally migrated to the UK but struggle to prove their right to be
here
(people
without
foundational
documents,
like
birth
certificates
or
passports,
or
expired
documents),
such
as
older
Commonwealth
citizens
and
the
Windrush
Generation
● those with no or poor internet connectivity, or incompatible or outdated tech ● people lacking essential digital skills ● people with low motivation or confidence to use digital technologies, which may
be
due
to
lack
of
skills
and
knowledge
● those lacking support networks to access available technology ● people experiencing unemployment ● people living with physical and cognitive disabilities ● people who are neurodivergent ● older people ● children and young people, including those Not in Education, Employment or
Training
(‘NEET’),
including
vulnerable
young
people
and
those
in
care
● care leavers ● survivors of, or those currently experiencing, domestic abuse ● people with limited English ● people who do not have a fixed or stable address, or experience homelessness ● people affected by human trafficking or modern slavery ● sex workers ● people in refuges or safe houses, witness protection, or with confidentiality or
non-disclosure
orders
● trans and non-binary people and anyone with recent name changes and
mismatched
records.
This
should
be
read
alongside
Part
3
which
includes
a
section
on
sex
and
gender
56
● groups that facial biometric systems may not reliably recognise, for example
people
who
live
with
facial
differences
or
people
who
have
undergone
facial
surgery
● people in prison, recently released or on probation ● in-patients in hospitals or secure mental health units and care homes ● cultural communities with less engagement in mainstream society, including
some
religious
and
traveller
communities
● people with concerns about data use, security and data privacy, who are
reluctant
to
engage,
or
do
not
trust
digital
products
or
government
services.
This
chapter
should
be
read
alongside
chapter
5.1
on
data
protection
and
privacy
57
Questions about Chapter 4.2: Unlocking access across society
These questions are for everyone:
We are committing to an inclusion programme to ensure everyone eligible in the UK can
access
the
digital
ID.
4.2.Q1. Some people may face barriers to creating or using the national digital ID. This
may
be
due
to difficulty
accessing
traditional
proofs
of
identity
(like
passports)
or
due
to
a
lack
of digital access,
skills or confidence.
Are you aware of any other barriers not captured in the consultation?
a. Yes b. No c. Don’t know i. 4.2.Q1.1 Which other barriers are you aware of and why? 4.2.Q2. The government is committed to making sure the national digital ID system stays true to the approach outlined in the Digital Inclusion Action Plan. This includes providing local level support, increasing access to the internet and helping
people
develop
digital
skills.
Is there any particular support not captured in the consultation or the Digital Inclusion
Action
Plan that
would
help
you or
other
people to
use
the
national
digital
ID?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 4.2.Q2.1 Which other forms of support would be helpful and why?
4.2.Q3. Chapter 4.2 of the consultation includes a non-exhaustive list of those
people who
may
benefit
the
most
from
additional
support
measures
to
ensure
they
are
able
to
access
the
national
digital
ID.
Are there any groups not included in the list that you believe could also be at risk of ID or
digital exclusion?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
58
i. 4.2.Q3.1. Please specify which other groups may be excluded and
describe
how
they
might
be impacted. Please
do
this
for
each
group
you identify.
Chapter 4.3 Commitment to supporting inclusion
Practical onboarding support Some individuals will require specific support to create and use the digital ID, and we
will
ensure
that
measures
are
in
place
to
help
them
do
this.
Support for onboarding and ongoing use of the digital ID could include● dedicated and locally accessible assistance ● support and training from trusted individuals ● guidance and programmes designed to inform and disseminate skills An example of this is HM Passport Office, part of the Home Office, which provides
additional
support
to
those
who
struggle
to
apply
for
a
passport.
This
includes
commercial
in-person
routes
in
local
communities
to
check
documents
and
ensure
the
correct
information
is
provided.
Telephone
support
for
disabled
and
digitally
excluded
customers
is
also
provided
to
facilitate
the
correct
completion
of
application
forms.
HM
Passport
Office
also
integrates
safeguarding
measures
for
vulnerable
applicants,
ensuring
sensitive
handling
of
personal
circumstances
such
as
disability.
We
will
ensure
that
support
is
in
place
to
ensure
all
eligible
individuals
can
access
the
digital
ID
if
they
wish
to.
Digital inclusion support It will be critical that those who require digital support are able to access the digital ID system. The Digital Inclusion Action Plan sets out the steps that government is taking to improve digital skills and help more people access the benefits of technology and online
services.
Some
examples
include:
● identifying what works and designing evidence-based interventions ● taking a cross-government approach to breaking down silos ● delivering in partnership with local authorities, national and devolved
governments,
and
private
and
third
sectors
● learning from international partners and following best practice
Government will continue to deliver targeted digital inclusion activity to assist those who
are
digitally
excluded,
including
providing
support
to
access
the
digital
ID.
59
Questions about Chapter 4.3: Commitment to supporting inclusion
This question is for members of the public:
4.3.Q1. What kind of support should be made available to people who do not have a
digital
device
(like
a
smartphone
or
tablet) to
enable
them
to
create
and
access
the
digital
ID?
a. Dedicated and locally accessible help
b. Support and training from trusted individuals
c. Guidance and programmes designed to inform and disseminate skills
d. Other. Please provide details.
This question is for experts responding in their own capacity and organisations:
4.3.Q2. We are considering dedicated accessible support for those who are digitally
excluded,
delivered locally,
in-person
and
by
trusted
organisations. Are
there
any
other ways you
think
the
government
should
consider supporting
those
who
are
digitally
excluded?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 4.3.Q2.1. Please explain what you support measures should be
considered
60
Chapter 4.4 Accessibility
The national digital ID will follow an inclusive by design approach. This means that we
will
aim
to:
● anticipate and remove barriers to accessibility ● design features with diverse users in mind ● extensively test features before roll-out ● ensure a good experience for all users regardless of their ability or the age or
model
of
their
device
The system will comply with recognised accessibility standards like the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.2 AA standards. The system will also comply with the Public Sector Bodies (Websites and Mobile Applications) (No. 2)) Accessibility Regulations 2018, which set out standards specifically for public sector bodies to ensure their websites and mobile applications are accessible. It will also aim to be fully
operable
using
common
assistive
technologies,
including:
● screen readers ● keyboard-only navigation ● voice commands ● biometric authentication ● screen magnification
Accessibility will be an ongoing and collaborative effort, and we will adapt our approach
as
new
opportunities
for
accessibility
are
identified
and
technological
needs
evolve.
61
Questions about Chapter 4.4: Accessibility
This question is for everyone:
4.4.Q1. The government intends to engage with a range of people and organisations
outside
of
government to help ensure
the
design
and
delivery
of
the
national
digital
ID system is accessible. Can
you
suggest
any specific
organisations or
types of organisations which the
government should engage
with?
62
Chapter 4.5: Alternative access routes
We recognise that some groups of people may significantly benefit from alternative
routes
and
additional
support
to
access
and
use
their
national
digital
ID.
The
standard
route,
as
set
out
in
Part
2,
will
require
a
device,
such
as
a
compatible
smartphone
or
tablet,
and
connectivity.
We are considering whether alternative routes to accessing the digital ID will be
needed,
to
ensure
that
all
eligible
individuals
can
access
the
system.
Any
alternative
route
would
facilitate
a
digitised
check
to
ensure
that
the
alternative
route
is
as
robust
as
the
standard
route
in
terms
of
security,
reliability,
accuracy
and
the
prevention
of
fraud.
This
means
that
a
physical
card
that
is
only
visually
checkable
cannot
be
an
alternative.
Below are examples of how other countries have approached an alternative but
digitised
access
route
to
their
respective
systems.
These
international
examples
are
included
for
reference
only
and
the
national
contexts
within
which
they
have
been
designed
are
likely
to
vary
significantly
to
those
in
the
UK.
They
provide
examples
of
technologies
that
can
facilitate
a
digitised
check
without
requiring
a
device
or
data
connectivity.
International case studies● Denmark’s MitID: MitID is predominantly accessed via the MitID app, but
alternative
access
routes
include
a
code
display.
This
is
a
physical
product
which
displays
a
one-time
passcode
for
users
to
safely
log
in
to
a
web
browser.
More
information is available on the MitID website
● India’s Aadhaar: India’s digital ID system includes a smartphone app alongside
alternative
access
routes.
These
alternative
routes
include
digitally
signed
QR
codes,
which
can
be
scanned
for
offline
identity
verification. More information is available on the Aadhaar Website
● Estonia’s E-ID: The foundation of this scheme is a physical ID card with a smart
chip
for
digital
authentication.
The
e-ID
system
also
includes
a
smartphone
app.
As
an
alternative
access
route,
Mobile-ID
offers
secure
digital
authentication
and
signatures
via
a
special
SIM
card,
enabling
access
to
e-services
without
a
card
reader. More information is available on the e-ID website
63
Questions about Chapter 4.5: Alternative access routes
This question is for everyone:
4.5.Q1. We are exploring alternative ways to access the national digital ID for those who
cannot
use
a device.
What do
you
think
are
the
most
important barriers for
government
to address when designing alternative access routes for
the
national
digital
ID?
This question is for members of the public4.5.Q2. If you are someone who does not use a digital device, what would you want
from
an
alternative
access
route?
64
Part 5Trusted
Introduction
It is essential to the success of the national digital ID system that government upholds
the
highest
standards
of
security,
privacy
and
data
protection,
with
effective
and
proportionate
governance
and
oversight.
Individuals
must
have
full
confidence
that
the
government
is
looking
after
their
data,
keeping
it
safe
from
unauthorised
disclosure,
fraud,
cyber-attacks
and
other
threats.
Similarly,
those
who
need
to
rely
on
information
in
the
digital
ID,
from
government
services
to
private
businesses,
must
be
able
to
trust
its
accuracy
and
validity.
Principles
of
data
minimisation
and
empowering
users
to
ensure
they
have
greater
control
over
how
much
data
they
share
when
using
their
digital
ID
at
point
of
use
will
be
central
to
the
system’s
design
and
implementation.
Chapter 5.1: Data protection and privacy
The digital ID system will be designed and delivered with privacy at its core. The UK has
strong
data
protection
legislation,
and
robust
legal
requirements
and
principles
of
data
protection
and
privacy
by
design
will
be
embedded
throughout
every
stage
of
development
and
delivery
of
the
new
system.
Data
protection
legislation
means
the
UK
GDPR,
the
Data
Protection
Act
2018
and
any
regulations
made
under
them.
Other
relevant
legislation
includes
the
Privacy
and
Electronic
Communication
Regulations
2003
and
the
Human
Rights
Act
1998.
This
legislative
environment
provides
strong
guardrails
for
how
the
digital
ID
system
can
be
implemented
and
used,
and
the
design
and
delivery
will
not
deviate
from
established
legal
requirements.
Building on existing progress The government already processes personal data for identity purposes, including via
GOV.UK
One
Login,
GOV.UK
Wallet,
the
eVisa
service
and
HM
Passport
Office.
These
services
are
safe,
secure
and
designed
with
privacy
in
mind,
and
the
new
system
will
build
on
these
well
established
and
robust
foundations
to
deliver
a
solution
that
is
designed
to
the
highest
standards
of
privacy,
security
and
trust.
65
Data protection by design is embedded into these systems and strong governance
arrangements
ensure
that
data
protection
compliance
is
integral
to
their
operation.
For
instance,
GOV.UK
One
Login
only
stores
the
minimum
data
required
to
verify
someone's
identity
and
ensures
that
it
is
being
shared
by
the
rightful
holder.
The
GOV.UK
Wallet
follows
a
decentralised
data
model.
This
means
that
instead
of
storing
everyone’s
personal
data
in
a
new
central
database,
each
government
department
or
agency
manages
its
own
part
of
the
system.
They
issue
and
maintain
digital
credentials
(and
hold
the
personal
data
necessary
to
do
so),
using
their
own
secure
infrastructure,
but
all
these
credentials
can
be
linked
and
used
through
the
GOV.UK
Wallet,
underpinned
by
GOV.UK
One
Login.
Building on these services, we will design the digital ID system to be secure, with only
the
minimum
amount
of
data
collected
and
stored.
The
majority
of
data
used
throughout
the
process
remaining
at
source,
where
it
is
already
securely
stored.
This
will
ensure
the
relationships
that
people
already
have
with
different
government
departments
remain
intact.
For
instance,
data
about
someone’s
benefits
entitlement
will
remain
with
the
Department
for
Work
and
Pensions
(DWP),
even
if
they
prove
their
identity
to
the
DWP
using
the
national
digital
ID.
Box 5.1.1. HM Passport Office protection of personal data
The protection of personal data is paramount to HM Passport Office and is an example
of
how
government
holds
personal
data
safely
and
securely.
HM
Passport
Office
uses
a
multi-layered
security
approach,
combining
encrypted
data
stores
with
strict
access
controls
for
both
users
of
the
data
and
those
maintaining
the
systems.
Our digital services run on modern, UK-hosted cloud infrastructure. We run the system
in
a
securely
protected,
self-contained
environment
designed
to
reduce
risks.
Data
is
encrypted
in
transit
and
at
rest,
only
authorised
people
can
access
the
system,
all
activity
is
recorded,
and
every
request
is
checked
to
ensure
it's
safe
and
legitimate.
Security is designed in from the outset. Threat-modelling is carried out as services are
developed
and
maintained,
ensuring
potential
risks
are
understood
and
mitigated
early.
This
is
supported
by
continuous
monitoring
and
regular
assurance
activities
to
maintain
the
highest
standards
of
security.
HM
Passport
Office
processes
personal
data
in
compliance
with
UK
data
protection
legislation.
Personal
data
is
only
kept
for
as
long
as
necessary,
and
is
not
shared
unless
it
is
lawful,
necessary
and
proportionate
to
do
so.
Full
details
can
be
found
in
the
Privacy
Information
Notice
on
GOV.UK
on
how
your
personal
data
is
used
in
HM
Passport
Office.
Exercising greater consent and control While people will always have a meaningful choice about whether to use the digital ID,
we
are
also
committed
to
exploring
design
options
that
will
support
them
to
exercise
66
greater consent and control while using their digital ID. As set out in Chapter 1.2, the
range
of
ways
people
can
choose
to
use
digital
ID
in
the
public
and
private
sector
will
grow
over
time
–
but,
crucially,
people
will
also
be
able
to
continue
using
any
other
alternatives,
like
physical
documents.
However,
for
those
who
opt
to
use
their
digital
ID,
our
ambition
is
to
build
in
greater
consent
and
control
than
physical
alternatives
offer.
For instance, in Chapter 3.1 we cover how the digital ID will support 'selective
disclosure'
functionality.
Currently,
when
presenting
or
using
scans
of
physical
identity
documents,
individuals
have
no
choice
but
to
disclose
all
of
the
information
printed
on
them.
This
can
often
include
unnecessary
attributes
or
information.
By
contrast,
the
digital
ID
will
allow
people
to
disclose
only
information
about
themselves
that
is
relevant
to
a
situation.
This
helps
reduce
privacy
risks
by
minimising
the
potential
for
exposure
of
sensitive
data.
By
allowing
people
to
control
when,
where
and
with
whom
to
share
information
from
their
device,
this
also
makes
someone’s
consent
central
to
any
interactions
where
they
choose
to
present
their
digital
ID.
We want to maximise these kinds of benefits for people. As this system develops, we
will
therefore
continue
considering
how
people
can
be
empowered
to
exercise
greater
consent
and
control
over
their
digital
ID
in
other
ways
and
in
different
use
cases.
For clarity, references in this section to consent are not intended to be read as
references
to
consent
as
defined
under
the
UK
GDPR.
Privacy by design and default We recognise that privacy is a central concern for many individuals and organisations.
We
take
these
concerns
seriously.
The
digital
ID
system
will
be
clear
about
what
data
is
collected,
why
it
is
needed
and
how
it
will
be
used.
We
welcome
an
open
dialogue
with
privacy
focussed
individuals,
organisations
and
communities
to
share
their
views
and
concerns
about
data
protection
and
privacy
of
the
system.
We
will
work
closely
with
stakeholders
to
help
ensure
that
privacy
concerns
are
heard
and,
where
appropriate,
addressed.
We expect that the digital ID system will offer a range of privacy benefits to users and to
society,
including:
● allowing people to share only the information necessary for a given transaction or
to
access
a
service
(e.g.
proving
age
over
18
without
revealing
a
full
date
of
birth
or
other
information
which
might
be
seen
on
a
physical
document)
● reducing reliance on less secure means of proving identity (e.g. reduced need to
share
or
use
hardcopy
identity
documents
and
other
evidence)
● ensuring greater transparency of how data is processed and who it is
shared with
● simplifying businesses’ privacy compliance responsibilities by introducing a
simple
and
secure
way
to
check
an
individual’s
right
to
work
67
While detailed arrangements for personal data processing are subject to the final design
of
the
system
and
cannot
be
set
out
in
detail
at
this
time,
the
following
safeguards
will
be
built
into
the
digital
ID
system
to
protect
user
privacy
and
give
people
full
confidence
in
how
their
information
will
be
handled:
● Data protection by design and by default. The system will be designed with
privacy
as
a
core
principle,
following
“privacy
by
design
and
default”
from
the
earliest
stages.
Every
architectural
and
functional
decision
will
prioritise
user
privacy,
including
minimising
data
collection,
ensuring
secure
storage,
and
maintaining
transparency.
Privacy
specialists
will
be
embedded
within
the
project
team
to
review
all
design
choices
and
provide
guidance
to
ensure
compliance
with
data
protection
laws.
Decisions
will
be
documented
and
auditable,
reinforcing
accountability
throughout
the
process.
As
part
of
the
UK’s
data
protection
framework,
the
accountability
principle
means
that
an
organisation
is
responsible
for
complying
with
the
data
protection
principles
and
must
be
able
to
demonstrate
that
compliance.
● Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs). DPIAs will be central to this
approach
and
conducted
continuously
throughout
the
system’s
lifecycle.
These
assessments
will
examine
how
personal
data
is
processed,
identify
risks
to
individuals’
rights,
and
outline
measures
to
mitigate
those
risks.
DPIAs
will
undergo
rigorous
governance,
involve
oversight
from
senior
officers,
and
be
shared
with
the
Information
Commissioner’s
Office
(ICO)
for
review
and
advice.
This
ensures
evolving
risks
are
addressed
promptly
and
compliance
with
data
protection
law
is
maintained.
● Transparency and public engagement . Transparency is central to building public
trust,
and
we
are
committed
to
being
open
and
accountable
in
how
personal
data
is
processed.
The
consultation
process
and
ongoing
engagement
will
give
people
a
say
in
how
the
system
is
designed.
Once
these
decisions
are
finalised,
users
will
receive
clear,
plain-language
information
about
what
data
is
collected,
how
it
is
used,
retention
periods,
and
their
rights.
Privacy
notices
will
be
accessible
and
easy
to
understand,
ensuring
people
remain
informed
and
confident
in
the
system.
● Compliance with all data protection principles and requirements. The digital ID
system
will
comply
with
all
applicable
data
protection
requirements,
including:
o Personal data will be processed fairly, lawfully, and transparently , with
clear
legal
bases
and
safeguards
embedded
to
prevent
harm
or
discrimination.
o Data will be collected only for specific, legitimate purposes , such as
verifying
identity
or
right
to
work,
and
only
the
minimum
necessary
information
will
be
used,
regularly
reviewed,
and
protected
through
technical
controls.
o Accuracy will be maintained via authoritative sources and user-friendly
update
mechanisms.
68
o Data will be retained only as long as needed , stored securely on users’
devices
where
possible.
o Children’s data will be handled with heightened protections, aligning with the
ICO’s
Age
Appropriate
Design
Code
and
Children
and
the
GDPR
guidance.
Questions about Chapter 5.1: Data protection and privacy This question is for members of the public: 5.1.Q1. Are there any additional measures, beyond the principles and standards set out
in
the
consultation,
that
we
should
consider
to
further
protect
user
data?
a. Yes b. No c. Don’t know i. 5.1.Q1.1. If yes, please explain which measures we should consider and
why
This question is for experts responding in their own capacity and for organisations: 5.1.Q2. Principles of data minimisation and empowering users to ensure they have
greater
control
over
how
much
data
they
share
when
using
their
national
digital
ID
at
point
of
use
will
be
central
to
the
design
and
implementation
of
the
digital
ID system.
How
should
the
government
ensure
transparency
around
how
national
digital
ID
data
is
used?
69
Chapter 5.2: Securing the national digital ID system
Building on existing cyber security best practice and processes The government has longstanding experience and best practice in securely protecting
public
systems
and
services
that
handle
large
personal
data
sets,
and
which
are
critical
to
day-to-day
life
in
the
UK.
This
includes
data
that
proves
an
individual’s
identity.
For
example,
HM
Passport
Office
upholds
rigorous
security
principles
to
ensure
the
integrity
and
trustworthiness
of
British
passports,
including
biometric
security
and
strict
identity
verification
protocols.
The
digital
ID
system
will
build
on
the
insights
gained
from
existing
trusted
and
secure
models
–
and
will
need
to
set
the
benchmark
for
a
secure,
national-scale
digital
identity
service.
It is essential that security of the systems and any data that is accessed, shared and
stored
is
at
the
heart
of
the
design.
The
government
has
identified
cyber
threats
as
a
growing
risk
to
the
resilience
of
public
services,
with
a
sharp
rise
in
sophisticated
attacks
targeting
critical
systems.
Maintaining
the
highest
standards
of
security
and
continuous
improvement
to
ensure
systems
keep
pace
with
evolving
threats
is
essential
to
maintaining
public
trust
and
ensuring
the
long-term
security
of
the
national
digital
ID
infrastructure.
All UK government digital services and technical infrastructure must comply with two
core
standards
–
Cyber
Assessment
Framework
profiles
and
Secure
by
Design
principles.
The
digital
ID
system
will
be
underpinned
by
these
fundamental
cyber
security
standards,
as
well
as
continuous
advice
on
keeping
pace
with
the
cyber
threat
to
the
UK.
We
will
seek
advice
from
the
National
Cyber
Security
Centre
(NCSC)
as
the
UK's
national
technical
authority
for
cyber
security.
Vulnerable and at-risk individuals It is particularly important that the government takes steps to ensure that government
services
correctly
handle
the
personal
data
of
those
individuals
who
may
be
vulnerable
or
at
heightened
risk
of
harm,
such
as
those
individuals
who
may
experience
disproportionate
harm
if
their
personal
data
is
misused,
exposed,
or
inadequately
protected.
This
includes
but
is
not
limited
to:
● victims of domestic abuse ● people in witness protection schemes ● government staff in sensitive roles ● high-profile public figures ● serving judges or MPs ● children or elderly individuals ● people with disabilities or mental health conditions
70
The digital ID system will operate in line with the government’s published principles for securing personal data in relation to vulnerable and at-risk individuals. This will ensure it
achieves
the
required
balanced,
inclusive
approach
and
protects
such
individuals
without
inadvertently
increasing
their
exposure
through
exclusion
or
inconsistent
treatment
of
their
identifying
information.
National security
The government is required to ensure the digital ID system is secure and protected in
the
interests
of
national
security.
While
detailed
arrangements
for
security
mitigations
are
subject
to
the
final
design
of
the
system
and
cannot
be
set
out
in
detail
at
this
time,
the
digital
ID
system
will
be
built
to
safeguard
against
national
security
threats.
Lawful access
Access to personal data processed as part of the digital ID system will be subject to
existing
legal
requirements
and
restrictions
ensuring
access
is
both
necessary
and
proportionate.
In
particular,
access
to
personal
data
by
law
enforcement
and
intelligence
agencies
for
the
purpose
of
preventing
or
detecting
crime,
or
in
the
interests
of
national
security
is
governed
by
existing
legislation,
including
the
Police
and
Criminal
Evidence
Act
1984,
Crime
and
Courts
Act
2013,
Investigatory
Powers
Act
2016
and
Data
Protection
Act
2018.
Existing
powers
are
designed
to
enable
the
detection
and
prevention
of
serious
threats,
such
as
terrorism,
espionage,
and
serious
crime.
Rigorous
oversight
and
safeguards
are
in
place
to
protect
the
rights
and
privacy
of
individuals.
Access to the new digital ID more broadly will also be governed by existing laws
(including
the
UK
GDPR
and
the
Data
Protection
Act
2018).
This
is
already
the
case
for
DVLA
and
the
driving
licence,
HM
Passport
Office
and
the
passport,
and
GOV.UK
One
Login.
Police powers There will be no legal obligation for people to have or present the digital ID. The police
will
not
have
new
powers
to
request
an
individual’s
digital
ID
for
stop
and
search
purposes.
71
Box 5.2.1 – Police stop and search
In the UK there is no legal requirement to carry proof of identity at all times, and this will
remain
the
case.
The
police,
with
several
limited
exceptions,
generally
have
no
powers
to
require
a
person
to
provide
them
with
identity
documents
during
day-to-day
encounters.
However, where immigration enforcement officers are carrying out an enforcement visit
or
warrant,
they
do
have
powers
to
ensure
that
all
those
who
are
employed
have
the
right
to
work
in
the
UK
which
may
include
examining
identity
documents.
The police have common law powers to prevent and detect crime, and must comply
with
various
legislation
such
as
data
protection,
human
rights,
equality
and
other
relevant
laws.
For
example,
there
is
a
legal
basis
for
police
use
of
facial
recognition,
which
may
include
access
to
biometric
data
held
by
government.
The
government
recognises
that
the
current
legal
framework
is
complicated
and
has
launched
a
consultation
(which
concluded
in
February
2026)
on
reviewing
the
legal
framework
for
using
facial
recognition
in
law
enforcement.
That
consultation
proposes
a
new
legal
framework
that
will
create
consistent,
durable
rules
and
appropriate
safeguards
for
facial
recognition
and
similar
technologies
which
are
likely
to
follow
it
in
relation
to
biometric
data
held
by
government
in
the
future
.
The
national
digital
ID
will
be
subject
to
existing
frameworks
and/or
to
any
new
legal
framework
introduced.
72
Questions about Chapter 5.2: Securing the national digital ID system
This question is for everyone:
5.2.Q1. Are there any additional security safeguards to those named above that should
be
considered
in
relation
to
the national digital
ID system?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
i. 5.2.Q1.1. What are they and why are you recommending them?
73
Chapter 5.3: Fraud as a national challenge
Fraud against individuals and businesses is a rapidly evolving and deeply harmful crime
which
devastates
victims,
erodes
public
trust,
and
poses
a
serious
threat
to
the
national
security
and
economic
stability
of
the
UK.
The
government
knows
that
fraud
is
a
significant problem in both the public and private sectors in the UK, with research from the Office for National Statistics estimating fraud to be the most prevalent crime type in England and Wales. We know that fraudsters will target the digital ID system – and that
ensuring
we
understand
why,
how
and
when
will
be
critical
to
maintaining
trust
and
keeping the system safe for use. This work will be implemented alongside the government’s expanded Fraud Strategy, which was published by the Home Office on 9 March 2026.
A significant proportion of fraud in the UK is enabled by identity misuse and
unauthorised
account
access.
This
occurs
where
criminals
impersonate
others,
steal,
buy or create false identities to access services, benefits, or financial products. In 2024, Fraudscape reported that identity fraud represented 59% of all cases filed to the Cifas National Fraud Database. Artificial intelligence (AI) has also altered the fraud landscape, introducing new and complex risks. AI can be used by malicious actors to
generate
highly
convincing
fake
identities,
manipulate
biometric
data,
and
automate
impersonation
at
scale.
Tackling identity misuse is therefore critical to ensuring a secure digital identity system.
The
digital
ID
system
offers
opportunities
to
strengthen
verification
and
authentication
processes,
making
it
harder
for
criminals
to
exploit
identity-related
weaknesses.
Identity
abuse
can
also
occur
when
credentials
appear
dormant,
outdated
or
the
digital
ID
is
no
longer
valid
or
required,
creating
opportunities
for
exploitation.
This
means
it
will
be
important
to
maintain
identity
accuracy
throughout
the
lifecycle
of
the
digital
ID.
74
Box 5.3.1 - Scammers
The national digital ID will be targeted by fraudsters, scammers and misinformation
campaigns.
Fraudsters
may
impersonate
government
agencies,
sending
fake
emails,
scam
texts
or
calls
asking
people
to
“register”
or
“verify”
their
digital
ID.
These
messages
could
link
to
malicious
websites
designed
to
steal
personal
data
or
payment
information.
Criminals
might
also
promote
unofficial
apps
claiming
to
be
the
new
digital
ID
or
GOV.UK
Wallet
tricking
users
into
downloading
malware
or
submitting
sensitive
data.
Criminals
could
pose
as
employers
or
government
officials
requesting
the
new
digital
ID’s
details
for
right
to
work
checks,
then
use
that
data
for
identity
theft
or
fraud.
Similarly,
unregulated
third-party
services
may
offer
to
“help”
users
set
up
their
digital
ID,
collecting
personal
information
under
false
pretences.
To ensure the success and integrity of the digital ID system, we know it is essential to
anticipate
and
mitigate
the
risks
posed
by
scams
and
misinformation.
As outlined in Part 4, some groups may require alternative routes and additional support
to
access
and
use
the
digital
ID.
These
alternative
routes
will
be
designed
without
compromising
security
and
with
robust
fraud
prevention
measures
built
in.
75
Questions about Chapter 5.3: Fraud as a national challenge
These questions are for everyone:
To make sure everyone can access and use the national digital ID, the application
process
will
need
to
offer
alternative
routes
and
additional
support
for
those
who
need
them.
5.3.Q1. We want to ensure these alternative access routes are secure. What do you
think are
the most
important factors we
need
to consider in
order to
achieve
this?
5.3.Q2. What do you think are the most important factors to consider
when ensuring alternative
access
routes to
the
national
digital
ID are
not misused
by
fraudulent
actors?
76
Chapter 5.4: Ensuring strong oversight and governance
Strong governance and oversight are vital to protecting individuals’ rights and
establishing
public
trust
in
the
national
digital
ID
system.
Robust
oversight
regimes
often
involve
a
combination
of
internal
and
external
processes,
ranging
from
internal
complaints
handling
mechanisms
right
up
to
independent
scrutiny
and
being
held
to
account
by
Parliament
and
others.
Existing oversight structures As set out in chapter 2.1, the government has a mature and trusted infrastructure for
identifying
good
digital
verification
services,
which
helps
ensure
people’s
data
and
privacy
are
protected.
This
includes
existing
standards
and
regulatory
safeguards
for
areas
including
cyber
security,
national
security,
fraud,
and
data
protection
and
privacy.
We
intend
for
the
digital
ID
system
to
operate
within
this
ecosystem,
adopting
these
standards
and
safeguards,
to
ensure
the
system
operates
to
the
highest
standards.
There is a key role for Parliament in scrutinising the proposals for the digital ID system,
its
ongoing
operation
and,
where
required,
any
secondary
legislation
that
is
necessary.
On
an
ongoing
basis,
government
departments
are
required
to
annually
report
to
Parliament
on
their
financial
performance
and
activities,
and
it
is
our
expectation
that
the
digital
ID
system
will
be
subject
to
these
same
requirements.
It
is
also
our
intention
to
put
in
place
bespoke
reporting
arrangements
that
will
reflect
any
statutory
powers
and
duties
agreed
by
Parliament
in
respect
to
the
system.
Any
legislation
will
also
be
subject
to
post
implementation
review
to
allow
Parliament
to
understand
how
it
is
operating.
Additional oversight arrangements We will examine the full range of oversight options that may be applicable to the system
once
the
final
design
is
in
place,
though
this
work
will
begin
with
public
input
throughout
the
consultation
process.
Appropriate
oversight
will
meet
the
needs
of
the
digital
ID
system,
and
will:
● hold the government to account for risk management and necessary controls ● be proportionate to the burdens or restrictions imposed on the public and
business
● be efficient and economical ● be suitably open and transparent, making information accessible Of specific importance will be how people can seek resolution if they encounter issues.
For
example,
an
error
with
the
issuance,
renewal
or
revocation
of
their
digital
ID,
or
a
technology
failure
that
could
lead
to
a
negative
impact
on
the
user.
It
is
essential
that
there
are
clear
routes
for
individuals
to
make
a
complaint
and
that
the
process
to
77
manage these complaints is quick and effective. The government will consider
appropriate
forms
of
redress
(the
process
by
which
an
issue
is
made
right)
and
whether
and
how
individuals
can
seek
compensation,
through
a
claim,
where
they
may
be
eligible
to
do
so.
For some existing government functions, users are provided with the ability to escalate
issues
to
an
independent
party
for
resolution
if
they
are
not
satisfied
with
earlier
attempts
to
resolve
their
issue.
We
could
consider
a
similar
procedure
for
the
digital
ID
system.
For
example,
HM
Passport
Office
has
a
procedure
for
complaints
about
handling
passport
applications
that
includes
four
steps,
two
of
which
are
fully
independent
from
HM
Passport
Office.
Box
5.4.1
summarises
the
HM
Passport
Office
complaints
procedure.
Box 5.4.1: Summary of HM Passport Office complaints procedure
HM Passport Office sets out the following 4 step process for managing complaints:
Step 1: If you have a complaint about how we handled your passport application,
contact
our
customer
contact
centre
by
phone,
in
writing
or
by
using
our
online
enquiry
form.
Step 2If you have followed step 1 and are not satisfied with our response, you can ask
us
to
review
your
complaint.
Step 3If you have followed steps 1 and 2 and are still not satisfied, you can escalate your complaint to the Independent Examiner of Complaints (IEC) within 3 months of receiving our response.
Step 4: If you are still not satisfied, you can ask your MP to request an investigation by
the
Parliamentary
and
Health
Service
Ombudsman
(the
Ombudsman).
You
can
only
do
this
through
your
MP.
The
Ombudsman’s
role
is
to
investigate
complaints
by
members
of
the
public
about
the
way
government
departments,
and
their
executive
agencies,
have
treated
them.
The government will also consider support for victims of fraudulent use of their digital
ID.
Victims
of
identity
theft
often
face
significant
harm,
including
reputational
damage,
exclusion from services and emotional distress. Home Office research finds victims of fraud can suffer significant emotional and health impacts, even if they have not
experienced
a
large
financial
loss.
Current support mechanisms in the UK focus primarily on identity fraud, with practical
advice
available
from
organisations
such
as
Action
Fraud,
Cifas,
and
credit
reference
agencies.
Legal
remedies
and
formal
victim
support
structures
for
identity
theft
remain
limited,
particularly
where
stolen
documents
have
not
yet
been
used
to
commit
a
further
offence.
The
government
intends
to
consider
how
victims
of
digital
ID
misuse
will
be
78
supported, including access to credential revocation, and protection against
re-victimisation.
Provisions
should
also
be
made
to
allow
individuals
affected
by
misuse
or
errors
to
restore
their
digital
ID
quickly
and
securely
without
creating
new
vulnerabilities,
to
ensure
they
can
access
services
and
benefits
to
which
they
are
rightly
entitled.
Strengthening
these
mechanisms
builds
public
trust
and
helps
ensure
that
the
system
is
resilient
to
abuse.
79
Questions about Chapter 5.4: Ensuring strong oversight and
governance
These questions are for experts responding in their own capacity and organisations:
5.4.Q1. What additional oversight mechanisms, if any, should be put in place for the
national
digital
ID system?
5.4.Q2. What measures can you suggest, if any, that could be put in place to make sure
people can
resolve
issues
with
their
national
digital
ID?
These questions are for members of the public5.4.Q3. What additional oversight mechanisms, if any, would help you to have trust in
the
national
digital
ID system?
5.4.Q4. What measures do you think should be in place to help you feel confident in
resolving
any
issues
with
your
national
digital
ID?
80