The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad (PDF)

Strategic
Defence
Review
Making Britain Safer:
secure at home,
strong abroad
2025

Strategic Defence Review
Making Britain Safer:
secure at home, strong abroad
2025

© Crown copyright 2025
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Cover image: A drone operator from 2nd Battalion The Royal Yorkshire
Regiment launches a drone on Salisbury Plain as part of a ‘Recce-Strike’
live fire event (2024). Source: Corporal Rebecca Brown, MOD
Crown Copyright 2024.
Printed on wood-free ECF, FSC Mix 70%, and EU-Ecolabel.

Contents
Prime Minister’s Introduction 2
Foreword from the Secretary of State 3
Foreword from the Reviewers 9
1. Introduction and Overview 11
2. The Case for Transformation 25
3. Roles for UK Defence 35
4. Transforming UK Warfighting 42
4.1 The Integrated Force Model 45
4.2 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth 51
4.3 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education 64
5. Allies and Partners 72
Defence’s Global Relationships: The SDR’s Starting Point 82
6. Home Defence and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Approach 86
7. The Integrated Force: A Force Fit for War in the 21st Century 94
7.1 The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent 98
7.2 Maritime Domain 104
7.3 Land Domain 108
7.4 Air Domain 112
7.5 Space Domain 116
7.6 Cyber and Electromagnetic Domain 119
7.7 Strategic Command 124
7.8 Special Forces 126
7.9 Intelligence 127
7.10 Defence Medical Services 130
7.11 Infrastructure 133
Appendix: Review Process 138

Prime Minister’s
Introduction
My first duty as Prime Minister is to
keep the British people safe. That is why
national security is the foundation of this
Government’s Plan for Change. In this
new era for defence and security, when
Russia is waging war on our continent
and probing our defences at home, we
must meet the danger head on. We must
recognise the very nature of warfare is
being transformed on the battlefields of
Ukraine and adapt our armed forces and
our industry to lead this innovation. And
we must understand that global instability
affects economic security too, driving
down growth and driving up the cost of
living for working families here at home.
That’s why, in one of my first acts as Prime
Minister, I launched this Strategic Defence
Review, setting the Reviewers the formidable
challenge of examining how our nation should
meet this moment. The fundamental truth is
clear: a step-change in the threats we face
demands a step-change in British defence
to meet them. We will never gamble with our
national security. So I have already acted,
announcing the largest sustained increase
in defence spending since the Cold War.
We are delivering our commitment to spend
2.5% of GDP on defence, accelerating it
to 2027, and we have set the ambition to
reach 3% in the next Parliament, subject
to economic and fiscal conditions. This
investment will end the hollowing out of
our armed forces and enable the UK to
step up, to lead in NATO, and take greater
responsibility for our collective self-defence.
But our response cannot be confined to
increasing defence spending. We also need
to see the biggest shift in mindset in my
lifetime: to put security and defence front
and centre—to make it the fundamental
organising principle of government.
Our experience of the pandemic exposed
the vulnerabilities of relying on international
just-in-time supply chains and required a
whole-of-society response. In that spirit, we
must drive a new partnership with industry
and a radical reform of procurement, creating
jobs, wealth, and opportunity in every corner
of our country—this is the ‘defence dividend’
which we are determined to seize. It must
drive innovation at a wartime pace, making
the UK the leading edge of innovation in
NATO and equipping our forces with the
full range of conventional and technological
capabilities. And it must foster a collective
national endeavour through which the state,
business, and society unite in pursuit of the
security of the nation and the prosperity
of its people.
This landmark Strategic Defence Review will
help to make this a reality. I am very grateful
to Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, General Sir
Richard Barrons, and Dr Fiona Hill for all their
work to lead it. This Government will now
drive a national effort to deliver it.
The Rt Hon Sir Keir Starmer MP
2
Prime Minister’s Introduction

Foreword from the
Secretary of State
The world has changed. The threats
we now face are more serious and
less predictable than at any time
since the Cold War, including war in
Europe, growing Russian aggression,
new nuclear risks, and daily
cyber-attacks at home.
Our adversaries are working more in alliance
with one another, while technology is
changing how war is fought. Drones now
kill more people than traditional artillery in
the war in Ukraine, and whoever gets new
technology into the hands of their Armed
Forces the quickest will win.
And since we began the Strategic Defence
Review (SDR), the UK and our European
allies have been challenged to step up on
European security.
We are in a new era of threat, which demands
a new era for UK Defence. This Review sets
out a vision to make Britain safer, secure at
home and strong abroad.
Delivering for Defence
Since the General Election less than a
year ago, we have demonstrated that we
are a Government dedicated to delivering
for Defence.
We have announced the largest sustained
increase to defence spending since the end of
the Cold War, stepped up support for Ukraine,
awarded Service personnel the biggest pay
rise in over 20 years, signed the historic
Trinity House Agreement with Germany,
bought back over 36,000 military homes to
improve housing for forces families and save
UK taxpayers billions, set new targets to
tackle the recruitment crisis, made it easier
for veterans to access essential care and
support under the new VALOUR system, and
passed through Parliament the Armed Forces
Commissioner Bill to improve service life.
This first-of-its-kind Strategic Defence
Review was launched by the Prime Minister
within two weeks of the General Election.
It has been externally led by George
Robertson, Richard Barrons, and Fiona Hill,
who have worked closely with the Ministry
of Defence to harness the best expertise
from inside and outside Government to
produce the first root-and-branch review of
UK Defence in 25 years. We are extremely
grateful for their exceptional work.
During the review process, 1,700 individuals,
political parties, and organisations submitted
over 8,000 responses, 200 companies
provided written contributions, over 150
senior experts took part in the Review and
3
Foreword from the Secretary of State

Challenge panels, and nearly 50 meetings
took place between the Reviewers and
our senior military figures. Members of the
public also toured Defence sites as part of
a ‘Citizens’ Panel’ to offer their views. These
views are presented throughout this report.
I want to say a huge ‘thank you’ to everyone
who has been involved. We set up the SDR in
this unique way to break old thinking, inject
fresh ideas, but importantly, to ensure the
SDR serves as Britain’s Defence Review, not
just the Government’s.
A New Era
The SDR signifies a landmark shift in
our deterrence and defence: moving to
warfighting readiness to deter threats and
strengthen security in the Euro-Atlantic.
This will be achieved by the UK leading within
NATO and taking on more responsibility
for European security. That’s why our
defence policy is ‘NATO First’. The UK’s
strategic strength comes from our allies
and, in a dangerous world, our unshakeable
commitment to NATO means we will never
fight alone. But ‘NATO First’ does not mean
‘NATO only’—and we remain committed to
our allies and partners across the world, as
our security is closely connected.
The SDR sets a path for the next decade and
beyond to transform Defence. We will end the
hollowing out of our Armed Forces and lead
in a stronger, more lethal NATO. We will also
draw lessons from the war in Ukraine, which
has demonstrated that a nation’s Armed
Forces are only as strong as the industry,
innovators, and investors that stand behind
them. And that technological innovation is
vital to stay ahead of our adversaries.
Importantly, it sets a new vision for how
our Armed Forces should be conceived—a
combination of conventional and digital
warfighters; the power of drones, AI, and
autonomy complementing the ‘heavy metal’
of tanks and artillery; innovation and
procurement measured in months, not years;
the breaking down of barriers between
individual Services, between the military and
the private sector, and between the Armed
Forces and society.
The SDR is the Plan for Change for Defence.
It sets out the following new ambitions:
• ‘NATO First’—stepping up on European
security by leading in NATO, with
strengthened nuclear, new tech, and
updated conventional capabilities.
• Move to warfighting readiness—
establishing a more lethal ‘integrated
force’ equipped for the future, and
strengthened homeland defence.
• Engine for growth—driving jobs and
prosperity through a new partnership with
industry, radical procurement reforms,
and backing UK businesses.
• UK innovation driven by lessons from
Ukraine—harnessing drones, data, and
digital warfare to make our Armed Forces
stronger and safer.
• Whole-of-society approach—widening
participation in national resilience and
renewing the Nation’s contract with
those who serve.
The Government—and our military chiefs—
strongly welcome this vision and direction.
This will set the strategic framework for
UK Defence. To achieve this vision, the
Government will Reform, Invest, and Act.
Reform
On Day 1 in Government, we launched the
Defence Reform programme—the deepest
defence reforms for 50 years. The SDR
strongly endorses this programme of change
and recognises that one cannot succeed
without the other.
4
Foreword from the Secretary of State

From 1 April 2025, we established a new
Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ),
set up a new National Armaments Director
(NAD) to drive our defence industrial strategy,
and gave new powers to the Chief of the
Defence Staff (CDS) to command the Service
Chiefs for the first time. We have also ended
the Levene Reforms and have replaced ten
budget holders with four new budget areas
for tighter budget control.
These changes will strengthen Defence with
stronger leadership, clearer accountability,
faster delivery, less waste, and better value
for money. We will unlock nearly £6bn of new
savings over the course of this Parliament
through efficiency and productivity savings,
civilian workforce changes, and structural
simplification.
Defence Reform is a Parliament-long
programme. More improvements will
come over the next 12 months—increasing
integration, reducing duplication, and
improving delivery. We will also introduce
radical reforms to the defence procurement
system, which the Public Accounts
Committee and Defence Select Committee
have both called ‘broken’.
Invest
On 25 February 2025, the Prime Minister
announced the largest sustained increase to
defence spending since the end of the Cold
War—rising to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, and to
3% in the next Parliament when fiscal and
economic conditions allow. We have already
boosted defence by £5bn this year. Defence
is now central to both our national security
and our economic growth.
At the heart of this investment lies our total
commitment to operate, sustain, and renew
our nuclear deterrent, which is deployed every
minute of every day to protect our people,
nation, and way of life. The UK’s nuclear
deterrent is a truly national endeavour that has
existed for over 60 years and sends the ultimate
warning to anyone who seeks to do us harm.
5
Foreword from the Secretary of State

A new £11bn ‘Invest’ annual budget has
also been established under the NAD. This
will fund kit for our front-line forces which
is affordable and grows our UK industrial
base. Our new partnership with industry
and a decade of consistently rising defence
spending will encourage more private finance
to grow our world-leading scale-up and
dual-use tech companies.
Act
This Government is endorsing the vision
and accepting all 62 recommendations in
the SDR, which will be implemented. In line
with SDR findings, we are also taking further
immediate action.
• We will secure the future of our nuclear
deterrent, by committing to £15bn
investment in the sovereign warhead
programme this Parliament and
supporting over 9,000 jobs.
• We will create a ‘New Hybrid Navy’,
building the Dreadnought and
SSN-AUKUS submarines, cutting-edge
warships and support ships, transforming
our carriers, and introducing new
autonomous vessels to patrol the
North Atlantic and beyond.
• We will create a British Army which
is 10x more lethal to deter from the
land, by combining more people and
armoured capability with air defence,
communications, AI, software, long-range
weapons, and land drone swarms.
• We will create a next-generation RAF,
with F-35s, upgraded Typhoons,
next-generation fast jets through the
Global Combat Air Programme, and
autonomous fighters to defend Britain’s
skies and strike anywhere in the world.
• We will protect the UK homeland, with up
to £1bn new funding invested in homeland
air and missile defence and creating a
new CyberEM Command to defend Britain
from daily attacks in the grey zone.
• We will ensure Defence is an engine for
growth across the UK, by investing £6bn
in munitions this Parliament, including
£1.5bn in an ‘always on’ pipeline for
munitions and building at least six new
energetics and munitions factories in
the UK, generating over 1,000 jobs and
boosting export potential.
• We will commit to continuous submarine
production through investments in Barrow
and Raynesway that will allow us to
produce a submarine every 18 months.
Through the AUKUS programme, this will
allow us to grow our nuclear-powered
attack submarine fleet to up to 12. This
will reinforce our Continuous at Sea
Deterrent (CASD) and position the UK to
deliver the AUKUS partnership with the
US and Australia.
• We will build up to 7,000 new long-range
weapons in the UK to provide greater
European deterrence and support
around 800 jobs.
• We will invest in world-leading innovation
in autonomous systems this Parliament
to boost UK export potential. And we
will invest more than £1bn to integrate
our Armed Forces through a new Digital
Targeting Web delivered in 2027.
• We will provide leadership in NATO,
by transforming our aircraft carriers
to become the first European hybrid
air wings—with fast jets, long-range
weapons, and drones.
• We will establish UK Defence
Innovation with £400m to fund and
grow UK-based companies.
6
Foreword from the Secretary of State

• We will create a new Defence Exports
Office in the Ministry of Defence to drive
exports to our allies and growth at home.
• We will deliver a generational renewal of
military accommodation, with at least
£7bn of funding in this Parliament—
including over £1.5bn in new investment
for rapid work to fix the poor state of
forces family housing.
Defence Investment Plan
We will develop a new Defence Investment
Plan to deliver the SDR’s vision. We
will ensure the Plan is deliverable and
affordable, considers infrastructure alongside
capabilities, enables flexibility to seize new
technology opportunities, and maximises the
benefits of defence spending to grow the UK
economy. This will supersede the old-style
Defence Equipment Plan.
This will deliver the best kit and technology
into the hands of our front-line forces at
speed and, importantly, invest in and grow
the UK economy. The Defence Investment
Plan will be completed in Autumn 2025.
The Rt Hon John Healey MP
7
Foreword from the Secretary of State

Britain’s Defence Review
8

Foreword from the Reviewers
When the Prime Minister and the
Defence Secretary asked the three of
us—a politician, a soldier, and a foreign
policy expert—to lead, externally, the
new Strategic Defence Review, the
world was already in turmoil. Russia, a
nuclear-armed state, had invaded and
brutally occupied part of a neighbouring
sovereign state. And in doing this it
was supported by China, supplied with
equipment from Iran and by troops from
North Korea, deployed in Europe for the
first time ever.
The sheer unpredictability of these and other
global events, combined with the velocity of
change in every area, has created alarming new
threats and vulnerabilities for our country—and
a dangerous complexity in the world.
If anything, the geopolitical context has
worsened since we started. The challenge to
the free world has intensified through so-called
‘great power’ competition and a collapse
of the post-Second World War consensus.
The certainties of the international order we
have accepted for so long are now being
questioned—and not only by authoritarians. The
international chessboard has been tipped over.
In a world where the impossible today is
becoming the inevitable of tomorrow, there can
be no complacency about defending our
country. Defence can no longer be seen as
contracted out only to our Armed Forces, good
and brave as they are. With multiple threats and
challenges facing us now, and in the future,
a whole-of-society approach is essential.
Everyone has a role to play and a national
conversation on how we do it is required.
We, the Reviewers, were initially asked by
the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary
to ‘determine the roles, capabilities and
reforms required to meet the challenges,
threats and opportunities of the twenty-f irst
century’. Over the past eleven months
that is what we have endeavoured to do.
This report, then, is the product of the
intensive scrutiny of every aspect of Defence
and it has involved one of the deepest
and most thorough consultations on the
subject ever.
It is a truly transformational and genuinely
strategic review. It is designed to bolster
deterrence by rebuilding our warfighting
readiness. As the old saying goes, ‘If you
want peace, prepare for war’.
Our independent nuclear deterrent, one
of the determining factors in the minds of our
adversaries, is committed to NATO and as such
adds to the security of the whole Euro-A tlantic
community. It is being renewed.
We are proposing a combination of
reinforced homeland resilience and a new
model Integrated Force, putting NATO first.
9

9
Foreword from the Reviewers

We therefore ensure that the British people
will be safer at home and more influential
abroad. However, we will never, in the
future, expect to fight a major, ‘peer’ military
power alone. NATO is the bedrock of our
defence, with 31 other countries committed
to collective security. A billion people in
the Euro-Atlantic area sleep easily each
night, protected by the mutual defence
clause, Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.
We must work hard to make sure this remains
the case, bolstering the Alliance through our
approach and our daily efforts.
By ruthlessly examining every aspect
of Defence, the Review challenges the
very idea of ‘business as usual’, just as
our enemies too have developed and
modernised. It proposes a new partnership
with industry, led by a powerful new National
Armaments Director, to ensure our forces
have the equipment they need—on time
and on budget. Taxpayers have a right to be
confident that the money they pay to keep
them safe is used wisely and appropriately.
The Review will boost the Reserves,
re-invigorate training, tackle the troop
accommodation problems, eradicate
ingrained bureaucracy, and change the
culture in Defence. Learning from the
cutting-e dge developments in use in
Ukraine, the fundamental lesson for today is
that with technology developing faster than
at any time in human history, our own forces,
and the whole of Defence, must innovate
at wartime pace. The hollowing out of our
forces—which was the hallmark of taking
a big ‘peace dividend’ after the end of the
Cold War—will, over time, be reversed.
We were asked to conduct our Review within
the budgetary context of a transition to 2.5%
of G D P.
1
1 W ith the contribution of the UK Intelligence Community, defence spending will rise to a total of 2.6% of GDP
from 2027.
We acknowledge with relief that this
will apply from 2027 and not later. What is
also significant is the ambition to spend 3%
of GDP on defence in the 2030s if economic
and fiscal conditions allow. Given that the
present 2.3% (which includes significant
investment in the nuclear deterrent, the
nation’s top defence priority, and other core
commitments) might have forced savings in
essential capabilities, this is good news.
We are confident that the transformation we
propose for the harder world we now live
in is affordable over ten years, given these
promised new resources. However, as we live
in such turbulent times it may be necessary to
go faster. The plan we have put forward can
be accelerated for either greater assurance
or for mobilisation of Defence in a crisis.
We have conducted this Review with, and not
to, the Ministry of Defence and we have worked
closely with the Prime Minister and the Defence
Secretary. There should therefore be no
surprises—even if we did not seek consensus
or shy away from being bold and radical.
The Review has benefited from the
endeavours and expertise of our fellow
reviewers, the ‘Defence Review Team 6’:
Grace Cassy; Edward Dinsmore;
Jean-Christophe Gray; Angus Lapsley;
Robin Marshall; and Rt Hon Sir Jeremy Quin.
We have also had all along heroic assistance
from a dedicated, talented, multi-departmental
team—drawn from within the MOD, the Armed
Forces, other Government departments,
and a cohort of international military liaison
officers and civilian officials—to whom we are
profoundly grateful.
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen KT GCMG
General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE
Dr Fiona Hill CMG
10
Foreword from the Reviewers

1. Introduction and
Overview
11

1. A generational challenge demands
a generational response. For the first
time since the end of the Cold War, the
UK faces multiple, direct threats to its
security, prosperity, and democratic
values. The world itself is beset by
volatility and deep uncertainty.
2. In response, the UK, with its allies—
especially those in NATO—must once
again be ready to deal with the most
demanding of circumstances: deterring
and preventing a full-scale war by
being ready to fight and win. Until
recently, such a war against another
country with advanced military forces
was unthinkable. It would likely be
high-intensity, protracted, and costly
in every way. Moving to warfighting
readiness in this new era is essential.
3. With rapid advances in technology
driving the greatest change in how war is
fought for more than a century, the UK
must pivot to a new way of war. It must
continually harness new technology and
think differently about what conventional
‘military power’ is and how to generate it.
In modern warfare, simple metrics such
as the number of people and platforms
deployed are outdated and inadequate.
It is through dynamic networks of
crewed, uncrewed, and autonomous
assets and data flows that lethality
2
2 Where ‘lethality’ refers to the combat power (disruptive and destructive force) of the Armed Forces.
and military effect are now created,
with military systems making decisions
at machine-speed and acting flexibly
across domains.
4. The UK’s Armed Forces must once
again be able to endure in long
campaigns through assured access to
key capabilities—all underwritten by a
thriving industry that is ready to scale
and sustain innovation and production
as required.
5. And in a decisive shift from the post-Cold
War era, a renewed emphasis on
home defence and resilience is
also imperative, with ‘sub-threshold’
activities,
3
3 ‘Sub-threshold’ attacks do not always meet the legal threshold of ‘war’. They include the use of espionage,
political interference, sabotage, assassination and poisoning, electoral interference, disinformation,
propaganda, and Intellectual Property theft. Such attacks are often difficult to attribute to a perpetrator with
certainty due to the methods used and the frequent reliance of some states on proxy actors. In this Review,
we use the term ‘sub-threshold’ attack. Others may refer to ‘grey-zone attacks’ because such acts lie in
the ‘grey zone’ between ‘peace’ and ‘war’, challenging the clarity of the legal distinction between the two.
The term ‘hybrid warfare’ is often used interchangeably with these terms but we take this to have a more
specific meaning, whereby ‘kinetic’ military action is used simultaneously with sub-threshold attacks to
pursue a state’s objectives.
growing access to space and
cyberspace, and unrelenting advances in
weapons systems all making it easier for
adversaries to cause the UK harm, even
at distance.
6. Where previous reviews have more
narrowly addressed the Armed Forces,
this Strategic Defence Review (SDR)
delivers the ‘root-and-branch’ review
of UK Defence that was commissioned
by the Prime Minister in July 2024 in
response to this rapidly changing world.
It outlines the deep reform needed ‘to
ensure the United Kingdom is both
secure at home and strong abroad—
now and for the years to come’.
4
4 Strategic Defence Review 2024-2025: Terms of reference - GOV.UK, 17 July 2024.
7. Overseen by the Secretary of State for
Defence, the SDR was unprecedented
in being led by external Reviewers:
Lord (George) Robertson; General
Sir Richard Barrons; and Dr Fiona Hill.
It has been conducted within the Terms
of Reference set by the Government
and latterly costed within an increased
12
Introduction and Overview

defence budget of 2.5% of GDP from
April 2027 and 3% in the 2030s, subject
to economic and fiscal conditions.
5
5 Strategic Defence Review 2024-2025: Terms of reference - GOV.UK, 17 July 2024; Prime Minister’s Oral
Statement to the House of Commons: 25 February 2025. The Prime Minister also announced the intention
to recognise the contribution of the UK Intelligence Community (UKIC) to the defence of the UK, with
Defence and UKIC together spending 2.6% of GDP on defence by 2027.
The
Review process, including its extensive
engagement with internal and external
expertise, is set out in the Appendix.
8. In this report, we set out:
• Why UK Defence needs to change,
considering the international and
security context in the period
to 2040 and the current state of
Defence (Chapter 2).
6
•
6 This Review has considered the strategic context in the period to 2040. However, the MOD’s programming
works on ten-year cycles. This is reflected in this report, which articulates a vision for Defence and a path to
transformation by 2035.
W
hat roles Defence should
perform and where in the coming
years (Chapter 3).
• How the Armed Forces should
fight and how wider Defence
should support that fight , with the
transformation of UK warfighting
delivered by an empowered and
adaptive workforce (Chapter 4).
• Who Defence should fight
alongside: the centrality of allies
and partners with which the UK can
build industrial power and common
capabilities, and ultimately fight and
win (Chapter 5); and the importance
of a renewed connection with UK
society to ensure resilience and
strategic depth in the event of crisis
or conflict (Chapter 6).
• The capabilities with which the
Integrated Force should fight
(Chapter 7), addressing the front-line
elements and foundational enabling
capabilities of UK Defence—creating
a force fit for war in the 21st century
t
hrough the new ten-year Defence
Investment Plan.7
7 Which will replace the Equipment Plan.
A new era of threat
9. This is an important moment for the
UK and its allies (Chapter 2). Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was
a strategic inflection point. It irrefutably
demonstrated the changing and dynamic
nature of the threat, with state-on-state
war returning to Europe, adversaries
using nuclear rhetoric in an attempt
to constrain decision-making, and the
UK and its allies under daily attack
beneath the threshold of war as part of
intensifying international competition.
The conflict has also shown the power
of emerging technology to change
where, how, and with what war is fought.
Armed Forces that do not change at the
same pace as technology quickly risk
becoming obsolete.
10. Importantly, Ukraine is just one flashpoint
of many amid growing global instability
and a volatility that is exemplified
by the remarkable rate of change
in the international landscape since
this Review was launched in 2024.
Most immediately relevant at the time of
writing, this includes: negotiations for a
ceasefire in the Ukraine-Russia war; the
possible deployment of a ‘reassurance
force’ to Ukraine in the event of a
ceasefire; and major questions about the
future of European security that inevitably
follow the United States’ change in
security priorities, as its focus turns to
13
Introduction and Overview

the Indo-Pacific and the protection of
its homeland.8
8 Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group , Brussels,
Belgium, 12 February 2025.
Fundamentally, the UK’s
longstanding assumptions about global
power balances and structures are no
longer certain.
11. UK Armed Forces have begun the
necessary process of change in
response to this new reality. But progress
has not been fast or radical enough. The
Armed Forces remain shaped by the
risks and demands of the post-Cold
War era—optimised for conflicts primarily
fought against non-state actors on Europe’s
periphery and beyond. Although substantial
and demanding, these operations also
did not require ‘whole-of-society’
preparations for war, home defence,
resilience, and industrial mobilisation.
A new era for UK Defence
12. In response to this strategic context,
our Review articulates a new era for
Defence. Building on changes already
underway, our vision is that, by 2035,
UK Defence will be:
A leading tech-enabled defence
power, with an Integrated Force that
deters, fights, and wins through
constant innovation at wartime pace.
Defence must be able to fulfil its
fundamental role: to deter threats to
the UK and its allies by being ready
for war, and to provide the definitive
insurance policy should deterrence fail.
14
Introduction and Overview

This should be pursued as part of a
whole-of-society approach to deterrence
and defence under which Defence
combines its strengths with those of
wider Government, industry, and society.
Roles for UK Defence
13. The starting point for this Review is
the Government’s ‘NATO First’ policy
(Chapter 3). There is an unequivocal
need for the UK to redouble its efforts
within the Alliance and to step up its
contribution to Euro-Atlantic security
more broadly—particularly as Russian
aggression across Europe grows and as
the United States of America adapts its
regional priorities. In a shift in approach,
the Alliance should be mainstreamed in
how Defence plans, thinks, and acts.
14. ‘NATO First’ does not mean ‘NATO
only’. The UK should take a pragmatic
approach to bolstering collective security
in the Euro-Atlantic through stronger
bilateral and minilateral partnerships.
9
9 ‘ Minilateral’ refers to smaller groupings of countries.
The Alliance itself recognises the
importance of working with partners
outside the region—reflecting the
connection between Euro-Atlantic
security and that of other regions such
as the Middle East and Indo-Pacific.
Defence must also be able to pursue
and protect the UK’s significant interests,
commitments, and responsibilities
outside the region, including the defence
of its sovereign territory.
15. Nevertheless, the fundamental importance
of meeting Alliance commitments and
shaping deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic
every day is reflected in the enduring
and mutually reinforcing roles that
Defence must fulfil. The three core
Defence roles are:
• Role 1: Defend, protect, and enhance
the resilience of the UK, its Overseas
Territories, and Crown Dependencies.
• Role 2: Deter and defend in the
Euro-Atlantic.
• Role 3: Shape the global
security environment.
The two enabling roles for Defence are to:
• Develop a thriving, resilient defence
innovation and industrial base.
• Contribute to national cohesion
and preparedness.
Transforming UK warfighting
16. To meet the threats of today
and tomorrow, Defence must
fundamentally change how it fights
and how it supports that fight :
rapidly increasing the Armed Forces’
lethality and enhancing their ability to
fight at the leading edge of technology
(Chapter 4). Drawing on lessons from
the war in Ukraine and enabled by
organisational change under Defence
Reform, the whole of Defence (the
Armed Forces and Department of
State together) should be driven by
the logic of the innovation cycle —
able to find, buy, and use innovation,
pulling it through from ideas to front
line at speed.
17. At the heart of this transformation
are three fundamental changes in
approach. Defence must be:
Integrated by design. For the Armed
Forces to be more lethal than the sum
of their parts, they must complete the
journey from ‘joint’ to ‘integrated’:
designed and directed as one force
15
Introduction and Overview

under the authority of the Chief of the
Defence Staff, and delivered according
to this design by the single Services and
Strategic Command. Under this new
model, there is no fixed force design to
be delivered by a specified date. The
design and capabilities of the Integrated
Force, and the way that wider Defence
supports it, must continue to evolve
as threats and technology do. The
Integrated Force must be capable of
operating in different configurations :
as part of NATO Component Commands
by design; in coalition; and as a
sovereign force. To deliver a step-change
in lethality, the Integrated Force must
be underpinned by a common digital
foundation and shared data . Delivery
should be a top priority. A single ‘digital
mission’—to deliver a digital ‘targeting
web’
10 in 2027—should enable Defence
to succeed where it has previously failed,
as should the creation of an expert
Digital Warfighters group that can be
deployed alongside front-line personnel
(Chapter 4.1).
Innovation-led. Today, much of the
best innovation is found in the private
sector, while the increasing prevalence
of dual-use technologies
11
10 T he digital targeting web would connect ‘sensors’, ‘deciders’, and ‘effectors’. This creates choice and
speed in deciding how to degrade or destroy an identified target across domains and in a contested cyber
and electromagnetic domain.
has widened
the net of potential suppliers that
can contribute to Defence outcomes.
Defence must embrace its role in
seeding innovation and growth,
rapidly adopting new technology to keep
the Integrated Force at the forefront of
warfare. In particular, Defence should
build relationships with the investors
behind the innovators. External expertise
11 T echnology developed for civilian use but with potential military applications.
should be systematically accessed
through a new Defence Investors’
Advisory Group whose membership
includes venture capital and private
equity investors, while private finance
should be crowded in under new funding
models. To set itself up for success
internally, Defence should reorganise
existing structures to create two distinct
organisations under the National
Armaments Director:
• A Defence Research and Evaluation
organisation,
12
12 P otentially retaining the Dstl brand.
focused on enabling
external early-stage research and
providing a gateway to academia.
• The new UK Defence Innovation
(UKDI) organisation,13
13 A nnounced in March 2025. Government to turbocharge defence innovation - GOV.UK.
focused on
harnessing commercial innovation,
including dual-use technologies. UKDI
will have a ringfenced annual budget
of at least £400m (Chapter 4.2).
Industry-backed. To develop a thriving,
resilient innovation and industrial
base that can scale in support of
the Integrated Force, Defence must
create a new partnership with
industry. Under the forthcoming
Defence Industrial Strategy and the
leadership of the National Armaments
Director, this involves overhauling
acquisition processes from top
to bottom: engaging industry early in
procurement processes on desired
outcomes; ensuring that suppliers
are rewarded for productivity and for
taking risks; and reducing the burden
16
Introduction and Overview

on potential suppliers from startups to
primes. At the heart of this partnership
should be a new, segmented approach
to procurement: 14
14 A nnounced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in March 2025. Spring Statement 2025, p. 36.
• Major modular platforms (contracting
within two years).
• Pace-setting spiral and modular
upgrades (contracting within a year).
• Rapid commercial exploitation
(contracting within three months), with
at least 10% of the MOD’s equipment
procurement budget spent on novel
technologies each year.
Exports and international capability
partnerships
15
15 S uch as AUKUS and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). Under AUKUS, Australia, the UK, and
the US will develop conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines that are interchangeable, as well
as advanced technologies such as AI, autonomous systems, cyber, hypersonic missiles, and underwater
warfare. Under GCAP, Italy, Japan, and the UK will develop a sixth-generation aircraft—part of the Future
Combat Air System, comprising crewed aircraft, uncrewed platforms, next-generation weapons, networks,
and data-sharing.
should also be
mainstreamed into acquisition
processes from the outset, with
responsibility for defence exports
returned to the Ministry of Defence
(MOD) and a new framework
for building and sustaining
government-to-government relationships.
Investment decisions should consider
associated costs to ensure they are
genuinely affordable—for example,
through-life upgrades, acquisition and
support, and attendant changes to
infrastructure (Chapter 4.2).
18. By more purposefully using its market
power and by prioritising UK-based
business, Defence should also strive
to deliver for the UK economy while
delivering for the warfighter. Defence
has significant untapped potential to
be a new engine for growth at the heart
of the UK’s economic strategy. Radical
root-and-branch reform of defence
procurement—combined with substantial
investment in innovation, novel
technology, advanced manufacturing,
and skills—would grow the productive
capacity of the UK economy. Defence
should aim high, measuring success in
the number and scale of defence and
dual-use technology companies in the
UK. Success will also see significant
improvement in Defence productivity,
competitiveness, exports, and value
for money, supported by the new
Defence Reform and Efficiency Plan
(Chapter 4.2).
16
16 Prime Minister’s Oral Statement to the House of Commons: 25 February 2025.
19. This transformation of UK Defence
must ultimately be delivered by its
people (Chapter 4.3), empowered
through changes in culture and ‘people’
policies that remove red tape and
eradicate behaviour that is unacceptable
in the workplace. Targeted intervention
is needed to tackle Defence’s workforce
crisis—improving recruitment through
faster, more flexible options such as
military ‘gap years’, and improving
retention through the MOD’s planned
‘flexible working’ initiative and
prioritised investment this Parliament in
accommodation that falls well short of
the standards required.
17
Introduction and Overview

20. The focus must be on maximising the
effectiveness of the ‘whole force’:17
17 In corporating the Regular and Reserve forces, civil servants, and contractors.
• To fulfil the roles set out in this
Review, there is no scope for reducing
the number of highly trained and
equipped Regulars across all three
Services, even as the forces move
to a much greater emphasis on
autonomy. Overall, we envisage
an increase in the total number of
Regular personnel when funding
allows. This includes a small uplift in
Army Regulars as a priority.
• Increasing the number of Active
Reserves by 20% when funding
allows (most likely in the 2030s) and
reinvigorating the relationship with the
Strategic Reserves.
• Reshaping the Civil Service workforce
with an emphasis on performance,
productivity, and skills, reducing costs
by at least 10% by 2030.
• Releasing military personnel in
back-office functions to front-line
roles and automating 20% of HR,
Finance, and Commercial functions
by July 2028. This should be a
minimum first step.
• Reforming training and education
so that it is much more adaptive
to operational lessons, ensures
managed risks can be taken in military
training, and creates greater capacity
and flexibility through developing a
single virtual environment. Civilian
qualifications and education provision
should be used where possible to
increase efficiency and to reduce the
barriers between Defence, industry,
and wider society.
Strengthening deterrence through
alliances and partnerships
21. The UK must bolster collective
security and create strategic depth by
actively investing in its relationships
(Chapter 5). Finite resources mean the
UK cannot be everything to everyone. It
must prioritise its approach, informed by
the roles outlined in Chapter 3 and using
the full range of tools available to it.
22. Bilateral agreements and capability
partnerships—with the United
States and European NATO Allies—
offer a powerful tool through which
to strengthen relationships and
Euro-Atlantic stability. The same is
true of minilateral activity, including
through the Joint Expeditionary Force,
E3, and E5 formats,
18
18 T he Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is UK-led and comprises nine other members: Denmark; Estonia;
Finland; Iceland; Latvia; Lithuania; the Netherlands; Norway; and Sweden. The E3 is a format for diplomatic
cooperation between France, Germany, and the UK, while the E5 is a format for diplomatic cooperation
between France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the UK.
supplemented by
implementation of the UK-EU Security
and Defence Partnership. AUKUS and
the Global Combat Air Programme must
be developed as exemplars of capability
collaboration and a powerful signal of
the UK’s ambition to bring partners
from different geographic regions closer
together in support of collective security.
Doubling down on support to Ukraine
in pursuit of a durable political
settlement is critical, as is learning from
its extraordinary experience in land
warfare, drone, and hybrid conflict.
Home defence and resilience:
a whole-of-society approach
23. A renewed focus on home defence
and resilience is vital to modern
deterrence, ensuring continuity in
national life in a crisis (Chapter 6).
Reconnecting Defence with society
18
Introduction and Overview

should be the starting point, as part
of a national conversation led by the
Government on defence and security.
This can be achieved in part through
expanding Cadet Forces by 30% by
2030 (with an ambition to reach 250,000
in the longer term) and working with the
Department for Education to develop
understanding of the Armed Forces
among young people in schools.
24. A more substantive body of work is
necessary to ensure the security and
resilience of critical national
infrastructure (CNI) and the essential
services it delivers. The MOD should
explore, with wider Government, a ‘new
deal’ for the protection and defence of
CNI that is rooted in partnership with
private-sector and allied operators. To
support this, the Royal Navy should play
a new leading and coordinating role in
securing undersea pipelines, cables,
and maritime traffic.
25. The Government must also be able to
achieve a sustainable and effective
transition to war if necessary. A new
Defence Readiness Bill should provide
the Government with powers in reserve
to mobilise Reserves and industry should
crisis escalate into conflict. It should
also facilitate external scrutiny of UK
warfighting readiness.
The Integrated Force: a force fit for
war in the 21st century
26. The essential task is to transform the
Armed Forces, restore their readiness
to fight, and reverse the ‘hollowing
out’ of foundational capabilities
without which they cannot endure
in protracted, high-intensity conflict
(Chapter 7).
19
Introduction and Overview

27. The UK must continue to dedicate
its independent nuclear deterrent
to NATO (Chapter 7.1), adapting its
alliances, industrial base, and military
capabilities to ensure it can continue
to deter the most extreme threats. The
UK will need a full spectrum of options
to manage escalation as part of NATO,
delivered by its nuclear and conventional
forces in combination. Defence should
commence discussions with the United
States and NATO on the potential
benefits and feasibility of enhanced UK
participation in NATO’s nuclear mission.
Further investment in conventional
deep precision strike and Integrated
Air and Missile Defence would increase
options for deterring and responding to
high-impact threats.
28. Senior Ministers must drive efforts
to sustain the nuclear deterrent as
Defence’s top priority and as a ‘National
Endeavour’. The programme to replace
the sovereign warhead is critical and
will require significant investment this
Parliament. Confirming the intended
numbers of SSN attack submarines
would provide clarity on the required
build capacity and tempo for all
nuclear-powered submarines. To secure
the long-term future of the nuclear
deterrent, the Government should start
work in this Parliament to define the
requirement for the successor to the
Dreadnought class submarine.
29. An immediate priority for force
transformation should be a shift
towards greater use of autonomy
and Artificial Intelligence within the
UK’s conventional forces (Chapter 7).
As in Ukraine, this would provide
greater accuracy, lethality, and cheaper
capabilities—changing the economics
of Defence. This shift towards AI and
autonomy should exploit the parallel
development of a common digital
foundation, a protected Defence AI
Investment Fund, and an initial operating
capability for a new Defence Uncrewed
Systems Centre established by
February 2026.
30. The Armed Forces should accelerate
their transition to a ‘high-low’ mix of
equipment—for example, through:
• The Royal Navy’s ‘Atlantic Bastion’
concept for securing the North
Atlantic for the UK and NATO and
its plans for hybrid carrier airwings
(Chapter 7.2).
• The Army’s ‘Recce-Strike’ model for
land fighting power, aiming to deliver
a ten-fold increase in lethality.19
19 Me asured against a conventional armoured brigade model.
This
new model should underpin the
transformation of the two divisions
and Corps Headquarters committed
to NATO’s Strategic Reserves Corps
(Chapter 7.3).
• The RAF’s development of the
Future Combat Air System—a
sixth-generation, crewed jet operating
with autonomous collaborative
platforms (Chapter 7.4).
31. With the Integrated Force fighting as
one across all five domains, greater
attention must be given to the space
and cyber and electromagnetic
(CyberEM) domains:
20
20 C yberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum are now treated as a single military domain (Chapter 7.6).
• Assured access to operate in, from,
and through space underpins UK
security and prosperity. The MOD
should invest in the resilience of
military space systems, with a focus
on space control, decision advantage,
and capabilities that support
20
Introduction and Overview

‘Understand’ and ‘Strike’ functions. A
reinvigorated Cabinet sub-Committee
should set the UK’s strategic
approach to space, maximising
synergies between the UK civil space
sector and clear military needs
(Chapter 7.5).
• The CyberEM domain is similarly
essential to securing and operating in
all other domains and is fundamental
to the digital targeting web.
Hardening critical Defence functions
to cyber-attack is crucial. Defence
must move to a more proactive
footing in this domain. A new
CyberEM Command—established
within Strategic Command—should
emulate Space Command in ensuring
domain coherence, rather than
directing execution. An initial operating
capability should be established by the
end of 2025 (Chapter 7.6).
32. Under Defence Reform, Strategic
Command will be responsible for
delivering, at the direction of the new
Military Strategic Headquarters, many
of the joint enablers and specialist
capabilities for the Integrated Force—
from Defence Intelligence to the
Integrated Global Defence Network,
Defence Medical Services, and Special
Forces and Special Operations Forces.
UK Special Forces—the ‘tip of the
spear’—represent a working model of
the Integrated Force, leading the way
in innovation of new technologies and
systems across all domains. Defence
must continue to enhance its Special
Forces, ensuring UK sovereign choice by
maintaining this strategic capability at the
very highest level.
33. Where some past reviews have focused
on front-line equipment at the expense
of foundational capabilities, we have
sought to redress this balance. We
recommend a focus on:
• Empowering Defence Intelligence
as the functional leader of all defence
intelligence organisations—pursuing
common priorities and standards,
underpinned by a new Defence
Intelligence charter, and, in time, fully
interoperable with the UK Intelligence
Community (Chapter 7.9).
• Rebuilding Defence Medical
Services, cohering disparate defence
medical resources and initiating a
sprint review with the Department
of Health and Social Care to ensure
personnel needs can be met in
peacetime and in war (Chapter 7.10).
• Restoring the Strategic Base 21
21 T he network of infrastructure (airports, seaports, warehouses, mounting centres, preparation bases),
‘movement assets’ (such as trains and shipping), and activities to transport troops and materiel.
from which the Armed Forces
deploy: delivering a Defence
Infrastructure Recapitalisation Plan
by February 2026 to address years
of underfunding and identify ways to
maximise the value of the estate as a
national asset (Chapter 7.11).
• Targeted investment in joint
support enablers and munitions .
Defence should maintain an ‘always
on’ munitions capability, laying the
industrial foundations for production
to be scaled up at speed if needed.
This should be complemented by the
further development of novel directed
energy weapons (Chapter 7).
21
Introduction and Overview

The transformation imperative
34. Prudent sequencing is needed to
ensure the Armed Forces have what
they need, when they need it, within
the resources available and to achieve
the best possible return on investment.
This includes being ready to accelerate
efforts to transform the Armed Forces
and restore readiness should conditions
deteriorate further, or to mobilise UK
Defence rapidly in the event of a crisis.
In this new and uncertain era, nobody
should be surprised if it became
necessary to transform further and faster.
35. There is no reason to delay in
changing fundamentally how Defence
works, however, leveraging Defence
Reform—the ongoing programme of
organisational and cultural change
(Box 1)—as a driver for reform across the
Department of State and the Armed
Forces. Unlike other departments in
Government, the MOD does not control
the timetable for confrontation and
conflict. ‘Events’ and the UK’s adversaries
do. Bold and decisive action is needed.
‘Business as usual’ is not an option.
36. We are acutely aware that words such
as ‘transformation’ have been used
before in defence reviews but the
intention has seldom been delivered.
A key factor in success in the coming
years will be Defence Reform. Where
the SDR states what Defence must do
in the next decade and beyond, Defence
Reform will ultimately determine how,
and how successfully, it is delivered.
To support implementation, we have
identified key interventions and deadlines
to further catalyse progress where in
the past it has been slow and lacked
accountability. The MOD will necessarily
take this work forward in creating
detailed implementation plans—an
essential part of the department taking
ownership of the Review’s findings
and recommendations.
22
Introduction and Overview

Box 1Defence Reform: setting Defence up for success
The purpose of Defence Reform is to establish robust and streamlined governance,
clearer accountabilities, and faster decision-making processes across the Ministry of
Defence and the Armed Forces. The starting point is the restructuring of Defence under
four areas (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Responsibilities of senior officials and military personnel under Defence Reform
23
Introduction and Overview

We strongly endorse the organisational change launched by the Defence Secretary and
pursued under Defence Reform. As it progresses, it should focus on:
• Supporting a ‘One Defence’ mindset
through career management
structures that reward behaviour
and action accordingly, with NATO a
primary consideration. More radical
options to break down single Service
siloes, such as joint promotion boards
or central career management, should
be explored.
• Delivering a step-change in
the department’s financial and
programme management. As the
Principal Accounting Officer, the
Permanent Under-Secretary must
retain primary responsibility for
financial planning and must be able
to account for the department’s
financial position, even as other
senior leaders are given greater
financial authority within their
respective areas of responsibility.
Further streamlining programme and
project approvals might be achieved
through full implementation of the
industry-standard ‘three lines of
defence’ model for risk assurance.
22
22 W here the portfolio or programme manager is the first point of risk assurance (or ‘line of defence’), the
internal approvals board is the second point, and the National Audit Office provides the third point of
assurance through external scrutiny.
Incorporating HM Treasury and the
Cabinet Office Commercial Function
in this model offers the basis for an
improved working relationship.
• Ensuring the role of the National
Armaments Director is focused on
engaging with industry and international
partners to progress the Government’s
defence industrial and exports agenda.
This will require delegating authority
for acquisition management and other
elements of the work of the National
Armaments Director Group.
• Supporting the continual adoption
of new technologies, in particular
Artificial Intelligence (AI), that will enable
Defence to take leaps forward both
in how it fights and the productivity
with which it delivers. The MOD must
engage in the implementation of the AI
Opportunities Action Plan,
23
23 AI Opportunities Action Plan, 13 January 2025 – GOV.UK.
led by the
Department for Science, Innovation and
Technology, wherever possible.
We have primarily taken our lead from,
or worked with, the Defence Reform
team on the most effective organisational
structures for governance and delivery
within Defence. However, in this report,
we occasionally make suggestions on
roles and responsibilities for consideration
as the Defence Reform programme is
developed further.
24
Introduction and Overview

2. The Case for
Transformation
25

1. The UK is entering a new era of
threat and challenge. The world is
more volatile and more uncertain than
at any time in the past 30 years and it is
changing at a remarkable pace.
2. The UK and its allies are once again
directly threatened by other states
with advanced military forces .
The UK is already under daily attack,
with aggressive acts—from espionage
to cyber-attack and information
manipulation—causing harm to society
and the economy. State conflict
has returned to Europe, with Russia
demonstrating its willingness to use
military force, inflict harm on civilians,
and threaten the use of nuclear weapons
to achieve its goals. More broadly,
the West’s long-held military advantage
is being eroded as other countries
modernise and expand their armed
forces at speed, while the United States’
(US) security priorities are changing, as
its focus turns to the Indo-Pacific and to
the protection of its homeland.
3. This is only one part of the picture,
however. In this more complex world,
the UK must deal with a wide array of
challenges to its security, prosperity,
and values at the same time. It must
also be ready to absorb and respond to
surprises and shocks, recognising that
it cannot prevent or protect against all
risks and threats.
4. Previous reviews have recognised the
rapid deterioration of the international
security environment. However, the
speed of change in Defence has not kept
pace with the threat or the scale of the
challenge. The imperative for a shift in
approach is clear.
The strategic context to 2040
5. The environment in which Defence must
operate in the coming years is shaped by
two major and accelerating trends:
• Growing multipolarity and
intensifying strategic competition
between states—and with non -s tate
actors—for political, military,
economic, and technological power.
As part of this competition, states are
seeking to reshape the rules-based
international order that has governed
international relations since the
Second World War.
24
24 T he ‘rules-based international order’ is the set of laws, rules, norms, and institutions established since
1945 to enable international cooperation in areas such as security, trade and development, human rights,
arms control, and technology standards.
The clear shift
in US security priorities underlines
how urgent and different managing
strategic competition now is.
• Rapid and unpredictable
technological progress that drives
strategic competition and continually
changes how armed forces must be
organised, equipped, and fight.
6. These trends will interact with a
backdrop of persistent transnational
challenges, including:
• Climate change and environmental
degradation, which: are creating new
geographical realities and competition
for resources; are driving migration,
instability, and more frequent
humanitarian disasters; and demand
military adaptation for operations in
more extreme weather conditions.
Of particular importance to Defence
is the likelihood that the Arctic and
High North will be ‘ice-free’ each
summer by 2040, providing access to
more actors and creating a new site
for competition within the UK’s wider
neighbourhood.
26
The Case for Transformation

• The enduring threat of terrorism .
The threat posed by overseas terrorist
groups is rising again, demanding
attention and resources.25
25 T he Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 killed seventeen British nationals: the single largest loss of
British life from a terrorist attack since 2017. The Houthi targeting of Red Sea shipping has demonstrated
the vulnerability of global supply chains to threats from non-state actors.
Daesh
and al-Qa’ida have evolved, while
state support is increasing some
terrorist groups’ capabilities, including
in cyberspace.
• Uneven global demographic
change, which is altering global
power balances and driving domestic
and regional instability, including
through migration, urbanisation,
and new demands on governments
for employment and social
welfare support.
7. Confronting any one of these challenges
is difficult. Confronting them
simultaneously poses a huge test for
the UK and for Defence.
Growing multipolarity and
strategic competition
8. Intensifying strategic competition will
make it more difficult for the UK
and its allies to shape the world
and events in their interests. Regional
settlements and solutions may be
necessary as it becomes harder for
states to achieve common goals at the
global level. The relationship between
the US and China will be a key factor
in a more multipolar world marked
by ‘great power’ competition and in
which global power is more widely—if
unevenly—distributed across regions and
countries. This competition is not just
among states: terrorist organisations,
organised crime groups, proxy actors
and partner groups, and powerful private
actors all seek to shape the geopolitical
environment to their advantage.
9. Managing competition between
states—and the potential for
escalation to crisis and conflict—
will be more challenging . States such
as Russia are intentionally blurring the
lines between nuclear, conventional,
and sub-threshold threats, complicating
the ability of the UK and its allies
to manage potential escalation and
miscalculation. Technology creates new
paths for escalation by creating new
ways to disrupt and coerce, for example,
in cyberspace and space. States
and non-s tate actors are ever - more
aggressive in using sub-threshold
activities to seek advantage.
10. At the other end of the spectrum,
nuclear-armed states like Russia and
China are putting nuclear weapons at
the centre of their security strategies,
increasing the number and types of
weapons in their stockpiles. The coming
decades will be defined by multiple
and concurrent dilemmas, proliferating
and disruptive technologies, and the
erosion of international agreements
and organisations that have previously
helped to prevent conflict between
nuclear powers. Strategic stability will
be challenged, with new and more
complex pathways to escalation
that the UK and its allies will need to
address. Allied assurance will become
more complicated as others may be
incentivised to develop nuclear weapons
of their own.
27
The Case for Transformation

11. Russia: an immediate and pressing
threat. Russia’s full-scale invasion of
Ukraine makes unequivocally clear its
willingness to use force to achieve its
goals, as well as its intent to re-establish
spheres of influence in its near-abroad
and disrupt the international order to the
UK and its allies’ disadvantage. While
the Ukraine conflict has temporarily
degraded Russian conventional land
forces, the overall modernisation and
expansion of its armed forces means it
will pose an enduring threat in key areas
such as space, cyberspace, information
operations, undersea warfare, and
chemical and biological weapons.
Russia’s war economy, if sustained,
will enable it to rebuild its land
capabilities more quickly in the event
of a ceasefire in Ukraine.
12. China: a sophisticated and persistent
challenge. China is increasingly
leveraging its economic, technological,
and military capabilities, seeking to
establish dominance in the Indo-Pacific,
erode US influence, and put pressure
on the rules-based international order.
Chinese technology and its proliferation
to other countries is already a leading
challenge for the UK, with Defence likely
to face Chinese technology wherever
and with whomever it fights. China is
likely to continue seeking advantage
through espionage and cyber-attacks,
and through securing cutting-edge
Intellectual Property through legitimate
and illegitimate means. It has also
embarked on large-scale, extraordinarily
rapid military modernisation across its
forces. This includes:
• A vast increase in advanced platforms
and weapons systems, such as space
warfare capabilities.
• The unprecedented diversification
and growth of its conventional and
nuclear missile forces, with missiles
that can reach the UK and Europe.
• More types and greater numbers of
nuclear weapons than ever before,
with its arsenal expected to double to
1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.
13. Iran and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK): regional
disruptors. Iran will continue to conduct
destabilising activities across the region,
including sponsoring proxies and
partners such as Hamas, Hezbollah,
the Houthis, and Iranian -aligned Iraqi
militias. Its escalating nuclear programme
presents a risk to international security
and the global non-proliferation
architecture. The DPRK will likely
pursue further nuclear modernisation to
guarantee regime survival and coerce
its neighbours. Both countries are
developing missile programmes with
growing reach, and they continue to pose
a direct threat to the UK in cyberspace.
14. Continued alignment and new
sources of hostility. China and Russia
have deepened their relationship and
there will continue to be grounds for both
strategic and opportunistic alignment
with Iran and the DPRK. However,
the dynamics of these relationships will
be conditioned by differing interests and
longstanding mistrust. They will likely
continue seeking to draw others into
their transactional networks in pursuing
a variety of objectives. As global power
dynamics change, it will be important
to scan for new threats, including from
emerging ‘middle powers’ that may be
hostile to UK interests.
28
The Case for Transformation

Rapid and unpredictable
technological change
15. Rapid advances in technology
offer both opportunity and risk ,
changing the global distribution of
power. Emerging technologies are
already changing the character of
warfare more profoundly than at any
point in human history. Progress will
continue across a range of technologies
whose collective impact will be highly
unpredictable (Box 2).
16. Warfare will be shaped by an evolving
mixture of high- and low-end military
capabilities.
26
26 F or example, widely available cheap attack drones are already used by states in combination with
advanced missiles to overwhelm air defences.
The widespread availability
of commercial, off-the-s helf capabilities
will enable a broader range of state
and non-state actors to develop and
possess them. This will have significant
implications for deterrence and
escalation management, as well as for
the UK’s freedom of manoeuvre across
land, sea, air, and space. It will also
change the economics of defence, with
low-cost weapons being used to damage
or exhaust expensive military capabilities.
Technological advancements are
outpacing the development of regulatory
frameworks to govern many of the most
potentially disruptive technologies.
The UK’s competitors are unlikely to
adhere to common ethical standards in
developing and using them.
29
The Case for Transformation

Box 2Technologies that are redefining warfare
Advantage on the battlefield will not come from a single technological advance but from
the combination of existing capabilities and a range of emerging technologies that include:
• Artificial intelligence (AI), machine
learning, and data science,
improving the quality and speed of
decision-making, the resilience of
digital networks, and operational
effectiveness. Forecasts of when
Artificial General Intelligence
27
27 W here AI matches or surpasses humans’ ability to understand, learn, and apply knowledge across a range
of situations unaided.
will
occur are uncertain but shortening,
with profound implications
for Defence.
• Robotics and autonomy, with armed
forces increasingly using uncrewed
and autonomous capabilities to
generate mass and lethality.
• Enhanced precision weapons
that mean targets can be struck
with greater accuracy from ever
greater ranges.
• Directed energy weapons, such
as the UK’s DragonFire, which have
the potential to reduce collateral
damage and reliance on expensive
ammunition.
• Hypersonic missiles, which,
travelling at over five times the speed
of sound, may offer greater range and
greater ability to evade defences.
• Space-based capabilities that
enable all aspects of modern
operations. States are rapidly
developing ways to disrupt military
and civilian assets in and from space.
• Quantum. Advances in quantum
computing offer the potential to
break encryption, making secure
communications much more difficult.
Quantum technologies have the
potential to reduce dependence on
satellite-based GPS, which may be
vulnerable to interference.
• Cyber threats that will become harder
to mitigate as technology evolves,
with AI, quantum technology, and the
increasing dependence on satellite
communications likely driving the
most disruptive changes to the cyber
threat landscape.
• Engineering biology that creates the
potential to enhance the capacity of
the armed forces through advances in
medicine, healthcare, and wellbeing,
possibilities for new energetic and
explosive materials, as well as avenues
for enormous harm in the shape of
new pathogens and other weapons
of mass destruction.
30
The Case for Transformation

What does this mean for the
UK and for Defence?
17. Defence must prepare for a much
more difficult world of heightened
competition, more frequent crisis, and
conflict that sees conventional military
attacks combined with intensified
sub-threshold aggression (Box 3) and
potentially with threats to use nuclear
or other weapons of mass destruction.
The UK is already subject to daily
sub-threshold attack, targeting its
critical national infrastructure, testing
its vulnerabilities as an open economy
and global trading nation (Figure 2),
and challenging its social cohesion.
Changes in the strategic context mean
that UK Defence must plan on the basis
that NATO Allies may be drawn into war
with—or be subject to coercion by—
another nuclear-armed state. With the
US clear that the security of Europe is
no longer its primary international focus,
the UK and European Allies must step up
their efforts.
Box 3: Potential effects of war on the UK’s way of life
Based on current ways of war, if the UK were to fight a state-on-state war as part of NATO
in 2025, it could expect to be subject to some or all of the following methods of attack:
• Attacks on the Armed Forces in the
UK and on overseas bases.
• Air and missile attack (from
long-range drones, cruise, and
ballistic missiles) targeting military
infrastructure and critical national
infrastructure (CNI) in the UK.
• Increased sabotage and
cyber-attacks affecting on- and
offshore CNI.
• Attempts to disrupt the UK economy—
especially the industry that supports
the Armed Forces—including through
cyber-attack, the interdiction of
maritime trade, and attacks on
space-based CNI.
• Efforts to manipulate information
to undermine social cohesion and
political will.
31
The Case for Transformation

Figure 2UK daily life: overseas dependencies and threats
32
The Case for Transformation

The state of Defence today
18. The starting point for this Review
is a UK military with innumerable
strengths, respected worldwide for
its dedication and professionalism.
The UK remains at the forefront of NATO
efforts to safeguard the Euro-Atlantic
against growing Russian aggression
in all domains, providing the ultimate
guarantee of UK and Allied security
in declaring its nuclear deterrent to
the Alliance. The Armed Forces are a
vital and agile instrument in achieving
Government priorities: securing NATO’s
front line in Estonia and Poland;
airdropping aid for the Palestinian people
into Gaza; helping to defend Israel
against Iranian air attack; protecting
international shipping lanes in the Red
Sea; defending the UK against persistent
cyber-attack; and enhancing UK
relationships with its allies and partners
in support of collective security.
19. Defence also remains an integral
part of the UK economy and wider
society, supporting 440,000 high-quality
jobs across the country and driving
social mobility through the training it
offers to Armed Forces personnel and
civil servants, including thousands of
apprentices. Examples of innovation
excellence within Defence demonstrate
its ability to deliver cutting-e dge
capabilities to warfighters and the
potential to deliver greater economic
growth across the UK.
20. However, Defence is still largely
shaped by the operations of the
post-Co ld War era , primarily conducted
against non-state opponents. The size
and readiness of the Armed Forces
declined as the threat posed by the
Soviet Union receded. The Cold
War’s large standing force of over
311,000 Regular personnel has fallen to
just over 136,000, with only a small set
of forces ready to deploy at any given
moment and the rest held at varying
levels of readiness. Defence spending
reduced in parallel, from 4.1% of GDP
in 1989 to 2.3% today.
We do need to put more
into our defences because
otherwise it won’t be long
before something more
significant happens and we
will think it should’ve been
more of a priority
—Citizens’ Panel member,
Rollestone Camp
21. This trajectory of declining investment
has been made more acute in recent
years by additional financial pressures,
including inflation and currency
fluctuations following the Covid-19
pandemic and Russia’s full-scale
invasion of Ukraine. Positive efforts to
improve military personnel’s salaries and
buy equipment designed to meet future
threats have added further pressure on
departmental finances.
22. More fundamentally, Defence’s wider
ways of working remain suited to
a peacetime era, with innovation
stifled and bureaucracy consuming
precious time and effort. The result is
an organisation that is not currently
optimised for warfare against a ‘peer’
military state:
28
28 A ‘ peer’ adversary is a country that can match the UK’s military capability and/or that of its allies.
33
The Case for Transformation

• A focus on ‘exquisite’ capabilities
has masked the ‘hollowing out’
of the Armed Forces’ warfighting
capability. Stockpiles are inadequate,
further reduced by the important
and necessary transfer of materiel
to Ukraine. The Strategic Base lacks
capacity and resilience following
years of underinvestment. Medical
services remain optimised for
counter-terrorism operations and
lack the capacity for managing a
mass-casualty conflict.
• Procurement systems and
Defence’s relationship with
industry have not materially
changed since the Cold War.
Risk reduction and consensus
decision-making are prioritised over
productivity and innovation at the
pace of technological change. Export
opportunities are too frequently an
afterthought in planning. Optimism
about equipment cost and timelines
for delivery means the Equipment
Plan is consistently over-budget and
outdated capabilities remain in the
field for too long. Defence struggles
to prioritise science and technology
spending and exploit innovation
for operational advantage. It is
insufficiently prepared for the digital
battlefield, lacks scale and resilience
in data flows, and carries intolerable
levels of cyber risk.
• Poor recruitment and retention,
shoddy accommodation, falling
morale, and cultural challenges
have created a workforce crisis.
The numbers of UK Regulars and
Reservists have been in persistent
decline (by 8% since 2022 for the
Regular Armed Forces). The shortfall
impacts disproportionately on the
skills most critical to UK advantage,
as it does for allies and partners.
The case for transformation
23. The Armed Forces have begun the
essential process of transformation in
response both to this changing context
and to lessons from the war in Ukraine.
However, they remain fundamentally
shaped by the risks and demands of the
post-Cold War era, when successive
Governments reasonably sought to
maximise the ‘dividend’ offered by
peace in Europe.
24. The MOD, wider Government, and
industry must be better prepared
for high-intensity, protracted war.
The sweeping and rapid changes to the
international security environment mean
it is not enough to change only how
and with what the Armed Forces fight.
To deter threats through being ready
for war, the whole of Defence must
change how it supports the Armed
Forces as part of a more flexible
policy response: deterring attacks that
blur the lines between competition and
conflict across all domains, harnessing
the very best technologies at wartime
pace, and drawing on support from
across Government, industry, society,
and allies. The following chapters chart
the course of this transformation.
34
The Case for Transformation

3. Roles for UK Defence
35

1. The fundamental role of the Armed
Forces is to deter threats so that
fighting a war—in defence of the UK,
the Overseas Territories and Crown
Dependencies, and allies—is not
necessary. It must be unequivocally
clear to potential adversaries that the
UK and NATO have the ability and
will to fight.
2. The UK last faced a direct military threat
from a highly capable state adversary
during the Cold War. Since then, it has
relied largely on an expeditionary
approach to disrupt potential threats
before they could reach Europe.
In parallel, the UK has guarded against
the possible re-emergence of more
significant threats through its nuclear
deterrent and membership of NATO.
This is no longer sufficient. The dynamic
nature of today’s threats (Chapter 2)
presents a vastly more complex
security challenge.
3. As the Prime Minister has stated,
navigating this environment demands
an integrated, whole-of-society
approach to deterrence and defence.
Most importantly, the Government
must be able to act and adapt with
agility to create doubt and dilemmas for
adversaries and to maintain escalation
dominance—detecting and attributing
attacks, choosing when and how to
respond, and being able to sustain
that response and escalate again if
necessary. To achieve this, the UK
will need to:
• Increase its options for threatening
retaliation—whether developed
nationally or with allies—to convince
a potential adversary that the cost
of its actions will outweigh the
potential benefits.
• Build national resilience to attacks
and shocks, enhancing the UK’s
ability to withstand and recover
quickly and to deny adversaries
potential benefits. Infrastructure
that is critical to the UK economy
and way of life must be protected.
Re-establishing credible national
preparations for war, home
defence, and industrial mobilisation
is a priority.
• Nurture strong relationships with
allies. No state can address all these
challenges alone. Together, the UK
and its allies have greater economic,
military, and diplomatic influence than
any of their potential adversaries—
individually or combined.
4. Defence plays a central role in this
whole-of-society approach. It is a key
instrument of Government: home to the
UK’s nuclear deterrent, multi-d omain
conventional and Special Forces;
and sole provider of highly specialist
capabilities that are vital to national
security, such as counter-t error
and counter-chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear expertise.
To achieve maximum effect in support
of Government objectives—whether in
war or during periods of heightened
competition or crisis—it must seamlessly
direct these forces across domains
29
29 T he five domains are maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.
and with allies, drawing on partners
across Government, industry, and
wider society.
36
Roles for UK Defence

A ‘NATO First’ approach to
deterrence and defence
5. Collective security, underpinned by
formal alliances and partnerships,
is a force multiplier for the UK’s
deterrence and defence. At the forefront
of the UK’s many valuable alliances is
NATO, which has brought peace to the
Euro-Atlantic for more than 75 years.
Under Article V of NATO’s founding treaty,
the UK would always expect to fight a
‘peer’ military adversary alongside Allies.
But the Alliance provides more than just
strength in numbers in the event of a crisis.
It provides a unique forum for collective
action and industrial collaboration in the
Euro-Atlantic, and facilitates agreement
on global issues and partnership with
countries beyond the region.
6. There is an unequivocal need for the UK
to redouble its efforts within the Alliance
and to step up its contribution to
Euro-Atlantic security more broadly—
particularly as Russian aggression
across Europe grows and as the United
States of America (US) adapts its
regional priorities.
7. The defining principle of this Review
is therefore ‘NATO First’ (Box 4). This
demands a different approach from that
taken since the end of the Cold War.
The Alliance must be the starting point
for how the Armed Forces are developed,
organised, equipped, and trained in
order to contribute to deterrence in the
Euro-Atlantic, shaping the environment
and potential adversaries’ thinking
every day. This approach will require
organisational and cultural change within
Defence and across Whitehall, given
the vital support provided by other
Government departments. Efforts to
deepen bilateral and minilateral
relationships should similarly be geared
to strengthening Europe’s security
architecture (Chapter 5).
Box 4: What does ‘NATO First’ mean for UK Defence?
Defence will be integrated with NATO by design. This demands that NATO is:
• Foremost in how Defence plans.
The UK should prioritise its ability to
contribute to NATO plans (including
for defending the UK), which
should be at the heart of capability
development and force design.
The UK must play a leading role in
developing Alliance plans, standards,
and verification.
• The foundation of how Defence
thinks: mainstreamed through policy,
doctrine and concepts development,
education, and talent management.
• Embedded in how Defence acts:
ensuring national activity prioritises
and enhances NATO objectives and
integration. This includes operations,
exercises, industrial strategy, and
defence engagement activity.
37
Roles for UK Defence

8. As NATO renews its own approach to
deterrence and defence, the UK must:
• Back up its commitment to Article V
by putting NATO at the heart
of how it plans to fight in the
Euro-A tlantic area . The UK should
prioritise its ability to fight as part of
NATO strategic and operational plans,
actively support their development,
and contribute leadership within
the command structures that will
execute them. This must continue to
be underwritten by the UK’s nuclear
deterrent, assigned to the defence of
NATO and adapted as nuclear threats
to the Alliance increase.
• Put NATO at the centre of its
force development, with a focus
on shaping and meeting ambitious
NATO Capability Targets designed
to strengthen the Alliance’s
military capabilities and to improve
burden-s haring between Europe and
Canada on the one hand and the
US on the other.
• Meet civil defence and resilience
planning obligations under Article III
of the NATO founding treaty to
strengthen deterrence and assure
the UK’s ability to project power in
support of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic
and beyond.
30
30 A rticle III of NATO’s Washington Treaty states that Parties to the Treaty ‘separately and jointly, by means of
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack.’
The UK must also
ensure it can provide military and
civilian Host Nation Support to NATO,
including in times of crisis and war.
• Support NATO’s development
in areas critical to warfighting .
This should include: leading the
way in new concepts; encouraging
NATO to reflect priority defence and
dual-use technologies in capability
38
Roles for UK Defence

planning processes; and influencing
standards and operating practices
accordingly. Drawing on experience,
expertise, and capabilities developed
through national and minilateral
activity—for example, as part of the
Joint Expeditionary Force—would
further support NATO-wide innovation.
Engaging with and leveraging the
work of NATO’s UK-b ased innovation
organisations31
31 N ATO Innovation Fund and DIANA (the Defence Innovation Accelerator in the North Atlantic).
would be mutually
beneficial in pursuing this goal.
• Engage fully in NATO-led efforts to
strengthen transatlantic industrial
cooperation as a central plank of
collective deterrence and defence,
with NATO an increasingly important
convenor and standard-setter.
Influencing NATO standards and
adopting them by default is key.
9. A ‘NATO First’ approach does not
mean ‘NATO only’. The Alliance itself
recognises the importance of working
with partners such as the Indo-Pacific
Four
32
32 T he Indo-Pacific Four are Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand.
—reflecting the connection
between Euro-Atlantic security and that
of other regions such as the Middle
East and Indo-Pacific. The UK also has
significant interests, commitments, and
responsibilities beyond the Euro-A tlantic.
These include: the defence of UK
sovereign territory; the UK’s status as
one of five permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council; the
Five Eyes intelligence alliance;
33
33 A ustralia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US.
and
flagship capability partnerships AUKUS
and the Global Combat Air Programme.
All are critical to UK and allied security
and to shaping the international security
environment.
Core defence roles
10. The Review has identified enduring and
mutually reinforcing roles that Defence
must fulfil to deliver the outcomes set
by the Government within the resources
available. They have informed our
recommendations on the transformative
methods and capabilities in the chapters
that follow. In alignment with a NATO
First approach, under Role 1 and
Role 2 effort and resources are focused
on defence and deterrence in the
Euro-A tlantic, centred on home defence
and resilience. Role 3 uses all Defence
levers—as part of a cross-government
effort—to defend where the UK must
and to shape the environment in favour
of national interests where it can.
Delivery of all three roles will depend on
capabilities deployed in the space and
cyber and electromagnetic domains as
well as common foundational enablers.
It is intended that the UK Special Forces
would also contribute to delivery of
all three roles where needed, as part
of a Defence-wide effort to deliver
crisis response, whether in the UK,
the Euro -A tlantic, or beyond.
11. To meet the most significant
threats facing the UK, the roles for
Defence are:
Role 1: Defend, protect, and
enhance the resilience of the
UK, its Overseas Territories,
and Crown Dependencies
• The nature of today’s threats mean
Defence must once again have
credible plans for defending UK
home territory as part of NATO,
rooted in improved national resilience
39
Roles for UK Defence

(Chapter 6)—a NATO Article III
obligation. The Armed Forces must
also be able to defend and protect
the Overseas Territories and Crown
Dependencies and be ready to deploy
globally to support British nationals
overseas during crises.
Role 2: Deter and defend in
the Euro-Atlantic
• Defence must contribute daily to
deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic, with
a force optimised for warfighting to
protect and defend NATO territory
and Allied populations against
attack, underpinned by the UK’s
nuclear deterrent. The UK must
apply its strengths in support of
the Alliance, enhancing deterrence
by driving modernisation. This role
responds directly to the UK’s Article V
commitment under which the security
of one Ally is the security of all, and
under which the UK would always
expect to fight a ‘peer’ military
adversary alongside NATO Allies.
Role 3: Shape the global
security environment
• Defence must shape the global
security environment in favour of
the UK’s interests, supported by
the prioritised use of all the levers
available to it, as part of a wider
Government effort (Chapter 5). Military
deployments beyond the Euro-Atlantic
should be used to retain deeper and
broader ‘match fitness’ of the Armed
Forces, developing and demonstrating
warfighting leadership, innovation,
and human and technical capabilities.
To ensure such deployments do
not detract from delivery of Roles 1
and 2, the Armed Forces must
be able to return at speed to the
Euro-Atlantic if necessary.
• The Review recommends the Middle
East and the Indo-Pacific as the next
priority regions after the Euro-Atlantic
for Defence engagement. The growing
links between Russia, China, Iran, and
the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea complicate calculations
of deterrence and escalation
management across regions.
Enabling Defence roles
12. There are two further enabling roles for
UK Defence that are fundamental to the
delivery of Roles 1–3. These roles make
the UK stronger and the Armed Forces
better able to deter and defend. They
are explored throughout this Review in
greater detail. These enabling roles are:
Develop a thriving, resilient defence
innovation and industrial base
• To support a move to warfighting,
the UK’s defence innovation and
industrial base must be able to adapt
and surge to meet emerging priorities
and demands (Chapter 4.2). A new
partnership with industry is essential
to ensure the Armed Forces are
permanently connected to innovation
and that industry can scale up
production at speed to sustain larger
and longer campaigns. Investing in
the capabilities and technologies that
will drive UK operational advantage
will in turn create broad-based
economic growth across the country.
Contribute to national
preparedness and cohesion
• Defence’s core roles can only be
credibly achieved if supported by
a whole-of-society effort to build
national resilience and preparedness
for crisis or conflict (Chapter 6).
Defence must play its part in this,
communicating clearly with the
40
Roles for UK Defence

public about the threats facing the
UK and what is involved to deter and
defeat them, and working across
Government to address potential
vulnerabilities that might be exploited
by adversaries. Defence must
maintain an active presence across
the four nations of the Union and step
up its efforts to recruit and retain a
workforce that represents the whole
of British society to harness the best
talent the country has to offer.
Recommendations:
1. While Defence plays a central role in protecting the UK’s security, prosperity, and
values, the nature of today’s threats means it cannot do this alone. To ensure the
UK can act with the necessary agility in deterring adversaries in competition, crisis,
and conflict, the MOD must work with wider Government to:
• Increase options for retaliation in response to an attack—or the threat of attack—
on the UK and its allies.
• Build national preparedness and resilience, ensuring the UK can withstand
attacks and recover quickly.
• Nurture a robust strategic culture, ensuring senior leaders and officials across
Government are equipped with the knowledge, skills, and intellectual framework
to understand the nuclear dimensions and escalation risks of today’s strategic
environment. This should be regularly exercised and tested through wargames
and table-top exercises.
• Rebuild the relationship with, and better utilise, the intellectual base outside
Government to support long-term adaptation in deterrence and defence policy,
working with industry, think tanks, and academia to ensure there is a thriving
network of expertise and debate.
• Cohere these efforts with close allies, developing and exercising mechanisms
for political decision-making in response to crises, especially where they
fall short of war.
2. A ‘NATO First’ policy is essential as the UK steps up its contribution to Euro-Atlantic
security. This demands a different approach from that taken since the end of the
Cold War. The Alliance should be mainstreamed in how Defence plans, thinks, and
acts. Defence must establish a roadmap for delivering this deeper interoperability
with NATO Allies and for leading the way on shared approaches and standards by
January 2026. Implementation should commence no later than July 2026.
41
Roles for UK Defence

4. Transforming UK
Warfighting
42

Vision for UK Defence by 2035A leading tech-enabled defence power, with an Integrated
Force that deters, fights, and wins through constant
innovation at wartime pace.
1. This Review charts a new era for
Defence, restoring the UK’s ability
to deter, fight, and win—with allies—
against states with advanced military
forces by 2035. This vision could
be achieved more quickly should
circumstances demand it and should
more resources be made available.
2. The measure of military effectiveness
today is not solely the number of people,
vehicles, planes, and ships fielded by
the Armed Forces. Military power is
increasingly generated and assessed
in terms of:
• How quickly the Armed Forces
and industry can innovate and
operationalise technology that
is developing faster than ever in
human history.
• How effectively the Armed Forces
use networked assets—increasingly
dominated by uncrewed and
autonomous platforms—to create
agility, lethality, mass, and endurance.
3. As described in Chapter 2, the UK
Armed Forces have begun the necessary
process of change in response to this new
reality. But progress has not been fast
or radical enough, limited to important
but small-scale experimentation and
the acquisition of a small number of
valuable capabilities. To meet the threats
of today and tomorrow, Defence must
fundamentally transform how it
works: changing how it fights and
how it supports that fight .
4. Lessons from the war in Ukraine and
organisational change under Defence
Reform are both critical starting points.
The whole of Defence—the Armed
Forces and the Department of State
together—should be driven by the logic
of the innovation cycle:
• Find it: Defence must be able to
seed early-stage research and
identify external innovation that will
keep the UK’s Armed Forces at the
leading edge of technology, using
its purchasing power to shape the
commercial market.
• Buy it: Defence must be able to
pull innovation through from ideas
to the front line at speed, getting
new capabilities into the hands
of warfighters and creating the
conditions for the market to invest,
experiment, and scale.
• Use it: for maximum impact, Defence
must continually develop its people’s
skill set, adapt its organisation, and
exploit a common digital foundation
to which all software-enabled
assets connect.
5. With dual-use technology increasingly
central to military advantage, Defence
should more purposefully use its
market power to create economic
growth—prioritising UK-based
businesses without losing the benefits of
competition—while also delivering for the
warfighter. Success in embedding the
innovation cycle will also see significant
improvement in Defence productivity,
43
Transforming UK Warfighting

competitiveness, exports, and value
for money, maximising the return on
the resources available to it, supported
by the new Defence Reform and
Efficiency Plan.
6. At the heart of this transformation are
three fundamental changes in approach.
Defence must be:
• Integrated by design: delivering
a digitally integrated combat force
that is more lethal than the sum of its
parts and interoperable with NATO
(Chapter 4.1).
• Innovation-led: rapidly adopting new
technology to keep this Integrated
Force at the forefront of warfare
(Chapter 4.2).
• Industry-backed: developing a
thriving, resilient innovation and
industrial base that can scale
innovation and production in support
of the Integrated Force (Chapter 4.2).
7. This diagnosis is not new. But Defence
has not yet made the organisational
and cultural change necessary for
success. Pressing on with ‘root and
branch’ reform to what Defence does
and how—supported by the acquisition
of select digital capabilities—offers
the potential for rapid improvements
in the Armed Forces’ lethality. With
adversaries’ intentions and capabilities
changing so significantly, and with
technology changing warfare so quickly,
‘business as usual’ is no longer an
option. The time for action is now.
Recommendation:
3. Defence must transform how it works to become a leading tech-enabled defence
power, with an Integrated Force that deters, fights, and wins through constant
innovation at wartime pace. To drive this transformation, Defence must more
systematically ensure that its efforts deliver both for the warfighter and for the
UK economy—with the forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy an important
opportunity to embed radical reforms. Success will require the MOD to develop
an understanding of the relationship between its military competitiveness and the
performance of the defence innovation and industrial base. As a starting point, the
MOD should establish and track metrics for:
• The lethality of the Armed Forces.
• Productivity within Defence and, separately, of industry.
• The national economic impact of Defence spending and procurement (including
departmental research and development spend), especially within the defence
and dual-use technology sectors.
44
Transforming UK Warfighting

4.1 The Integrated Force Model
1. The UK has long been at the forefront
of efforts to deliver a combat force that
is ‘joint’ and ‘multi-domain’. However,
in practice, the single Services have
largely evolved separately in terms
of design, equipment, and training—
creating siloes. The result is a force
that joins up only on the battlefield:
the effectiveness of the Armed Forces
on operations is determined by the
capabilities available to each Service
at the point of deployment, rather than
as the result of joined-up planning
and delivery.
2. For the Armed Forces to be more
lethal than the sum of their parts, they
must complete the journey from ‘joint’
to ‘integrated’, inverting the model so
that authorities for design and delivery
flow top-down from a single point of
military authority. This step-change in
approach is dependent on the elevation
of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)
under Defence Reform as the head of
the new Military Strategic Headquarters
(MSHQ) with command over the
Service Chiefs. The Services must
be integrated in planning, readiness,
deployment, and procurement. And this
Integrated Force must be underpinned
by the common digital foundation and
shared data that are central to today’s
software-d efined warfare.
Integrated by design
3. The key features of the Integrated
Force are:
• A single force design that delivers
a more lethal and agile combat force.
The UK’s nuclear, conventional, and
Special Forces are connected in a
unified effort, with non-nuclear force
elements designed and directed by
CDS as one force to achieve the
goals set by the Secretary of State.
This coherent combat force trains
and fights across domains under a
single vision, drawing on the unique
strengths and expertise of the single
Services and Strategic Command.
CDS is responsible for the readiness
and endurance of the Integrated
Force, supported by the Service
Chiefs. In designing this unified
force, CDS must balance investment
between front-line capabilities
and the foundational enablers that
sustain the force in protracted,
high-i ntensity warfare.
• A common set of foundational
enablers. The full range of
supporting activity and capabilities34
34 S uch as training, exercises, infrastructure, logistics, medical services, intelligence, stockpiles,
and munitions.
are delivered according to a single
scheme set by CDS and the MSHQ.
Delivery of this design is directed by
CDS and led by the Service Chiefs.
It is supported by the new National
Armaments Director (NAD), whose
remit incorporates defence innovation,
procurement, support, infrastructure,
and Defence Digital.
45
The Integrated Force Model

• Digital enablement at its core.
A common digital foundation of data,
Artificial Intelligence (AI), synthetic
environments, and networks connects
people and platforms across all
domains, and with allies and partners.
This gives the Integrated Force agility,
speed of manoeuvre, and effective
targeting to outmatch opponents.
• Collaboration with other
Government departments
in real time , not least the UK
Intelligence Community,35 to achieve
maximum effect in response to
national security challenges.
4. To fulfil the roles for Defence outlined
in Chapter 3, the Integrated Force
must be able to operate in different
configurations. It should be:
• Integrated into NATO by design (Box 4
in Chapter 3), capable of operating as
part of NATO Component Commands
while still drawing on the UK’s
common enablers and other elements
of the Integrated Force, such as the
UK Intelligence Community.
• Capable of integration when
operating in coalition, including as a
leading framework nation36 and as
a contributing partner.
• Capable of operating as an
integrated, sovereign force when
needed. This will particularly apply in
meeting the UK’s responsibilities to
the Overseas Territories.
35 Comprising the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), and GCHQ.
36 Providing the organisational leadership, military enablers, and many force elements for an operation,
into which partners ‘plug’ specialised capabilities.
5. Where previous reviews have established
a fixed force design to be delivered by
a specified date, this Review instead
advocates a model of constant
innovation of the Integrated Force at
wartime pace, delivered through a new
partnership with industry (Chapter 4.2).
This ensures that commercial innovation
and the ability to scale and sustain
supply is built into how the Armed Forces
are conceived and operate. Under
this model, there is no end state for
the Integrated Force: its design and
capabilities—and the way that wider
Defence supports it—must continue to
evolve as threats and technology do.
Digitally enabled integration
6. Digital integration is essential to
achieving a step-change in lethality.
Data and digital systems are the
fundamental underpinnings of all modern
military capabilities, making them more
capable, resilient, and lethal. They are
integral to developing a force dominated
by AI, uncrewed, and autonomous
systems, and in preparing the ground for
the profound potential impact of Artificial
General Intelligence. They can no longer
be viewed as a capability choice to be
weighed up against traditional military
platforms, like missiles, ships, or tanks.
They require priority funding and delivery.
46
The Integrated Force Model

Urgently fix the foundations
7. There are pockets of excellence working
towards this vision across Defence.37
37 P articularly in the Special Forces. Projects ASGARD (Army), EVE (Royal Navy), and NEXUS (RAF) are also
using digital and data innovations to connect forces on the ground, in the air, or at sea with other networked
assets to provide machine-speed decision support for reconnaissance and strike.
However, Defence’s digital transformation
has been hindered by the loss of central
funding, lack of defined and consistently
applied standards and architecture,
and a persistent shortage of key digital
skills within the Armed Forces and
Civil Service.
8. Defence should be ruthlessly
focused on delivering the core
digital platform for the warfighter .
The Chief Information Officer (CIO)
must have clear authority to establish
and supervise common technical
standards, including those related to
cyber security and data management.
With the CIO defining the core platform
and standards at the ‘centre’, exploitation
primarily shifts to the edge: front-line
personnel can experiment and create
the digital applications they need at
speed, feeding their insights back into
the central design. Delivering the core
platform requires:
• Concentration on the core
enterprise capabilities: resilient and
secure communications networks,
an assured data fabric,
38
38 D ata fabric is a sophisticated system that enables the efficient management and integration of large
amounts of data across multiple sources. It is vital for informed decision-making and strategic planning
in an increasingly digital world, where data is produced and stored in diverse locations and formats. Just
as a well-designed transport network ensures smooth and efficient travel, a data fabric connects and
harmonises different data sources, allowing for a comprehensive and coherent view of the data landscape.
and the
ability for users to consume services
and exploit AI and autonomous
capabilities in real time, in any
location, and at scale. This requires
rapid progress in delivering the
Secret Cloud.
39
39 A s ecure and scalable platform for storing and sharing information classified at Secret.
• Robust cyber security. Legacy
systems should be retired to reduce
the currently intolerable levels of
cyber risk carried by Defence.
• Embracing open architectures
and shared technical standards ,
from standardised drone hardware
ports to universal communications
and AI protocols. Simplicity is key.
• Treating data as a strategic asset,
with protected computing and data
infrastructure, and assured data flows
from allies and the UK Intelligence
Community. Appointing a data/
AI lead within each procurement
capability portfolio (Chapter 4.2)
would ensure that data and AI are
considered through the full lifecycle
of new capabilities.
Invest in the people … they
have to understand the tech.
You can build it and buy it, but
they need to be able to use it
—Citizens’ Panel member,
RAF Waddington
9. To maximise the benefits of cutting-e dge
technology and of the common digital
architecture, Defence must also
make a concerted effort to develop
the necessary digital, AI, cyber, and
electromagnetic warfare skills that
are central to modern warfighting.
47
The Integrated Force Model

10. Establishing a dedicated Digital
Warfighter group would allow
Defence to deploy digital and
conventional warfighters on
operations side-by-side, maximising
opportunity for rapid learning and
adaptation. The Digital Warfighters would
exploit technology such as sensors,
AI-powered systems, and drones to
achieve a decisive advantage: analysing
battlespace data in real time, predicting
threats, optimising operational strategy,
speeding up decision-making, and
improving communication and integration
across domains. This new group should
exemplify best practice for recruitment,
retention, and training: attractive to those
who would not typically see Defence
as a career option; benefiting from
flexible opportunities within structured
career streams; and a cohort of Regular,
Reserve, civilian, and industry personnel.
A single digital mission: the digital
targeting web
11. A clear, unifying mission would enable
Defence to succeed where it has
previously failed, catalysing progress
in laying the foundations. Establishing a
new digital ‘targeting web’ (Box 5 and
Figure 3) would have this catalytic effect
while ultimately enhancing the Armed
Forces’ precision and lethality at scale
and reach. With the MSHQ providing the
central demand signal for this new web,
digital leaders should be held to account
for implementation. An external Advisory
Panel should be established to support
the vision and mission delivery.
48
The Integrated Force Model

Box 5The digital targeting web
Informed by lessons from Ukraine, the digital targeting web would connect ‘sensors’,
‘deciders’, and ‘effectors’. This creates choice and speed in deciding how to
degrade or destroy an identified target across domains and in a contested cyber and
electromagnetic domain. For example, a target might be identified by a sensor on a ship
or in space before being disabled by an F-35 aircraft, drone, or offensive cyber operation.
Informed by AI and supported by a common synthetic environment, the targeting web
epitomises how the Integrated Force must fight and adapt. Its very existence contributes
to deterrence.
Figure 3: Illustration of the digital targeting web
49
The Integrated Force Model

Recommendations4. The Government should implement the Integrated Force model to achieve full
integration within Defence, delivering a more agile and lethal combat force.
To ensure accountability for the continual adaptation of the Integrated Force over
time, Defence should:
• Submit an annual statement to the Secretary of State on force design that
identifies what has changed.
• Undertake an annual evaluation of the effectiveness of the Integrated Force
model, measured through demonstrable improvements in: availability of
assets; sustainability; pace of exploitation; rates of experimentation through to
adoption; NATO interoperability; and speed of decision-making.
5. Digital integration is essential if the UK Armed Forces are to significantly increase
their lethality. The MOD should (a) protect digital spend as a no-fail priority and (b)
embed a culture of constant innovation with a target of minimum annual shift of
10% expenditure from current to next-generation capabilities on its enterprise digital
platforms and services. To ensure accountability for delivery:
• Progress in establishing the fundamental capabilities of a core common
platform—under the authority of the Chief Information Officer—should be
reported to the Secretary of State on a quarterly basis.
• Progress should be catalysed through a single digital mission: to deliver a digital
targeting web in 2027, requiring access, in whole or in part, to a Defence-wide
Secret Cloud, with a minimum viable product available in 2026.
• The MOD should report to the Secretary of State by July 2026 on assurance of
critical data flows, with a plan for scaling up dissemination and exploitation of
data in warfare and across Defence.
• A new Digital Warfighter group should be established, with appropriate recruitment
and pay freedoms, by July 2026. This new group should allow Defence to deploy
digital and conventional warfighters on operations side-by-side.
50
The Integrated Force Model

4.2 Innovation and Industry:
A New Approach for
Deterrence and Growth
1. Innovation and industrial power are
central to deterrence and decisive
factors in war. The conflict in Ukraine
provides a stark reminder of the
imperative of maintaining sufficient
inventories of munitions and spares,
the fast replenishment and resupply by
industry, and a rapid, continual cycle
of innovation between industry and
the front line.
2. Today, much of the best innovation is
found in the private sector, while the
increasing prevalence of dual-use
technologies has widened the net of
potential suppliers that can contribute
to Defence outcomes. There is a deep
range of partners outside Defence
that it must work to bring in alongside
its prime contractors, from technology
and innovation startups and scale-ups,
40 A ‘ scale-up’ company is one that has moved beyond the startup phase, having proven its business model.
40
to small and medium-sized enterprises,
private investors, and the trade unions
and their members, who are the
workforce without which a step-change
in industrial productivity would not
be possible.
3. Defence has a crucial role to
play in developing the thriving
and resilient base that underpins
warfighting competitiveness and
readiness (Chapter 3). But it is stuck
in Cold War-era procurement cycles
and relationships with industry.
Current MOD processes stifle adaptation
and productivity, imposing unattractive
timelines, requirements, and costs on
smaller companies. Innovation cycles
increasingly happen in days and weeks,
not months and years. Yet for projects
valued above £20m, it takes 6.5 years on
average for a contract to be awarded.
4. To deliver our vision for UK
Defence, business as usual is no
longer an option. Through the UK’s
support to Ukraine, we have seen
what effective joint working between
the MOD and industry looks like.
Processes designed for peacetime
have been revolutionised to enable
delivery at speed. Defence must
now mainstream these practices,
transforming acquisition processes
and making sure through-life support
is considered from the outset.
5. Defence also has significant untapped
potential to be a new engine for
growth at the heart of the UK’s
economic strategy. It already makes a
vital contribution to the UK economy.
In 2023/24, the MOD spent c.£29bn with
UK industry.
41
41 MOD regional expenditure with industry 2023/24 - GOV.UK.
Defence exports were
valued at £14.5bn in 2023. Defence
supports 440,000 jobs across the
UK and over 24,000 apprenticeships,
with significant economic and social
benefit (Figure 4).
42
42 Mi litary apprenticeships starting in 2018/19 delivered a gross economic benefit of around £600m by
2023/24. Measuring the Net Present Value of Further Education in England 2018-19 - GOV.UK.
Yet it can go further.
51
Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

6. Radical root-and-branch reform of
defence procurement—combined
with substantial investment in
innovation, novel technology, advanced
manufacturing, and skills—would grow
the productive capacity of the UK
economy, ensuring that Defence
investment delivers both for the
warfighter and for the economy.
Figure 4: The nationwide defence industry
52
Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

7. To succeed, Defence must be more
purposeful in its approach to industry .
It is uniquely positioned to use its buying
power to support economic growth,
given its significant market size, its ability
to purchase at scale through coordinated
procurement, and a constantly evolving
need for technology. Prioritising
UK-b ased business, Defence should
aim high: success should be measured
in the number and scale of deep tech
suppliers in the UK in areas such as
Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomy,
advanced manufacturing, quantum, and
space—with high-Intellectual Property
(IP) companies delivering leading-edge
capabilities for Defence while creating
high-skilled, high-paid jobs and driving
exports in software, IP , and equipment.
8. The forthcoming Defence Industrial
Strategy provides an important
opportunity to drive the necessary
radical reform. It should clearly lay out
how the MOD and industry must evolve,
with leadership provided within Defence
by the new Defence Growth Board
43
43 Spring Statement 2025, p. 19. The board will co-chaired by the Defence Secretary and Chancellor of
the Exchequer.
and
the National Armaments Director (NAD).
Seeding innovation
and growth
9. Defence must embrace its unique
market position—including the power of
its role as a ‘first customer’ for startups—
to seed innovation and growth. A more
comprehensive and ambitious approach
should include:
• Maximising existing MOD
investment in research and
development (R&D)—some
£2.6bn in 2023/24.44
44 N et expenditure. MOD departmental resources: 2024 – GOV.UK.
This should be
supported by collaboration with the
Department for Science, Innovation
and Technology (DSIT), Department
for Business and Trade, UK Research
and Innovation (UKRI), and the
Advanced Research and Innovation
Agency to ensure taxpayer-funded
research supports Defence priority
problem sets. Expert science and
technology (S&T) and innovation
voices must be heard at the top
table in MOD to shape the strategic
vision for this investment and
support its delivery.
• A concerted effort to unlock
private capital and expertise.
Private-s ector interest in the defence
sector is growing but barriers to
private investment remain. Defence
must develop better relationships
with, and understanding of, the
financial services sector. New
funding models should be explored
to make defence innovators a more
attractive proposition for private
capital, reduce the cost of finance for
defence companies, and increase the
ability to pool capital with allies.
• A cross-government initiative to
develop regional clusters
45
45 A r egional cluster is a geographical concentration of interconnected businesses, supported by universities
and research institutions, built around specialist knowledge, expertise, and experience.
for
specific technologies and to stimulate
place-based growth, from cyber in
Manchester to AI in the North East
of England and marine autonomy
in Plymouth. The partnership to
develop Barrow-in-Furness (Box 6),
home to the UK’s nuclear deterrent,
53
Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

offers a useful model for local-national
partnerships that combine national
and regional funding and expertise to
develop local strengths. Consideration
must also be given to the defence
industries across the devolved
nations—Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland—when taking
forward these plans.
• Creating a pipeline of skills
and creative talent that will help
Defence and industry to deliver
cutting-edge capabilities while
developing the foundations for
economic growth. The MOD should
work with the Department for
Education, DSIT (including directly
with UKRI), and universities to invest
in science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics, and other
specialist skills.
Box 6: Developing towns and regions through
local-national partnership: Barrow-in-Furness
Launched in 2024, the Plan for Barrow recognises the town’s critical importance for
maintaining the UK’s nuclear deterrent. Through more than £200m of government
investment over the next ten years, ‘Team Barrow’—a partnership between the
Government, Westmoreland and Furness Council, and BAE Systems—will address
historic underinvestment and high levels of deprivation, helping to regenerate and
revitalise the area to the benefit of Defence, the local community, and the local economy.
Team Barrow is a model of cross-government collaboration. Alongside the MOD
and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Departments
for Transport, Education, Business and Trade, Work and Pensions, and Health and
Social Care are all playing a crucial role through funding or supporting initiatives.
These include improved transport connectivity, additional homes and new public
spaces, revised education offers, support to local businesses, and plans to alleviate
skills shortages.
54
Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

10. Delivering this more ambitious
approach will require the MOD to
set itself up for success internally.
There is a distinct difference between
seeding early-stage scientific research
(from basic principles to lab testing) and
shaping the commercial sector through
collaboration and contracts. Success
in these two undertakings depends on
different ways of working, skills, partners,
and networks. Defence must treat them
separately, reorganising existing
teams to create two new structures
(Box 7). These teams’ agendas should
be cohered as core elements of the
new National Armaments Director
Group, coalescing around thematic
and technological missions that in turn
align with capability plans and industrial
sectors.
46
46 F rom Technology Readiness Levels 1 to 9, which represent the development stage of technologies,
from lab testing of an idea (level 1) through to the technology in use on operations (level 9).
These new departmental
organisations should focus on:
• Seeding early-stage scientific
research. A new Defence Research
and Evaluation (DRE) organisation—
created as an evolution of the
current Dstl and Defence Science
and Technology teams
47
47 T he department may wish to retain the Dstl brand for this more focused organisation.
—should
act as a gateway to academia and
research institutions across the
UK and allied countries, leveraging
Government-f unded, world-class S&T
more effectively to make it worthwhile
for universities to invest in long-term
capacity- and capability-building.
• Harnessing commercial innovation .
A new UK Defence Innovation
organisation (announced in March
2025)
48
48 Government to turbocharge defence innovation – GOV.UK. The leader of this new organisation should have
an appropriate title for external engagement, such as ‘Chief Innovation Officer’.
should provide the mechanism
by which Defence quickly finds and
then buys innovative commercial
products and services from the
UK and allied countries, including
dual-use technologies. By connecting
external innovation with Defence
procurement, this organisation should
act as an engine for growth in the
defence and dual-use technology
sectors. It will have a ringfenced
annual budget of at least £400m.
49
49 Spring Statement 2025, p. 18 – GOV.UK.
We should be investing in
brains, minds, and innovation.
You’ve always got to leverage
your strengths
—Citizens’ Panel member,
HM Naval Base Portsmouth
11. Under this revised model for S&T and
innovation, the Chief Scientific Adviser
(CSA) in the Department of State will
continue the essential role of providing
science policy guidance and connecting
externally with the Government’s
CSA network, universities, and other
scientific institutions. The MOD should
routinely draw on the available S&T
and innovation expertise to inform
procurement decisions.
55
Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

Box 7Finding and steering early-stage research and commercial innovation
The new Defence Research and Evaluation organisation should work with academic
and research institutions to:
• Design and deliver an early-stage
science and technology (S&T)
research portfolio with strong
programme management, aligned
with National Armaments Director
priorities, and drawing on consultation
with internal and external partners.
DRE should share problem sets with
academia and research institutions
to develop their understanding of the
problems facing Defence.
• DRE’s internal research should
robustly prioritise a small number
of national security issues where
sovereign ownership and skills are
crucial, supported by partnership with
one or two universities to develop
expertise and talent.
50
50 G iven security requirements, it is likely that only one or two universities or small clusters will provide
the relevant training and expertise.
The central,
dominant effort should be on:
° Chemical and biological defence.51
51 T he Atomic Weapons Establishment will continue to steward early-stage scientific research on behalf
of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (Chapter 7.1).
This is the essential and urgent
activity.
° Novel and unconventional
weapons systems, including
energetic and explosive materials.
° Counter-terrorism technology
and manufacturing, including
specialist munitions.
° Maintenance of unique testing
capabilities, such as Porton
Down laboratory.52
52 P orton Down laboratory is an exemplar of Defence’s critical, world-leading capabilities, as evidenced
by its role in identifying the military-grade nerve agent, Novichok, used by Russia in attempted
assassinations in the UK in 2018.
This potentially requires contributions
from other Government departments,
given its utility beyond Defence.
• Empower the Scientific Adviser
network to ensure evidence-based
decision-making and scientific advice
is adopted across Defence and work
closely with the Front Line Commands
under the leadership of the National
Armaments Director.
• Enhance allied and NATO scientific
efforts, including shaping and
participating in international, classified
research where this aligns with National
Armaments Director priorities.
• Horizon scan for early advancements
in S&T that could shape long-term
defence capabilities and identify where
Government can spur and shape the
market through proof-of-concept
contracts.
• Revisit key priorities regularly, cutting
projects that are not delivering and
ensuring headroom in the budget for
emerging themes.
• Develop closer relationships across
the S&T ecosystem, especially with
universities. This should include
establishing thematic experts working
with universities, the UK Intelligence
Community, and others in Government
across areas of national priority.
56
Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

• As a subset of these relationships,
forge ‘anchor partnerships’ with
a small set of trusted universities
to leverage Government-funded,
world-class S&T more effectively,
and to make it worthwhile for
universities to invest in long-term
capability-building. These institutional
relationships should be reviewed every
five years and adapted to ensure
relevance to Defence priorities.
The new UK Defence Innovation organisation should shape and draw on external
innovation expertise to:
• Find existing full, partial, or ‘good
enough’ commercial solutions,
including dual-use technologies—
sharing problem sets with industry,
not specifications.
• Drive the adoption of innovation by
connecting innovators to Defence
procurement teams co-located in the
National Armaments Director Group
and accessing protected funding for
rapid commercial exploitation.
• Identify where it could stimulate the
market as a ‘first customer’.
• Coordinate a significantly streamlined
set of innovation hubs (across
the Front Line Commands) and
innovation challenges (under the
Defence and Security Accelerator) in
alignment with Defence’s priorities
and in support of innovation-led
startups and scale-ups.
• Be responsible for developing regional
clusters and supporting local-national
partnerships—using locally based
staff to build understanding of local
business sectors.
• Build relationships with other
Government departments, especially
with the Department for Business and
Trade and the Department for Science,
Innovation and Technology. This should
include delivering the Defence Industrial
Strategy and ‘Scan’ activities under the
AI Opportunities Action Plan.
• Pivot to ‘outcomes-based’ partnerships
with:
° Startups, scale-ups, and spinouts,
creating the current and next waves
of technology products and services.
° Innovation organisations, private
equity, venture capital, and other
investors within the UK and NATO
member states.
57
Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

A new partnership
with industry
12. Under the NAD’s leadership and the
forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy,
Defence must overhaul its acquisition
processes to improve productivity
and create a new partnership with
industry, moving away from the
customer-vendor relationship and
creating the conditions under which
high-IP companies can scale and grow.
This requires a more intelligent approach:
• Engaging industry early in the
procurement process on desired
outcomes and problem-solving.
• Ensuring that suppliers are rewarded
for their productivity and for taking
greater risk in their investments.
• Removing barriers to collaboration,
especially for smaller companies.
13. At the heart of this partnership should
be a segmented approach to
procurement
53
53 A nnounced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in March 2025. Spring Statement 2025, p. 36 – GOV.UK.
(Figure 5) that builds
on the Integrated Procurement Model54
54 The Integrated Procurement Model – GOV.UK, launched in April 2024, seeks to accelerate the delivery of
military capability across the Armed Forces.
and recent changes to the Defence
Equipment & Support Operating Model.
Segmentation would increase the
range of suppliers available to Defence
by tailoring processes and timelines
to the type of acquisition, supplier,
and risk involved. Protecting the budget
for rapid commercial exploitation
(the third segment) would ensure that
high-tempo innovation is not squeezed
out by investment in major platforms,
more reliably unlocking private finance.55
55 A cquisition processes for the ‘rapid commercial exploitation’ segment should build on the experience of the
Future Capability Team in Defence Equipment & Support.
Commercial practices must be updated
through routine use of more flexible,
evergreen contracts.
56
56 A n ‘evergreen’ contract automatically renews itself after the deadline or expiration date. For software
procurement, the Commercial X approach—using a new framework to accelerate procurement for
micro or small business—could be scaled up to enable a faster cycle of testing and development before
buying at scale.
Routine access
to digital twins57
57 A di gital twin is a virtual representation of an object or system that accurately reflects the physical
object. It is updated using real-time data. The digital twins, models, and data should adhere to standards
defined by the MOD’s Chief Information Officer (Chapter 4.1).
and predictive models
(simulations) would also reduce the time
from concept to delivery.
14. Service-agnostic capability portfolios
that pool funding and expertise for
technology areas would further support
agile procurement and embed common
standards across the Integrated Force.
In-year funding flexibility would allow
the NAD to move resources where they
were most needed within a portfolio. The
costs and processes for both acquisition
and through-life support should be
incorporated into each portfolio to ensure
affordability and improve readiness.
58
Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

Figure 5Market segmentation for smarter procurement
59
Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

Bolstering exports and
capability partnerships
15. If we fight together, we should build
together. It is no longer affordable for
NATO Allies, especially within Europe, to
develop their own exquisite capabilities
at low production volumes. The existence
of more than 165 land platforms across
NATO illustrates the scale of the problem.
Defence exports and international
capability partnerships—such as
AUKUS and the Global Combat Air
Programme (Box 8)—provide a potential
solution, offering economies of scale
and mass, new paths to innovation and
economic growth, interoperability with
allies, and a stronger collective defence
industrial base. They underpin the UK’s
relationships and ultimately strengthen
collective security (Chapter 5).
16. Exports and capability partnerships
must be considered in procurement
decisions from the outset. A new
approach to exports will drive the UK’s
market share, boost capabilities, and
strengthen growth. Most importantly,
it will underpin the long-term health of
the defence sector. Defence exports are
about more than just trade undertaken
by private companies. Success is based
on long-term relationships between
Governments and militaries. The MOD
must once again assume responsibility
for developing both the capabilities
for export and the relationships that
underpin them. To enhance export
opportunities, the UK should develop
a new framework for an enhanced
government-to-government mechanism
alongside ongoing, post-sale
military-to-military collaboration.
The National Armaments Director must
have the ability to increase coordination
and collaboration with allies (in and
outside NATO), including through
agreeing common standards and
greater collaboration on R&D.
Box 8: International collaboration in action: AUKUS and the Global Combat Air
Programme (GCAP)
AUKUS and GCAP will deliver next-generation capabilities for the UK Armed Forces
through collaboration with close allies. Under AUKUS, Australia, the UK, and the US will
develop conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines that are interchangeable,
as well as advanced technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, autonomous systems,
cyber, hypersonic missiles, and underwater warfare. Under GCAP, Italy, Japan, and
the UK will develop a sixth-generation aircraft—part of the Future Combat Air System,
comprising crewed aircraft, uncrewed platforms, next-generation weapons, networks,
and data-sharing.
But these programmes deliver more than cutting-edge military capabilities. It is estimated
that, at its peak, the AUKUS attack submarine programme will have more than 21,000
people working on it at UK sites, with the work generating an additional 7,000 skilled
roles. The AUKUS nations’ ITAR exemption and reciprocal export control arrangements
by the UK and Australia have had a beneficial impact in enabling allies to collaborate.
GCAP supports over 3,500 UK jobs, sustaining a skilled workforce for the UK’s combat
air industry.
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Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

Robust prioritisation in
acquisition decisions
17. A robust Balance of Investments
(BOI) process is vital if the MOD is to
prioritise capabilities for acquisition
effectively, making trade-offs between
departmental objectives. To ensure
the new Defence Investment Plan
(the successor to the Equipment
Plan) is genuinely affordable, the BOI
process should consider associated
costs—for example, through-life
upgrades, acquisition and support,
and attendant changes to infrastructure.
When assessing potential investments,
the Secretary of State must have
access to assured data as well as
detailed analysis of through-life costings
and the affordability of the proposed
capability within the overall Defence
portfolio. Authority for deletions from the
programme should rest with the National
Armaments Director in conjunction with
the Service Chiefs, providing combined
advice to the Secretary of State.
Recommendations:
6. To boost private investment in the defence and dual-use technology sectors, and to
support new entrants and innovation, the MOD should develop a dedicated strategy
for the financial services sector by March 2026. Important starting points include:
establishing a Defence Investors’ Advisory Group whose membership includes
venture capital and private equity investors; and exploring alternative funding and
financing models for Defence programmes and projects.
7. By December 2025, the MOD should establish a revitalised system for science
and technology and innovation that more directly responds to the annual problem
set provided by the MSHQ to the National Armaments Director (NAD). The MOD
should reorganise existing structures into two new organisations under the National
Armaments Director Group:
• A Defence Research and Evaluation organisation, focused on enabling external
early-stage research. Highly expert Defence researchers should serve as
affiliated faculty to partner universities, starting in the 2026–27 academic year.
• The UK Defence Innovation organisation, focused on harnessing commercial
innovation, including dual-use technologies.
These two organisations should work in collaboration with the Chief Scientific
Adviser. The NAD should set ambitious targets for pull through and scaling, reporting
quarterly to the Secretary of State on these efforts.
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Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

Recommendations8. The MOD must establish a new partnership with industry that maximises internal
and industrial expertise, accelerates acquisition processes, manages risk and cost,
and engages a wider set of suppliers. Greater agility and productivity should be
delivered through service-agnostic capability portfolios and a segmented approach
to procurement:
• Major modular platforms (contracting within two years).
• Pace-setting spiral and modular upgrades (contracting within a year).
• Rapid commercial exploitation (contracting within three months). This segment
should benefit from protected funding, with at least 10% of the MOD’s
equipment procurement budget spent on novel technologies each year.
58
58 Spring Statement 2025, p. 18 – GOV.UK.
This new approach to market segmentation and capability portfolios should be
established by March 2026.
9. To ensure long-term accountability for delivery:
• Two productivity Key Performance Indicators should be agreed for the National
Armaments Director—one focused on departmental productivity (for which
accountability should be shared with the Chief of the Defence Staff), and one
externally focused on supply chain productivity.
• Senior Responsible Owners of service-agnostic capability portfolios and
acquisition programmes for major modular platforms should remain in post for
at least five years, without disadvantage to promotion.
10. By April 2026, the MOD should develop a package of support for its industrial
partners that removes barriers to collaboration and drives better, more
cost-effective results: reducing by at least 50% the burden of Defence Standards
and Conditions; working across Government to amend the Single Source Contract
Regulations; reforming regulations, Intellectual Property handling, and security
clearance requirements; and providing access to intelligence, data, and test
and evaluation sites.
11. The MOD should establish a mechanism for assessing the full implications of
largescale capability partnerships with allies, including in NATO. This should
be supported by a multilateral capability plan with NATO Allies that identifies
capabilities for joint procurement, agrees common standards, and drives
interoperability. Delivery would be enhanced by mutual recognition of well-founded
test and evaluation regimes across the Alliance, saving time and money.
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Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

Recommendations12. The UK must establish the necessary conditions for boosting defence exports
and joint capability partnerships under the leadership of the National Armaments
Director. This should include:
• Clear governance, accountability, and streamlined processes. Responsibility
for UK Defence and Security Exports should be transferred from the
Department for Business and Trade to the MOD. The MOD should coordinate
with other relevant departments to achieve its export goals.
• A new framework for building and sustaining government-to-government
relationships, including through ongoing military-to-military collaboration, with a
view to delivering export opportunities for UK businesses.
• A review of export licensing policies. This should include considering how to
improve prioritisation and provide clarity to industry and international partners.
13. The MOD must have a robust Balance of Investment process in which the
Secretary of State has access to detailed analysis of through-life costings and
the affordability of the proposed capability within the overall Defence portfolio.
To support this:
• The MOD’s Cost Assurance and Analysis Service must have ‘open book’
access to data and the authority and independence to provide regular advice to
Ministers, including on overall budget affordability.
• The MOD must digitise acquisition and support processes as soon as
funding allows.
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Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth

4.3 ‘One Defence’: People,
Training, and Education
1. People are fundamental to UK
Defence and to delivering the
transformation set out in this Review.
Defence has, in many ways, a good offer:
compelling starting salaries, purposeful
work, skills training and education,
prestige, and the opportunity to see
the world. The Armed Forces are rightly
respected for their skill, professionalism,
and dedication worldwide. At a time
when strategic depth in the Defence
workforce is increasingly important
to deterrence, it must now meet the
longstanding challenge of recruiting and
retaining new generations with different
requirements—a challenge shared by
many UK allies and partners. Defence
must also free its workforce from the red
tape and risk aversion that inhibits action
at all levels of the organisation.
2. Initiatives underway within the MOD
are an important start in addressing
these challenges. To succeed,
however, Defence must be more
radical in unleashing innovation and
productivity in pursuit of its central
purpose: to deter through being ready
to fight and win wars. This chapter takes
existing initiatives as its starting point.
Its recommendations are aligned with
the goals of the 2023 Haythornthwaite
Review
59
59 ‘Agency and agility: Incentivising people in a new era’, 2023 – GOV.UK.
but are the priority for catalytic
change in creating a ‘One Defence’
approach to people, training,
and education.
High-level workforce
planning and development
3. Defence needs a dynamic ‘blend’ of
Regulars, Reserves, and civil servants
to give it the mix of skills, experience,
and strategic depth required for the
threats of this era. This blend will need
to evolve over time as threats, warfare,
and technology evolve. This demands
high-level workforce planning and
development in support of Defence
outcomes that is ‘whole force’,
outcome-focused, and skills-based:
putting the right people in the right roles
and using the range of tools available to
meet changing need, including through
recruitment and retention efforts, greater
harnessing of industry skills in select
areas, and a focused training and
education offer.
4. To fulfil the roles set out in this Review,
there is no scope for reducing
the number of highly trained and
equipped Regulars across all three
Services, even as the forces move to
a much greater emphasis on autonomy
(Chapter 7). Increasing the total
number of Regular personnel should
be prioritised when funding allows,
likely in the next Parliament. Care and
attention must be given to roles occupied
by Regulars away from the front line.
They deliver these roles with pride and
skill but it potentially weakens UK fighting
strength, allowing operational skills and
training to atrophy.
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‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education

5. The diversity of knowledge, skills,
experience, and behaviours that
Reserves bring from their outside
jobs are an invaluable strength.
We anticipate it will become necessary to
increase the UK’s Active Reserve forces
by at least 20% when funding allows,
most likely in the 2030s. In the meantime,
to restore mass and resilience in a crisis,
Defence must make much better use
of the resources available by urgently
reinvigorating how it engages with the
Strategic Reserve (ex-Regulars who have
a mobilisation obligation, Chapter 6) and
improving recruitment and retention
within the Active Reserves. We support
the MOD’s work to simplify the structures
and types of Reserves, amplify the
visibility and recognition of their roles, and
make it easier to scale specialist skills and
mobilise them en masse if required. To
support this work, the department should:
• Better publicise the ‘specialist’
roles available in the Reserves
(such as lawyers, engineers, and
cyber specialists) and ensure their
capability, skills, and advice are made
available to the whole workforce.
• Protect time, funding, and equipment
for Reserves in the training
programme, gaining efficiencies and
scale by aligning Regular and Reserve
specialisations and roles.
6. Civil servants are central to Defence
outcomes and must be treated as
such. Defence must invest with purpose
in the Civil Service it needs—reshaping the
workforce with a focus on performance,
productivity, and skills. The genuinely
integrated nature of the military and
civilian workforce is a significant
advantage and must not be lost.
7. The opportunity and need to improve
productivity and efficiency cannot be
ignored, however.60
60 T he Government has committed all departments to reducing their administrative budgets by 15% by the
end of the decade. Spring Statement 2025, p. 25 – GOV.UK.
MOD Civil Service
costs should be reduced by at least
10% by 2030. Accelerating efforts
to harness Artificial Intelligence
(AI), automation, and augmentation
technology would enable military
personnel (some 5,000) and civil
servants in roles in Human Resources,
Finance, and Commercial functions
to move into front-line roles and reduce
administrative costs. This will result in a
smaller Defence Civil Service over time
but the focus should be on productivity,
not headcount.
8. Additionally, conducting a baseline
review of all Head Office and Staff
Headquarters roles would identify
which substantially benefit from being
undertaken by military personnel, with a
view to releasing a significant number
to operational roles (in line with the
approach taken by allies and partners).
Service Leavers, employed as Reserves
or civil servants, are a suitable substitute
in the limited areas where military
experience is required and where the use
of technology is not an option.
Fixing recruitment and retention
9. The MOD faces a longstanding
recruitment and retention crisis. Young
people today want different things from
their employers, including more flexibility
and hybrid working. They expect to
change jobs multiple times throughout
their careers. Critically, they also have
fewer connections to the Armed Forces.
There is no quick fix to these challenges.
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‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education

10. Long-term success depends on
reconnecting society with the Armed
Forces and the purpose of Defence,
supported by a Government-led national
conversation (Chapter 6). The work of
the Office for Veterans’ Affairs is key
to connecting positively with society
and recruiting the next generation,
through setting veterans up for success.
This should be supported by targeted
interventions in recruitment and
retention, focusing on initiatives that have
the greatest impact and that attract the
widest possible range of talent.
11. For recruitment, the focus should be
on speed, drastically shortening the
period between applicants expressing
interest and joining. A more modern,
accommodating approach is required,
including through: more flexible medical
and fitness standards, reducing the number
of pre-existing conditions that are a barrier
to entry; and shorter commitments that give
people a flavour of military careers, offering
them a route in while building skills and
experience they can take with them for life.
The Australian military’s ‘gap years’ offers
an exciting model from which to learn.
I was impressed the most by
the people that we’ve met—the
professionalism, dedication, the
passion, and the excitement
they’ve portrayed to us
—Citizens’ Panel member,
HM Naval Base Portsmouth
12. To improve retention, the MOD
must prioritise delivering its ‘flexible
working’ initiative, enabling military
personnel to dial their commitment up
and down throughout their career—a
major shift from current practice. Where
accommodation falls well short of the
standard required, it must be rapidly
improved (Chapter 7.11). Providing
support towards home ownership (paid
off through return of service and in line
with costs for service accommodation)
should also be explored. Policies that
support families—including flexible
working and greater stability in location
and postings—should be embraced.
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‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education

13. In the event of Defence returning to
enduring deployments at scale, pastoral,
practical, and financial support for
families will be fundamental to personnel
retention and should be accounted for
in operational planning.
A culture of empowerment
14. To drive innovation and productivity,
Defence people must be empowered
to deliver, cutting through bureaucracy
and addressing risk aversion. ‘People’
policies must be revised on the
principle of trust. Line managers must
be encouraged to use common-se nse
judgement within a prescribed
framework, rather than codifying strict
entitlements in thousands of pages of
policy. Technology must also play a role,
including in improving counter-fr aud
detection (as in other Government
departments and the private sector).
15. Success relies on creating an
environment in which all people
can develop and deliver. Defence
leadership must do much more to root
out behaviour that is unacceptable and
counterproductive in the workplace:
creating an environment in which victims
are supported and feel willing and able to
report wrongdoing; and fulfilling its duty
of care to those accused of wrongdoing
while allegations are investigated. Where
wrongdoing is proven, there must be
zero tolerance: those who cannot change
their behaviour should be dismissed—
and this must be widely noticed to have
an effect. We welcome the legislation to
create an Armed Forces Commissioner
to improve Service life—as a direct
point of contact for Armed Forces
personnel and their families—and the
n
ew Tri-Service complaints unit for the
Armed Forces.61
61 Fundamental changes to Armed Forces processes to better support Women in UK Defence – GOV.UK ,
18 March 2025.
16. Defence will not get to the heart of
the problem unless the workforce
becomes more representative of society,
harnessing all talents to deliver the
strongest possible workforce.
62
62 For example, women make up only 12% of Regular personnel.
T
he MOD must take a data-led approach
to understand and address the systemic
behavioural, structural, and leadership
problems that currently prevent people
from progressing within, and delivering
for, Defence. Work currently driven in
single Service siloes must be brought
together to make the most of good
ideas. Sustained focus by Ministers
and the Defence Board is needed,
as well as powerful, independent
oversight of delivery, accountable to
the Secretary of State.
An adaptive training and
education system
17. The Defence training and education
system is in many respects highly
effective and well regarded. Institutions
such as the Royal College of Defence
Studies and the military academies
and colleges are leaders in their field.
They continually attract the next global
leaders of defence and national security,
underpinning alliances and partnerships.
Educational centres such as the Defence
Academy offer the opportunity for
military personnel to learn alongside civil
servants and industry representatives,
and to develop technical skills and
technological expertise.
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‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education

18. Defence training and education
should be designed to deliver
innovation at speed, given this is
the difference between victory and
failure in war. Its design should also
ensure Defence trains how it will
fight, with provision based on the
following principles:
• ‘Whole force by default’ to develop
a shared culture and credible
warfighting capability. Where activity
can be delivered by and for ‘One
Defence’ it should be, with single
Service provision only where domain
expertise is paramount.
• NATO First, using NATO’s exercise
programme, doctrine, and planning
process as the basis for UK training
and education. Where there is a valid
argument for exceptionalism, the UK
should seek to influence NATO to
adopt its own approach (noting that
the UK already does more than any
other Ally to develop and maintain
joint doctrine).
• Adapts at pace of changing
warfare and technology, applying
innovations and lessons from
operations to education, doctrine,
and concepts. Current policy
63
63 JS P 822 – Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education
is not geared to truly innovative
training approaches, instead driving
risk-a verse behaviours and levels
of assurance. Addressing this is a
key component of delivering the
innovation cycle (Chapter 4).
19. Training policy must ensure sensible,
managed risks can be taken in
military training, so that they are not
unduly taken on the battlefield instead,
reversing a recent trend towards safety
at all costs. Validation testing must be
used to prepare the commander to win,
incentivising learning through mistakes.
Using NATO-validated standards by
default64
64 R ather than NATO-accredited validation, which will not always be necessary or available.
would free up national training
and exercising to be much more
experimental by reducing the need for
multiple validations. Supplementing live
training with virtual training environments
would also offer greater opportunities
for Regulars and Reserves to learn,
as well as other benefits such as the
ability to test concepts, undertake
mission rehearsal, advance UK and
NATO integration, and increase
export opportunities.
20. Defence should only run training
and education itself when it cannot
be obtained externally at suitable
quality and cost. Further Education
colleges offer potential, while strategic,
outcomes-based partnerships with
universities should bring cutting-edge
research into training and education.
This shift in approach would be aided
by adopting civilian qualifications
and standards where there is a
suitable equivalent in common use—
for example, for air traffic controllers
or paramedics—supplementing them
with military qualifications only where
necessary. This would improve skills
development and the entire people
ecosystem: recruitment and retention;
employment for veterans; zig-zag
careers between Defence and other
sectors; integration with industry; and
mobilisation of the Reserves in the
event of war.
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‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education

Foundational skills for the
Integrated Force
21. Constant innovation across Defence
must be supported by an agile
approach to skills development within
the whole force. Defence must press
on in rolling out a simple but effective
‘Pan-D efence Skills Framework’, 65
65 A n ew ‘whole force’ approach to identifying, defining, and managing the skills of Defence people and
their associated roles.
using
it to link workforce planning to Defence
outcomes (such as improved readiness)
and to enable career mobility. Extending
the Framework to industrial partners
(incentivised through commercial
processes) and the Strategic and Active
Reserves would enable the MOD to
understand where skills are available in
the supply chain, where Defence carries
risk, and where there are solutions.
22. Some skills are foundational
to warfighting and the modern
workplace, essential to implementing the
innovation cycle and becoming a more
intelligent partner to industry. Defence must
invest in the following key skills across
the whole force as a matter of urgency:
• Leadership, which must be taught,
trained, exercised, and rewarded
throughout the system. This is about
creating leaders that adapt, enable
their teams, and reimagine the
organisation, including using AI and
digital technologies.
• Financial, commercial, and
programme management, including
in commissioning and contract and
service management. The pursuit
of professional qualifications should
be encouraged.
• Cyber, ensuring all personnel are
aware of growing cyber risks and
equipped to take essential measures.
• Digital, AI, and data skills, of which
there is a persistent shortage but
an opportunity to lead in NATO if
Defence gets this right. The whole
workforce must be equipped with the
essential skills required. The need
for more specialist skills should be
addressed through the creation of a
Digital Warfighter group (Chapter 4.1).
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‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education

Recommendations14. The MOD must take a ‘whole force’, skills-based approach to workforce planning
to deliver Defence outcomes and meet the evolving requirements of the Integrated
Force over time. In the current strategic and fiscal situation:
• There should be no further reduction in the number of Regulars across the
three Services.
• The number of Active Reserves should be increased by 20% when
funding allows.
• Civil Service costs should be reduced by at least 10% by 2030.
For a truly ‘One Defence’ workforce, the Reserves and civil servants should have
protected access to the necessary funding, time, and equipment for training
alongside Regulars. To maximise existing resources, the MOD should seek to move
all Regular personnel from administrative into front-line roles and should automate at
least 20% of Human Resources, Finance, and Commercial functions by July 2028.
This should be delivered as a minimum first step.
15. To create a workplace where all are empowered to deliver, the MOD must:
• Remove the red tape and excessive bureaucracy created by ‘people’ policy,
process, and assurance. It should rewrite its ‘people’ policies in accordance with
the principle of trust, starting with the top ten by May 2026. Technology should
be used to make day-to-day processes such as claiming expenses and auditing
easier, with positive and efficient user experience a key criterion.
• Develop a plan to prioritise and address the structural, behavioural, and
leadership barriers to the creation of a more representative and meritocratic
workforce that resolutely delivers a more capable warfighting and deterrent
force. This plan should be established by June 2026. Recommendations for
independent oversight of implementation should be made by October 2025.
16. Defence must offer novel ways of entry into the Armed Forces that attract more
people from a wider range of backgrounds, submitting a plan with timelines for
delivery to the Secretary of State by November 2025. Options include:
• Offering shorter commitments that appeal to more of society, including the
MOD’s forthcoming plans for ‘gap years’.
• Developing a series of Tri-Service ‘phase 0’ camps to which applicants can
report within 30 days of expressing initial interest, with suitable recruits offered
roles at the camps’ conclusion.
• Applying medical standards that are tailored to role types, accounting for
advancements in medical treatments and reflecting shorter assumed periods
of service. Terms and conditions can be changed to move liability for some
pre-existing conditions to the applicant, thereby enabling many more who want
to join on those terms to do so.
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‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education

Recommendations17. To aid retention, Defence should explore options to support Service personnel’s
aspirations for home ownership. This would strengthen the bond between those
that serve and the communities that support them. It should be accompanied by
an approach that reduces the frequency with which people must move to new
locations if that is their preference, staying in roles longer or moving to roles in the
same location.
18. To meet the changing needs of the Integrated Force, education must be ‘whole
force by default, single Service by exception’. By the end of 2026, Defence must
establish a career education pathway for the whole force—Regulars, Reserves,
and Civil Service—designed to respond to the changing ways of warfare over time
and with NATO at its heart. To drive integration, the MSHQ should:
• Oversee which personnel undertake key courses at each stage of the
education pathway.
• Direct the delivery of staff training from the Initial Staff Course up, with single
Service input.
• Provide the required integrated elements of single Service courses.
• Own the funding for joint education to remove the incentives for single
Services to ‘opt out’.
19. Training and education must be adaptive to operational lessons, innovation, and
research. The MOD must rewrite the relevant policy by January 2026, empowering
those who deliver training to revise courses at speed and consulting them in the
policy’s design. The department should also:
• Develop a single virtual training environment that is integrated into Defence’s
common digital architecture, drawing on existing resources where this is
beneficial. Procurement programmes must embed a requirement for a synthetic
wrap and virtual training that is good enough to reduce reliance on live training.
• Adopt civilian qualifications and standards where possible and use civilian
providers for education and training where it is available at a similar cost or less.
A review of current standards, qualifications, and in-house training should be
completed by the end of 2025. Where there are significant barriers to progress,
the MOD should work with the Department for Education, other relevant
Government departments, and industry to develop a plan to overcome them.
20. Defence must invest in foundational leadership, financial, commercial, and
technology skills across the civilian and military workforce. This should include:
the flexibility to reward the development of expertise in specialist areas,
including through pay and promotion freedoms; and developing a two-way
secondment programme with a focus on short-term, informal schemes that are
effective and can be delivered quickly. A plan for delivery should be developed
by March 2026.
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‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education

5. Allies and Partners
72

1. Alliances and partnerships are
the bedrock of global stability and
are even more important to the
UK in the context of growing risk
and uncertainty (Chapter 2). They
are essential to the Integrated Force
and the ability to deter, fight, and win:
delivering combined strength through
interoperability; pooling financial and
technological resources to innovate, with
military and economic benefits; building
industrial and supply chain resilience; and
mitigating geographical disadvantages.
2. The UK should bolster collective
security by actively investing in
these relationships, taking as its
starting point the relationships set out
in the next section (‘Defence’s Global
Relationships’) as well as the UK’s
membership of international bodies such
as the UN Security Council, the Group
of 7 (G7), and NATO. Defence has a lot
to offer, from the operational capabilities
of its Armed Forces to its professional
military education establishments. These
efforts should be coordinated with other
departments, most notably the Foreign,
Commonwealth and Development
Office (FCDO), to maximise Defence’s
unique and powerful contribution to the
Government’s ambitions and approach to
international relations. Finite resources
mean the UK cannot be everything
to everyone. Defence will need to
prioritise its approach, informed by the
roles outlined in Chapter 3 and using the
full range of levers available to it.
The United States of America
3. The United States of America (US) is
the UK’s closest defence and security ally,
reflecting a longstanding and common
interest in contributing to global security
in this era of strategic competition. The
US is facing a major strategic challenge,
with two near-pe er nuclear competitors
in the form of China and Russia. The UK
should work with it to maximise the
relationship’s potential as a force
multiplier in renewing deterrence :
modernising their respective military
forces; leveraging the UK’s niche
capabilities and overseas bases;
connecting the Euro-Atlantic with key allies
in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen collective
security in both regions; and building
collective defence industrial capacity.
4. There is enormous potential
for expanding industrial and
technological collaboration with the
US in particular. Bilateral technology
collaboration is already unmatched,
with the UK participating in more
US-l ed technology projects for military
advantage than any other country.66
66 T he UK contributes to more US Coalition Warfare projects and Foreign Comparative Testing with the US
than other countries, in addition to a broad portfolio of multilateral and bilateral technology programmes.
Defence should explore how to boost
the mutual benefits of this investment,
developing deeper collaboration in areas
such as autonomy, Artificial Intelligence
(AI), electromagnetic warfare, modelling,
and simulation. An important channel
for this is AUKUS, which provides a
singular opportunity to develop military
advantage and thriving innovation and
industrial bases with close allies.
NATO Allies in Europe
5. Greater political and military leadership
by European Allies within NATO is the
best way to meet the challenge posed
by Russia. In support of the UK’s NATO
First approach, bilateral agreements
with Allies in Europe are a particularly
powerful tool through which to create
strategic depth, strengthening the
Alliance and stability in the Euro-Atlantic:
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Allies and Partners

• The MOD should build on the 2010
Lancaster House Treaties67
67 Lancaster House Treaties – GOV.UK.
with
France and the landmark 2024 Trinity
House Agreement68
68 Trinity House Agreement – GOV.UK.
with Germany
as the basis for increasingly close
co-op eration: developing shared
outlook, cutting-e dge capabilities,
burden-sharing arrangements, and
industrial capacity and growth.
• The new UK- Poland Treaty will
provide the basis for an even closer
relationship, with the two countries
working together to bolster NATO’s
Eastern Flank, tackle disinformation
and hybrid military threats, and
with defence industrial cooperation
anchored in air defence and complex
weapons cooperation, as well as
the export of Type 31 (Arrowhead)
frigates to Poland.
• The negotiation of a new defence
agreement with Norway, building
on the 2024 Joint Declaration
on the Norwegian-UK Strategic
Partnership, offers potential for
enhancing bilateral interoperability
on NATO’s Northern Flank, as well
as cooperation on protecting critical
undersea infrastructure and countering
hybrid threats.
• The UK should continue to deepen
and adapt its relationship with
Italy—a crucial bilateral partner
on NATO’s Southern Flank and
contributor to security in the
Mediterranean—through the Global
Combat Air Programme, conducted
jointly with Japan, and deepening
interoperability between the two
countries’ Carrier Strike Groups.
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Allies and Partners

• Turkey remains a key NATO and
bilateral Ally for the UK, with strong
military integration and defence
industrial collaboration. As an
influential G20 member located at
the crossroads between the Black
Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East,
and Africa, Turkey is imperative to UK
security interests across Europe and
on NATO’s flanks.
6. Minilateral action with Allies—
especially with the E3, E5, and Joint
Expeditionary Force (JEF)—should
also be used to bolster European
security. Defence should continue
working with its Allies to develop the
JEF as a capable and willing coalition
committed to improving NATO’s
deterrence posture in Northern Europe
and the High North. The goal should be to
generate and embed new approaches to
collective deterrence within the Alliance.
The UK should also consider building
relationships with allies with interests
or capabilities that could add value to
UK Defence and where the UK has a
credible offer to make, such as with
Black Sea NATO Allies.
7. To complement the UK’s NATO First
approach and enhance cooperation
between NATO and the European
Union (EU), the MOD should support
implementation of the UK’s Security
and Defence Partnership with the EU .
The EU is a defence and security actor
of increasing significance, whose
unique regulatory and financial levers
can complement NATO’s role as the
primary guarantor of European security—
as demonstrated by the European
Commission’s recent proposals for the
rearmament of EU member states.69
69 European Commission, ‘Press statement by President von der Leyen on the defence package’,
4 March 2025; Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 , March 2025.
Ukraine
8. This is a once-in-a-generation
inflection point for collective security
in Europe: securing a durable political
settlement in Ukraine that safeguards
its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
future security is essential to deter
Russia from further aggression across
the region. The UK is doubling down on
its support to Ukraine, stepping up its
international leadership, and sustaining
its unprecedented commitment of £3bn
in military support to Ukraine every year
for as long as it takes (Figure 6).
9. The UK should explore further ways
to sustain Ukraine’s defence industrial
capacity and its security—for example,
by increasing joint ventures between
the UK and Ukraine’s defence industries
and, once the immediate conflict is
over, supporting Ukraine in accessing
new markets for its defence industry,
including for servicing and modernising
legacy Soviet equipment in use by
third countries. Defence should also
learn from Ukraine’s extraordinary
experience in land warfare, drone,
and hybrid conflict in developing its
own modern approach to warfighting.
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Allies and Partners

Figure 6UK support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022
Beyond the Euro-Atlantic
10. Defence must work bilaterally
and through NATO to bolster the
capabilities of its allies and partners
in other theatres of importance to
the UK, notably the Middle East and the
Indo-Pacific. This involves a combination
of security assistance, capability
partnerships, and trade. The UK’s
offer should:
• Focus Defence investment in
those relationships that offer
the greatest strategic advantage
without detracting from deterrence
efforts, warfighting, and capability
development in the Euro-Atlantic.
• Be the partner of choice
for exports and capability
partnerships (Chapter 4.2) to
develop next-generation capabilities,
bolster resilience in production
capacity, and secure supply chains.
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Allies and Partners

• Draw on cross-government and
external expertise, especially in
academia and industry. This includes
using small, flexible teams of
military and/or civilian technical
experts to support partners in
specialist areas such as cyber, space,
intelligence, and counter- hybrid
warfare without diverting
operational personnel.
• Use impactful but low-cost
activities that offer a ‘spread
bet’ against unpredictable future
developments by maintaining
understanding of partner countries
and global complexities. Examples
include high-level ministerial
engagements, intelligence-sharing,
export opportunities, training and
education offers, and technology
collaboration. There is great value in
investing in even the thinnest web of
wider relationships so that the UK
can draw on existing collaboration
and partnerships as circumstances
change, supplementing the deeper
and more focused relationships set
out in this chapter.
11. The UK should build on its relationships
in the Middle East, bolstering security
and developing long-term trade
opportunities and technology and
capability partnerships across the region
to further economic growth. The Middle
East is significant to UK security and
prosperity due to its position as an artery
of global trade and its role in global
energy supplies. The UK’s footprint in
the region and increased investment in
strategic defence partnerships supports
the Government’s economic growth
agenda. UK trade with members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
70
70 B ahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
is
currently valued at £57bn a year and
the region accounts for over £5bn in
defence exports each year—the single
largest UK market.
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Allies and Partners