Courts and Tribunals Bill — Further written evidence submitted by Both Parents Matter (CTB35)

Further written evidence submitted by Both Parents Matter (CTB35)

Submitted by national shared parenting charity, Both Parents Matter in relation to
amendments selected and grouped by the Chair for debate in Committee.

Introduction
Both Parents Matter, formerly Families Need Fathers and now in its 52 nd year, is a respected
national shared parenting charity, dedicated to allowing every child the opportunity to
maintain meaningful relationships with both parents and their wider family after separation.
We believe children thrive when they are supported in a loving and stable environment, free
from unnecessary conflict.
Each year, we support thousands of parents and grandparents seeking to sustain positive
involvement in their children’s lives after separation. This support is delivered through our
national helpline, peer-led support groups and online services.
We were a member of the Advisory Group to the Ministry of Justice Review of the
Presumption of Parental Involvement (“the Presumption”) , whose final report (published 22
October 2025 ) set out the Government’s intention to repeal the Presumption. We also
contributed to the introduction of the Presumption in 2014.
Our evidence is grounded in extensive casework, engagement with families and ongoing
dialogue with academics, policymakers and practitioners. We previously submitted written
evidence CTB10 to the Committee , outlining concerns regarding Clause 17 and its repeal of
the Presumption, including the lack of evidential basis for repeal, together with our proposed
amendment to strengthen child welfare assessment.
This second submission outlines our opposition to three amendments selected by the Chair
for debate under “Decisions of courts under the Children Act 1989 (Clause 17)”.
1. Opposition to Proposed Amendment NC16
We oppose amendment NC16 “Protective relocation and presumption of reasonableness”
moved by Jess Brown-Fuller (see Appendix A for the text).
1.1 Undermining of Established Legal Safeguards
This amendment introduces a rebuttable presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child,
whether within the UK or abroad, accompanied by documented advice from an authority or a
support service in the context of domestic abuse, is reasonable and in the child’s best
interests, unless the contrary is shown.
In the case of international or domestic relocation of a child subject to family court
proceedings, existing legal mechanisms already provide robust safeguards. International
relocation is governed by “leave to remove” proceedings, while domestic relocation typically
proceeds via Specific Issue Orders or Prohibited Steps Orders.
These frameworks require a holistic assessment of the child’s best interests, including all

relevant risks. The proposed amendment risks introducing a summary or expedited pathway
that could bypass this comprehensive evaluation.
Such a change would undermine the court’s ability to fully consider the child’s welfare before
a potentially irreversible decision is made. A supporting letter from a domestic abuse
organisation—however well-intentioned—cannot substitute for full judicial scrutiny.
Critically, once a child has been lawfully removed from the jurisdiction under such provisions,
the UK courts may have limited or no ability to revisit or reverse that outcome. The
consequences are therefore not only significant , including potentially significant harm to the
abducted child, but potentially permanent.
1.2 Erosion of Judicial Discretion and Procedural Integrity
Where a Child Arrangements Order is already in place, the court will have considered
allegations of domestic abuse alongside the child’s welfare. Protective measures , including
non-molestation orders, are available and widely used.
Unless it is asserted that the UK’s existing protective framework is inadequate—a position for
which there is no clear evidence —this amendment risks undermining the integrity of
established legal processes. It effectively legitimises unilateral action and risks encouraging
parties to circumvent the courts and “take the law into their own hands”.
1.3 Conflict with International Obligations
International child abduction and wrongful removal are governed by the 1980 Hague
Convention, to which the UK is a signatory. The Convention already provides a structured
framework for assessing risk and determining appropriate outcomes in cases where domestic
abuse is alleged.
Domestic legislation cannot override or conflict with these obligations. The proposed
amendment risks introducing procedures that are incompatible with the Convention,
potentially placing the UK in breach of its international commitments.
2. Opposition to Proposed Amendment NC20
We oppose amendment NC20 “ Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related
presumptions” moved by Jess Brown-Fuller (see Appendix B for the text).
2.1 False Dichotomy Between Forms of Harm
The amendment requires the court to determine domestic abuse allegations before
considering claims of alienating behaviours and that, if the courts find there has been abuse
on the balance of probabilities , that a child’s reluctance to see such parent is presumed a
justified response. This presumption must be rebutted before the court can consider
allegations of alienating behaviour.
The amendment is premised on an artificial dichotomy between allegations of domestic abuse
and allegations of “parental alienation” (now more accurately described in the family justice
system as “alienating behaviours”).

This is a flawed starting point. The statutory guidance to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already
recognises conduct that undermines a child’s relationship with a parent is a potential form of
domestic abuse—both against the parent and the child—falling within controlling or coercive
behaviour and emotional abuse.
In the introduction to its guidance on responding to allegations of alienating behaviours, the
Family Justice Council Guidance”1:
“acknowledges that where found the harm of Alienating Behaviours to a child can be
significant and enduring, akin to other forms of emotional/psychological child abuse.
Alienating Behaviours range in intensity and their impact on children, but these harms can be
far re aching. They can affect a child’s emotional, social and psychological development.
Severed relationships and growing up with a false narrative can also have a harmful impact on
a child’s identity, self-worth and sense of safety in the world. Whilst the foc us here is on the
welfare outcomes for children, it is also important to recognise the very significant emotional
impact on parents of the loss of a relationship with a child.”
The proposed amendment would create a hierarchy of abuse, whereby one form is only
investigated after another is disproven. This is inconsistent with both the realities of family
dynamics and a victim-centred approach to safeguarding.
2.2 Risk of Harm Through Delayed or Incomplete Investigation
By imposing a sequential rather than holistic approach to allegations, the amendment risks
delaying or preventing the proper investigation of harm to both children and parents.
This is particularly concerning given the long -term and often severe impact of alienating
behaviours on children. A system that prioritises one form of harm over another risks leaving
significant abuse unaddressed.
2.3 Removal of Case-by-Case Judicial Assessment
The amendment introduces a rebuttable presumption that a child’s reluctance or refusal to
spend time with a parent is a reasonable and justified response to domestic abuse.
This risks predetermining outcomes and undermining the ability of judges, experts and
practitioners to assess each case on its individual facts. It displaces the established framework
of the Children Act 1989, including the welfare checklist and the paramountcy principle, as
well as the Practice Directions for investigating domestic abuse allegations.
Effective decision-making requires a balanced, evidence -based assessment of all risks, not
presumptions that constrain professional judgement.

2.4 Practical Challenges and Evidential Ambiguity
In practice, Cafcass officers and other professionals are often unable to determine with

1 Family Justice Council Guidance on responding to allegations of alienating behaviour s, December 2024
(introduction, para 6, page 6)

certainty why a child resists contact. The proposed amendment nonetheless imposes a
presumption tied to domestic abuse —without, it should be noted, specifying against whom
that abuse must have been directed.
This creates a risk of conclusions being drawn without sufficient evidential foundation. It
would be equally arbitrary to adopt the inverse presumption—that absent a finding of abuse,
resistance must be due to alienating behaviours.
Neither approach reflects the complexity of family cases.
2.5 Incentivising Allegations and Increasing Delay
The amendment is likely to incentivise the strategic use of allegations —whether pre -
emptively or in response to claims of alienating behaviour. This risks increasing conflict,
prolonging proceedings and placing additional strain on already overburdened courts.
Most importantly, it risks children being unnecessarily excluded from relationships with a
parent, not on the basis of substantiated risk, but due to procedural distortions driven by
adversarial dynamics.
3. Opposition to Proposed Amendment NC31
We oppose amendment NC 31 “Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related
presumptions” moved by Alison Hume (see Appendix C for the text).
3.1 Removal of Case-by-Case Judicial Assessment
The amendment introduces a rebuttable presumption that a child’s reluctance or refusal to
spend time with a pa rent is a reasonable and justified response where the child, or a party
representing the child, has made an allegation of domestic abuse against such parent.
There may be several reasons why a child may be reluctant or refuse to sp end time with a
parent, including, amongst others, harmful parenting , alignment with the other parent ,
concern about practical arrangements or because of alienating behaviours by the other
parent. Where the child makes an allegation of abuse in the family court, it is for judges,
experts and practitioners to investigate and assess the allegation , within the risk -based
statutory framework, in to assess the risk and the best welfare outcome for the child. One of
the main features o f the Government’s Child Focused Courts program is for such an
assessment to be made at the earliest opportunity with a multi -agency approach. The
amendment risks constraining such professional investigation, which may have otherwise
concluded that the allegation results from undue influence and alienating behaviours of the
other parent . Instead, the onus is on the accused party to prove , on the balance of
probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to any form
of domestic abuse, despite the fact that no domestic abuse has been found.

3.2 Increased risk to the child of alienating behaviours
For a parent inclined to influence a child to prevent them spending time with the other parent

when no risk exists, the amendment provides a perfect incentive. Such a parent can influence
the child to make an unfounded allegation of abuse against the other parent and this, and
other instances of alienating beha viours, cannot then be investigated until the other par ent
has proven any reluctance of the alienated child to spend ti me with them is not due to any
form of abuse. This will likely increase delay and conflict in the family court system, delay in
which the rupturing of the child’s relationship with the accused parent becomes more likely,
and runs counter to the key aim of early intervention of the Child Focused Courts.
This amendment risks increased weoponising of children in high-conflict cases where no risk
exists and for such alienating behaviours to cause significant and long-term harm to the child.
Conclusion
Both Parents Matter strongly opposes these amendments. While we recognise the vital
importance of safeguarding children and victims of domestic abuse and support initiatives to
achieve this, these proposals instead risk undermining well -established legal principles and
processes to that end, weakening judicial discretion and introducing unintended harms.
The family justice system must remain grounded in evidence -based, case-by-case decision-
making, with the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration. Legislative changes that
introduce rigid presumptions or bypass thorough judicial scrutiny risk comprom ising that
objective.
20 April 2026

Appendix A – NC16

Jess Brown-Fuller NC16

To move the following Clause-

“Protective relocation and presumption of reasonableness

(1) This section applies to family proceedings in which—
(a) a parent (“the relocating parent”) has relocated, or proposes to relocate, with a child; and
(b) it is alleged that such relocation has adversely affected, or is intended to affect, the
child’s relationship with another party.
(2) Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in
consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a
relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was
reasonable and in the best interests of the child.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), “documented advice” includes advice, guidance, or
referral from—
(a) a police force;
(b) a local authority exercising social services functions;
(c) a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC); or
(d) an Independent Domestic Violence Adviser (IDVA) or equivalent specialist support
service.
(4) The presumption in subsection (2) can be rebutted if the other party demonstrates, on the
balance of probabilities, that the relocation is not reasonable or not in the best interests of
the child.
(5) In determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, the court must have regard to—
(a) the nature and impact of the domestic abuse;
(b) the circumstances in which the advice or referral was given; and
(c) the welfare of the child as the court’s paramount consideration.
(6) The court may disapply the presumption in subsection (2) where it is satisfied that—
(a) the evidential basis for the documented advice is insufficient; or
(b) it is otherwise necessary to do so in order to safeguard and promote the welfare of the
child.
(7) In this section—
(a) domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;
(b) “child” means a person under the age of 18;
(c) “family proceedings” has the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause introduces a rebuttable presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child, undertaken in reliance
on documented advice from authorities or support services in the context of domestic abuse, is reasonable and in the
child’s best interests, unless the contrary is shown.

Appendix B – NC20

Jess Brown-Fuller NC20

To move the following Clause-

“Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions
(1) This section applies in family proceedings in which—
(a) party A alleges that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse, and
(b) the court is invited to consider whether a party A has engaged in conduct intended, or
having the effect of, undermining a child’s relationship with another party.
(2) Where this section applies, the court must determine, as a preliminary issue, any allegation
of domestic abuse before considering any allegation falling within subsection (1)(b).
(3) The court must treat the determination of allegations of domestic abuse as a matter of priority
and, so much as reasonably practicable, must not proceed to determine any issue relating to
the child’s relationship with either party until such allegations have been determined.
(4) Where the court finds, on the balance of probabilities, that party B has perpetrated
domestic abuse against another party or the child—
(a) there shall be a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by the child to
spend time with party B constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the
domestic abuse; and
(b) the court must not consider any allegation that party A has engaged in conduct
falling within subsection (1)(b) unless satisfied that the presumption in paragraph
(a) has been rebutted.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4)(b), the presumption may be rebutted only where party B
demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be
reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.
(6) Subsections (2) to (5) apply only where the allegation of domestic abuse meets such
minimum evidential threshold as may be prescribed by rules of court.
(7) Notwithstanding the above, the court may disapply the presumption in subsection (4)(a),
or the requirement in subsection (2), where it is satisfied that to do so is necessary to
secure the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration.
(8) In this section—
(a) domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act
2021;
(b) references to a child are to a person under the age of 18;
(c) references to “family proceedings” have the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the
Courts Act 2003.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause requires courts to determine domestic abuse allegations before considering claims of parental
alienation. If abuse is proven, a child’s reluctance to see the abusive parent is presumed a justified response. This
presumption must be rebutted before the court can entertain allegations of alienating behaviour against the
protective parent.

Appendix C – NC31

Alison Hume NC31

To move the following Clause—

“Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions

(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by a child to spend time
with a party against whom the child, or a party representing the child, has made allegations of
domestic abuse constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse.

(2)The presumption in subsection (1) may be rebutted only where the accused party
demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be
reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.”

Member's explanatory statement
This new clause provides that, in family court, where a child refuses or is reluctant to spend time with one
party as a result of an allegation against that party of domestic abuse against the child, the court must
presume the reluctance or refusal is reasonable.