Representation of the People Bill — Written evidence submitted by Professor Justin Fisher (RPB49)

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Evidence to the Public Bill Committee for the Representation of the People Bill
Professor Justin Fisher, Brunel University of London
2nd April 2006

Professor Justin Fisher is a renowned expert on political finance and has published
extensively on the subject. He is a member of the Register of Specialists at the Ministry
of Housing, Communities and Local Government, and provided i nvited advice to the
Rycroft inquiry into foreign financial interference in UK politics in January 2026. He was
an advisor to the Hayden Phillips Review of Party Funding in 2007 and the Committee
on Standards in Public Life reviews of Political Finance in 1998 and 2011. He has worked
extensively on matters of political finance with the Electoral Commission and has
appeared before numerous committees in the House of Commons. House of Lords, and
the Scottish Parliament . He has conducted detailed analyses of political finance
regulations in Poland, the Czech Republic and Georgia on behalf of the Council of
Europe and has also provided invited advice to electoral bodies from the Netherlands,
Japan, Ethiopia, Albania, Ukraine, Kosovo and Tunisia.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The evidence below is structured in three parts: 1) suggested amendments to the
Representation of the People Bill as it was laid; 2) a suggested additional measure for
inclusion; and 3) recommendations arising from the Rycroft Review published on 25th
March.
• The limitation on company donations should be relative to profits generated
after tax in the UK, rather than revenue.
• The stipulations regarding the citizenship of registrable persons having
significant control of a company should be removed.
• The value of party spending limits should be adjusted for inflation every five
years.
• The recommendation of a moratorium on cryptocurrency donations is welcome.
• The recognition of the challenges posed by donations made by overseas voters
is very welcome, but the government should recognise the precedent that the
proposed caps on these donations establish.

1. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

1.1. I welcome the proposed limitation of corporate donations relative to company
activity (Subsection 3ZA) but am of the view that the criterion should be profit
after tax in the UK, rather than revenue. Both measures are auditable (which is a
sensible approach), but the profit criterion as recommended by the Committee

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of Standards in Public Life1 is more defensible as it pertains to available funds
from which a donation may be made, rather than from notional funds.
1.2. The proposals in respect of the citizenship of registrable persons having
significant control of companies making donations are excessive (Section 54E).
The donor is the company, where the key criteria for ‘Britishness’ are that the
company operates in the UK and generates sufficient revenue (or profit) in the
UK.
1.3. Stipulations about the citizenship of registrable persons having significant
control of donating companies represent ‘mission-creep’ in respect of political
finance legislation. So long as the company is operating in, and generating
sufficient revenue/profit, in the UK, the nationality of registrable persons is
irrelevant, since it is not those individuals who are making the donation.
Moreover, it imposes conditions on companies which are unnecessarily
restrictive, since a legitimately politically active company may not potentially
appoint or recruit senior personnel who do not have British citizenship if the
conditions laid out in the Bill are not met.
1.4. Relatedly, the conditions pertaining to registerable persons and shares are
similarly excessive.

2. PROPOSED ADDITION
2.1. I recommend that regular reviews of expenditure limits be implemented
properly to avoid the significant increase observed in advance of the 2024
election.
2.2. Until 2023, the formula determining the national spending limit introduced by
the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (£30,000 per
constituency contested) had never been adjusted for inflation. By 2023, its real
value had fallen by 45%.
2
2.3. The previous failure to adjust party spending limits for inflation also presented a
challenge to a principle PPERA laid out—namely that parties and candidates
should be the principal actors in elections. The rising number of registered non-
party campaigners and associated levels of expenditure put this principle under
threat, where spending limits were not adjusted for inflation.
2.4. The increases implemented in 2023 (from £30,000 per contested constituency to
£54,010) were justified but produced a significant step change in election
expenditure limits, which had the potential to favour a party with the capacity to
expand its fundraising.
2.5. To avoid any potential partisan advantage in the future, it would make good
sense for spending limits to be routinely reviewed (say every five years) and
adjusted for inflation accordingly.

1 Committee on Standards in Public Life (2021) Regulating Election Finance
2 Fisher, Justin (2025) ‘Party Finance. Not a Broken System, But Some Reforms Are Required ’
Political Quarterly 96 (3): 570 -574; Fisher, Justin (2025) ‘Party Finance: Labour Exploits its
Advantage’ Parliamentary Affairs: Britain Votes 2024. 78, Issue Supplement_1: 182–204.

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3. THE RYCROFT REVIEW
3.1. I welcome the recommendations of the Rycroft Review and the government’s
stated intention that the moratorium on cryptocurrency be introduced
immediately.
3.2. I particularly welcome the recognition of the dangers of foreign money
emanating from UK citizens resident abroad. This is a longstanding concern of
mine, on which I have published.3
3.3. My recommendations in a recent paper were that, as a first step, information
about donations made by UK citizens based abroad be collected by the Electoral
Commission and published, provided the donations exceed the thresholds
applied for UK donations (i.e. £11,180). I remain of the view that this should be
the case for all such donations, so that the principle of transparency is applied to
all overseas donations.
3.4. The proposal for a cap of £100,000 on donations made by UK citizens based
abroad is a radical one, which has seemingly attracted widespread support.
However, I would urge caution in the drafting of relevant legislation. This is for
two reasons:
3.4.1. The first is that the differential treatment of UK citizens (where domestically
based UK citizens’ donations are not subject to a cap, while those of overseas
UK citizens are capped) risks the accusation of a two-tier approach to
citizenship.4 This risk may be defensible, however, and if it is, then there is no
reason why donations by UK citizens should not be banned altogether, thereby
eliminating any risk arising from donations made by citizens based abroad.
Regardless, if a cap is to remain, the relevant legislation should build in a regular
review such that the value of the cap is not eroded by inflation over time.
3.4.2. The second is that by accepting a cap on these donations, the government is
accepting the principle of a cap on any donation. In principle, I am supportive
of caps on all donations (including individuals, companies and trade unions),
provided that public financial support for eligible political parties is extended to
ensure that political parties are not enfeebled financially. Equally, I acknowledge
that such a change (as proposed by both the Hayden Phillips Review5 and the
2011 Committee on Standards in Public Life Review6) is politically challenging,
particularly in economically difficult times. For that reason, it is important to

3 Fisher, Justin (2023) ‘The regulation of political finance. Choppier waters ahead?’ Institute for
Government / Bennett Institute for Public Policy Review of the UK Constitution. Fisher, Justin (2025) ‘Party
Finance. Not a Broken System, But Some Reforms Are Required ’ Political Quarterly 96 (3): 570-
574; Fisher, Justin (2025) ‘Party Finance: Labour Exploits its Advantage ’ Parliamentary Affairs :
Britain Votes 2024. 78, Issue Supplement_1: 182–204.
4 Fisher, Justin (2023) ‘The regulation of political finance. Choppier waters ahead?’ Institute for
Government / Bennett Institute for Public Policy Review of the UK Constitution. p.8.
5 Phillips, Sir Hayden, (2007) Strengthening Democracy: Fair and Sustainable Funding of Political Parties ,
London: HMSO
6 Committee on Standards in Public Life (2011) Political party finance. Ending the big donor
culture, Cm 8208

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recognise that the imposition of donation caps on overseas voters has wider
implications.